Re Sarabia Glen Genovia
Read the full judgment text of CACV 351/2023 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 8 February 2024.
1. This is an appeal against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“ Judge ”) on 2 November 2023 refusing to grant leave for judicial review (“ Judge’s Decision ”). The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) given on 18 April 2019 (“ Board’s Decision ”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) of his
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CACV 351/2023, [2024] HKCA 143 On Appeal from [2023] HKCFI 2672 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 351 OF 2023 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1138 OF 2019) ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“Judge”) on 2 November 2023 refusing to grant leave for judicial review (“Judge’s Decision”). The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) given on 18 April 2019 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 22 March 2018 (“Director’s Decision”). Bases and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The bases of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of the Philippines, are fears of being harmed or killed by (1) the boyfriend (“Boyfriend”) of the applicant’s separated wife and (2) by a childhood friend known as Arman Mayormente (“Arman”). 3.The two incidents, which allegedly gave rise to the applicant’s claimed fears and which eventually led to his leaving the Philippines to seek non-refoulment protection in Hong Kong in 2015, both occurred in 2003. The two incidents have been set out in paragraph 6 of the Director’s Decision, paragraphs 7 to 9 of the Board’s Decision and [5] of the Judge’s Decision embodied in the Form CALL-1 [2023] HKCFI 2672 (“Form CALL-1”):
4.In fear of the Boyfriend, the plaintiff moved to Manila in 2003 after he was discharged from hospital. From 2008 to 2011, he worked in Saudi Arabia. Upon completing his work in 2011, he returned to Manila where he stayed until 2015 when he left for Hong Kong. In the 12 odd years running from the occurrence of the two incidents in 2003 until he left the Philippines for Hong Kong in 2015, the applicant had never encountered the Boyfriend or Arman again. Entry into Hong Kong and lodgement of NRF Claim 5.The applicant left the Philippines and entered Hong Kong on 24 October 2015. He was permitted to stay as a visitor until 7 November 2015. He did not depart on or before 7 November 2015 and has been overstaying since 8 November 2015. On 13 January 2016, he surrendered himself to the Immigration Department. 6.He lodged the NRF Claim on 10 April 2017. Director’s Decision 7.After considering the information provided by the applicant in his non-refoulement claim form dated 31 January 2018 and at the screening interview with the Director’s representative(s) on 23 February 2018, at which time the applicant was legally advised and represented by the Duty Lawyer Service, the Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under all the 4 applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4]. 8.To sum up, the Director found:
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 9.The applicant appealed to the Board. 10.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 11 March 2019, which the applicant attended to give evidence and answer the Board’s questions through an English/Tagalog interpreter. 11.The Board dismissed the appeal on all 4 applicable grounds. The Board found that:
Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 1138/2019 on 29 April 2019, the applicant applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The applicant did not request an oral hearing and the leave application was disposed of by the Judge on paper. 13.The applicant did not state any proposed grounds in the Form 86. The proposed grounds as stated in the supporting affirmation is summarized by the Judge at [12] of the Judge’s Decision as follows:
14.The Judge refused to grant leave for the reasons stated at [13] – [18]:
Appeal to Court of Appeal - grounds of appeal and submissions 15.By the notice of appeal filed herein on 8 November 2023, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review, on the ground that he does not want to go home yet because his life is still in danger. 16.In his written submission dated 29 December 2023, he said:
17.The applicant did not appear at the hearing of the appeal on 30 January 2024, despite having been given notice of the date and time of the hearing. This judgment is therefore based on the written material before the court. Discussion 18.In view of the manner in which the applicant has conducted the application before the Judge and the appeal before us, we can dispose of this matter shortly. 19.First, the role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Nor could an applicant rely on material which has not been produced before the Board or the Director to contend that they had erred in not taking such material into account unless the decision makers have a positive duty to elicit such materials on their own volition. See Nupur Mst Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)] and [14(5)]. 20.Second, an appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board (or that of the Director) afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance, which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal shall interfere if and only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst Director of Immigration at [14(2)] and [14(4)]. 21.The applicant’s proposed grounds for review as set out in the supporting affirmation are either bare assertions of the Board’s failure to consider matters the assessment of which rests with the Board, or matters which were not raised before the Board at all. The applicant did not identify any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in dismissing his appeal against the Director’s Decision. 22.That being the case, the applicant’s proposed judicial review would have been hopeless and leave was rightly refused. In such circumstance, we cannot see how it can be contended that the Judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. 23.Nor did the applicant identify in the notice of appeal or written submission before us any of the said bases upon which the Court of Appeal can disturb the Judge’s Decision. Clearly the Court of Appeal should not entertain the newly raised matters concerning his creditors (the relevance of which is questionable anyway). The assertions that the Director did not believe him and the Board had made errors are devoid of particulars. The allegation that the Judge’s Decision did not consider all the points raised by the applicant was plainly untrue. It was also appropriate to dispose of the leave application without an oral hearing given that the applicant did not ask for one. 24.In any event, we have anxiously examined the Board’s Decision and the Judge’s Decision and are satisfied that both are in order. Disposition 25.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented and absent [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”), which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383) (“HKBORO”). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered (“CIDTP”) by article 3 of s 8 of the HKBORO. |
Cases cited in this judgment