Do Thi Ha v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2209/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 March 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 October 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 198 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
|
HCAL 2209/2023 [2024] HKCFI 633 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2209 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 October 2023 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 198 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 15 January 2024. 4.The applicant admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her application for subsequent claim. The procedural history 5.The applicant is a national of Vietnam, aged 63. She entered Hong Kong illegally on 29 September 2008 and surrendered herself to the Immigration Department on 1 September 2014. She lodged a non-refoulement claim by written signification on the same date. 6.Her non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department was on the grounds of Torture risk under Part VIIC of the Ordinance, BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 7.Her claim was rejected by the Director by Notice of Decision dated 23 December 2016 on all applicable grounds. 8.She appealed to the Torture Claims Board. By Decision dated 9 August 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal. 9.She applied for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 18 November 2021. 10.She pursued her applications in the High Court and all the way to the Court of Final Appeal. Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is still pending. 11.She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 27 June 2023. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 13.The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her creditor. 14.The Director found that her previous claim was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. 15.The Board considered the applicant’s evidence. It accepted that the applicant was indebted to the creditor. However, it found that it was a private monetary dealing between herself and the creditor and there had not been physical injuries to the applicant. In any event, state protection and internal relocation were both available to her. It therefore found that the applicant failed to establish that she had real and genuine fear of risk of harm and death if she returned to Vietnam. 16.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 17.The immigration officer considered the applicant’s statement and further materials. He found that the applicant relied upon the same fear in her previous claim, which had been considered and rejected. 18.The Director did not accept that there was significant change of circumstances, which, coupled with the material in her previous claim, would give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. Thus, he refused her application for the subsequent claim. 19.In my view, the Director was correct to take that view. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 20.The applicant filed Form 86 dated 11 December 2023 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 21.In support of her application, she attached a copy of the Director’s Decision without raising any specific ground. Discussion 22.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 23.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. 24.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 29.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 7th day of March 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment