Wisdom Wealth Resources Investment Holding Group Ltd and Others v. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 412/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 June 2024.
1. In these proceedings, the Applicants seek leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the 2 February 2024 decision (“LRC Decision”) made by the Listing Review Committee (“LRC”) of the Putative Respondent (“Exchange”) in disciplinary proceedings.
Cited by 12 cases · Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 412/2024 [2024] HKCFI 1570 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 412 OF 2024 ________________________
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_________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.In these proceedings, the Applicants seek leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the 2 February 2024 decision (“LRC Decision”) made by the Listing Review Committee (“LRC”) of the Putative Respondent (“Exchange”) in disciplinary proceedings. 2.The Applicants are the listed company Wisdom Wealth Resources Investment Holding Group Ltd (“Company”) and 10 of its directors (“Relevant Directors”). The disciplinary proceedings related to the Company’s reliance on and public disclosure in relation to valuations of certain land parcels (“Land”) owned by it on Donghai Island, Zhanjiang City, Guangdong Province, PRC. The relevant events took place in 2018 and 2019. 3.The LRC Decision partly upheld the earlier decision (“LC decision”) of the Listing Committee (“LC”), and held that the Applicants had breached Rule 2.13(2) and Rule 3.08 of the Listing Rules, and that the Relevant Directors had breached their Directors’ undertakings. The LRC Decision decided that the Applicants should be sanctioned by a public statement involving criticism, and the Relevant Directors were required to undergo training. 4.I gave directions for the matter to come to a rolled-up hearing on 14 June 2024. At that hearing, the Applicants were represented by Mr Jeffrey Tam and Ms Yvonne Leung of Counsel, and the Exchange was represented by Mr Victor Dawes SC leading Mr Joshua Chan of Counsel. 5.At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision to be handed down. This is my Decision. B. Factual Background 6.The Company is a company incorporated in Bermuda, and listed on the Main Board of the Exchange. Amongst its principal areas of business was property investment. 7.On 28 February 2018, the Company completed the acquisition of the company holding the Land, from Dr Hui Chi Ming, the controlling shareholder and an executive director of the Company. The acquisition price was RMB 1.1 billion. 8.On 26 January 2018, the Company published a Circular for the purposes of satisfying the disclosure requirements in respect of that acquisition. The Circular included the valuation of the Land obtained from Malcolm & Associates Appraisal Ltd (“Malcolm”). Malcolm stated that it had valued the Land using the direct comparison method and set out seven comparables it had used for the purpose of the valuation. 9.The valuation of the Land given was RMB 1.15 billion, with a valuation date of 15 December 2017 (“1st Valuation”). 10.On or around 18 June 2018, the Company engaged Malcolm to provide a valuation in respect of the Land in preparation for its 2018 Interim Results. Malcolm stated the valuation method was the market comparison approach and the income approach, with reliance placed upon the same seven comparables referred to in the 1st Valuation. 11.The valuation of the Land given was RMB 8 billion, with a valuation date of 30 June 2018 (“2nd Valuation”). 12.On 20 July 2018, the Company issued a positive profit alert. It stated that the anticipated increase in net profits was mainly due to appreciation on the Group’s investment properties in the PRC. 13.The 2018 Interim Results were published on 31 July 2018, following an audit committee meeting and board meeting (“July 2018 Meetings”) held on the same date. Both the 2018 Interim Results and the 2018 Interim Report (issued on 31 August 2018) incorporated the 2nd Valuation and stated the Land was valued at RMB 8 billion. The “Notes to the Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements” provided that:
14.However, no explanation was given as to why the valuation of the Land had apparently increased by more than 7 times in the roughly 6-month period since 15 December 2017, the valuation date of the 1st Valuation. 15.On or around 4 March 2019, the Company engaged Malcolm to provide a valuation of the Land for the purpose of its 2018 Annual Results. The valuation involved the same parameters and methodology, namely the market comparison and income methods. 16.The valuation of the Land given was RMB 7 billion, with a valuation date of 31 December 2018 (“3rd Valuation”). 17.When preparing the 2018 Annual Results, the Company’s auditor (“Auditor”) raised concerns about the 3rd Valuation, including the reason for the significant increase in value of the Land from the valuation of RMB 1.15 billion given in the Circular, when there were no dramatic changes in market conditions since the previous year. There was resultant delay in publication of the 2018 Annual Results. In response to the Auditor’s concerns, Malcolm prepared another valuation dated 7 April 2019. The valuation methodology was stated again to be the direct comparison method, but the seven comparables relied upon were different. 