Re Baljinder Singh

CACV 287/2023, [2024] HKCA 431

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 6

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 287 OF 2023

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1136 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the court):

1.By a judgment dated 12 January 2024 ([2024] HKCA 6)  (“the Judgment”), this court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Deputy Judge”)  dated 11 September 2023 ([2023] HKCFI 2234), whereby the Deputy Judge refused to grant extension of time and dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.On 8 February 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Judgment.

3.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

4.Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

5.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant complained that this court failed to apply the principles of procedural fairness and rationality and there were errors of law in the Judgment.  The applicant further complained that the decision maker failed to consider all aspects of his case and that actual life situation was different from those in the Country of Origin information.  In his supporting affirmation, the applicant craved leave to file his Notice of Motion out of time as he was unaware of the rules regarding the 14-day time limit and that he was unrepresented.

6.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 21 February 2024.  In those submissions, he cited various legal authorities on the principles of high standard of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness and alleged that the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner.  However, these were all general and vague allegations and the applicant failed to condescend upon particulars.

7.In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merits.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are essentially a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [9] - [16] of the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  More importantly, he fails to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

8.For completeness, the applicant is also mistaken in relation to his request for leave to file his Notice of Motion out of time as the time limit for filing such application is 28 days instead of 14 days.  Accordingly, his application was filed within time.

9.Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

10.Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

11.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person