18.The valuation of the Land given was RMB 3.147 billion, with the same valuation date of 31 December 2018 (“4th Valuation”). 19.The Auditor accepted the 4th Valuation, which the Company adopted in its 2018 Annual Results and the 2018 Annual Report published on 8 and 29 April 2019 respectively. 20.The Company subsequently obtained valuations from other valuers in 2019 and 2020, where the valuations offered ranged from RMB 4 billion to RMB 5.23 billion. C. Investigation and Disciplinary Proceedings 21.In around April 2020, the Listing Division (“LD”) of the Exchange commenced an investigation into the events described above. Enquiries were made by the LD of Malcolm and the Company’s Board of Directors (“Board”). 22.Malcolm sought to explain the fluctuations in value on the basis that the 1st Valuation was a “valuation report” while the 2nd to 4th Valuations involved “calculations of value” based on the parameters and assumptions given by the client – and there were different valuation was adopted. 23.The Board stated it disagreed with Malcolm’s submission that the 2nd to 4th Valuations were not valuations, and stated that it had treated all four valuations as valuations by Malcolm. The Company’s Directors also identified what occurred during the review of the 2nd Valuation at the July 2018 Meetings. Some Directors also gave independent, individual responses. 24.On 5 January 2022, the LD commenced disciplinary proceedings against the Company and each of the Directors. In response, the Company and Directors filed a joint submission on 10 May 2022, raising a number of new points not previously raised during the investigation. Therefore, on 16 June 2022, the Chairman of the LC directed a stay of the disciplinary proceedings at the request of the LD, to permit the LD to conduct further investigations. 25.Those investigations included contacting the Auditor to enquire as to the extent of their involvement in the 2nd Valuation. The Auditor’s solicitors responded stating unequivocally that the Auditor was not intimately involved in the 2nd Valuation and had not given any seal of approval to it. 26.The LC restored the disciplinary proceedings in April 2023. Further submissions and correspondence between the parties ensued. The LD raised a new allegation, namely that the Company and the Board had breached their obligations under, amongst other things, Rule 2.12A by failing to provide accurate and complete information during the investigation. 27.The disciplinary proceedings were held by the LC on 5 September 2023. By the LC Decision given on 11 October 2023, the LC found that: (1) the Company had breached Rule 2.13(2); (2) the Directors had breached Rule 3.08 and their Compliance Undertakings; and (3) the Company and the Directors had also breached Rule 2.12A and their Investigation Undertakings. The LC imposed a public censure on the Company and the Directors, and required the Directors to undergo 17 hours of training. D. The LRC Decision 28.The Company and the Relevant Directors applied to the LRC for review of the LC Decision. Two of the Company’s directors at the time, who had also been subject to the disciplinary action, did not apply to review the LC Decision (and are not parties to these proceedings). 29.The parties filed three rounds of submissions. The review hearing was heard by the LRC on 10 January 2024. The LRC Decision was given on 2 February 2024. 30.In summary, the LRC upheld those parts of the LC Decision relating to the Company’s breach of Rule 2.13(2) and the Directors breach of Rule 3.08 and their Compliance Undertakings. But the LRC was not satisfied that the Company or the Directors had breached Rule 2.12A or their Investigation Undertakings. The LRC also imposed a less severe sanction, namely a public statement involving criticism, instead of a public censure. The LRC maintained the same requirement in respect of directors’ training. 31.The detail of the LRC’s consideration is to be found in the LRC Decision. It is helpful to set out those parts relating to the analysis and conclusions:
E. Grounds of Review 32.The Form 86 identifies three intended grounds of review, being:
33.In his written submissions, Mr Tam (who had not drafted the Form 86) recognised that all intended grounds of review faced the high threshold of Wednesbury unreasonableness. Mr Tam also recognised that Grounds 2 and 3 are essentially the same complaint, namely that the LRC Decision on sanctions is disproportionate and, as a result, irrational in the public law sense. The two grounds were addressed in submissions in one go, and will similarly be addressed together by me. F. Ground 1: Failure to take into account material considerations 34.This Ground 1 has been presented against various legal principles which are not controversial, and which can be found, for example, touched on in my own previous decisions in Tenwow International Holdings Ltd (In Provisional Liquidation) v The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd [2020] HKCFI 2982 at §52; and Fan Ren Da Anthony v The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd [2023] HKCFI 2932 at §76:
35.Though the Form 86 covered more ground, Mr Tam brought his usual more focused approach to his submissions, and focused on two matters which he said were material relevant considerations which the LRC failed to take into account:
36.As to the first point, Mr Tam submitted that the volatility of the PRC property market is well known, and had been addressed in submissions as potentially explaining such a significant increase in the property value between the 1st and 2nd Valuations. But, Mr Tam said, that factor was not listed at §50 of the LRC Decision, and not addressed. 37.As to the second point, Mr Tam submitted that the LRC accepted that the Directors had made enquiries with the CFO of the Company, even if not directly through Malcolm. In those circumstances, their conduct should not be judged with the benefit of hindsight, where (without the benefit of hindsight) it was reasonable for the Directors to place trust and reliance on the expertise of the CFO, Malcolm and the Auditor. Further, the Applicants had made enquiries at the July 2018 Meetings, and the 2nd Applicant had asked about the significant increase in the fair value of the Land in the 2nd Valuation, and was told that the valuation was affected by a list of factors. The 11th Applicant had also made specific enquiries. 38.Mr Dawes criticised these points as being in effect merits challenges, where this Court is not exercising any appellate function. Whilst recognising that this is not a case where the Relevant Directors were acting dishonestly, the focus should be on the LRC’s finding that they ought to have made proper disclosure, but failed to do so. 39.In that regard, I accept Mr Dawes’ submission that the Applicants’ intended challenge is based upon a misunderstanding or misreading of the LRC’s reasoning and analysis. There, the critical concern was with disclosure, and in particular (1) whether the Company had provided sufficient disclosure of the reasons for the significant increase in the purported value of the Land, and (2) whether the Directors had taken adequate steps to ensure that sufficient disclosure was made. This is clear from the LRC Decision, in particular at §§43-44, 46, 48-49 and 52 – where §§46-56 were under the heading ‘Breach relating to the disclosures of the Land’s value’ (see above). 40.As Mr Dawes has correctly submitted, Mr Tam’s submission focuses on whether there were grounds for the Directors to form the view that the 2nd Valuation was reasonable, but those arguments do not directly address or answer – or show to be irrational – the findings made in the LRC Decision that (1) the disclosure by the Company was inadequate because it failed to provide an explanation for the significant increase in value, and (2) the Directors had failed to conduct proper enquiries into how the increase was derived, and to ensure that a proper explanation for the increase was disclosed. 41.The core of the concern leading to the LRC Decision and its conclusion is that there ought to have been a proper and sufficient explanation to the investing public as to how the sudden and enormous increase in value had occurred, or was justified (not least in the context of the positive profit warning which had been given because of it). On that basis, precisely what individual Applicants did in the July 2018 Meetings in perhaps reaching their own state of satisfaction is of less relevance. 42.It also seems to me that it is probably obvious – rather than irrational – to require further information to have been provided as to the reasons for the more than seven-fold increase in the roughly only 6-month interval between the 1st and 2nd Valuations. I also accept that the fact that the Applicants (when responding to the investigation) did not speak with one voice shows that the valuation of the Land was not such a straightforward matter, emphasising the need and importance for public investors to understand the basis for the valuations and the highly significant variation in them. It was not irrational for the LRC to form the view that the various factors relied upon by the Applicants were not all so obvious such that no public disclosure was necessary to the investing public. 43.Proper disclosure is of fundamental importance to the investing public. Without that information, investors cannot ascertain the basis of the figures put forward, leading to an inability to assess whether and to what extent they accept or can rely upon the sudden and significant increase in value. 44.Further, as Mr Dawes has submitted, it is to be noted that the Auditor has denied that it gave any seal of approval in respect of the 2nd Valuation. (Indeed, the Auditor’s later concerns about the slightly lower 3rd Valuation is what led to obtaining the 4th Valuation – at less than half of the value of either the 2nd or 3rd Valuations.) But, even if the Auditor had approved the 2nd Valuation, that is not itself an explanation for the sudden increase in value of the Land, and formed no part of what was disclosed. 45.There is no arguable irrationality in the view that mere market volatility is insufficient explanation or disclosure for the 2nd Valuation. 46.Nor is there any merit in the Applicants’ suggestion that the LRC Decision somehow identified an expectation that they would micro-manage the Company’s business or that their conduct has been judged by hindsight. The enormous difference between the 1st and 2nd Valuations – on their faced reached adopting the same methodology – was absolutely clear at the time, and the need to have obtained and then disclosed more information should also have been obvious. That is not requiring micro-managing; it is simply requiring the proper exercise of powers to obtain and then disclose the appropriate information which was missing. 47.Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. G. Grounds 2 and 3: Disproportionate/Irrational Sanction 48.Obviously, these two intended grounds of review only arise if the Court refuses Ground 1. As already identified, these grounds seek to raise a Wednesbury unreasonableness challenge. Mr Tam invited the Court to intervene on the settled principle that a Court will intervene in a sanction if it is irrational: see, for example, the Fan Ren Da Anthony case at §§110-170. 49.Mr Tam also invited the Court to keep in mind that the focus of attention – when considering oppression, and therefore irrationality, in the public law sense – will principally be on the impact of the decision upon the affected person. The outcome or end-product of the decision-making process will thus be assessed, rather than the way the decision was reached: see ‘De Smith’s Judicial Review’ 9th ed at §6-050. 50.Further, Mr Tam referred to my recent decision in Tam Yuk Fun Toffee v Secretary for the Civil Service [2024] HKCFI 1020, a case in which I was satisfied that the relevant sanction imposed in that case was, in all the circumstances of that case, oppressive. Mr Tam submitted that he relied on that case for the approach taken in it. However, that case was on very different facts from the present case, and in a different context. I do not think the discussion in it significantly adds to the analysis necessary for present purposes. 51.It is well-settled that the question of appropriate sanction is a matter for the LRC, comprised as it is by a range of individuals with experience and expertise in matters relating to the Listing Rules. It can also be noted that the LRC overturned the LC’s decision to publicly censure the Applicants, and instead imposed the lesser sanction of a public statement involving criticism. 52.In essence, Mr Tam’s submissions echoed the submissions made by then Counsel to the LC (and, indeed, those submissions were essentially rehearsed in Mr Tam’s skeleton argument for these proceedings). But there is no reason to think that the LRC had not done what it said it had in the LRC Decision at §61, namely taking particular note of the Applicants’ submissions as to the various factors which they had asserted should be taken into account when considering appropriate sanctions, including the Applicants’ background and compliance history, the Applicants’ intentions at the relevant times, the nature of the misconduct, the absence of a personal advantage or loss to the Company / investors, the corporate culture at the Company and any reputational impact of the sanctions on the Applicants. 53.Further, the LRC went on to explain why it nevertheless considered the sanctions imposed to be the appropriate sanctions to impose. Amongst its reasons were that: (1) complete, accurate and meaningful disclosures are an essential part of providing investors with the information they need, and ensuring a high-quality, fair, and orderly market; (2) notwithstanding the various factors identified by the Applicants, the Applicants’ breaches were sufficiently severe to warrant the imposition of public sanctions; and (3) but finding of no breach of Rule 2.12A and the Directors’ Investigation Undertakings meant the Applicants had not committed a breach which would warrant the imposition of a public censure. 54.As is common ground between the parties, the only potential lesser sanction than that was a private reprimand. Mr Tam has emphasised the “most critical distinction” (his words) between the public or private nature of the sanctions, and submitted that the most distinctive feature between them was not simply whether the sanction is known to the public, but the long-lasting effect that only exists as regards a public sanction. Hence, the Applicants only advocated for the private reprimand option that was available, because it has a material difference from the rest of the other (public) options available. Mr Tam submitted that the LRC Decision must be viewed against the unintentional misconduct which had no or minimal bearing or potential to damage the reputation of the Exchange and/or the integrity of the market. On the other hand, the public sanction would have serious ramifications to the Applicants, especially as they are well-known businessmen and public figures. 55.With respect, on the settled applicable principles, I do not think those submissions identify any reasonably arguable irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness in the LRC Decision relating to sanctions. The rationality is evident from the LRC Decision itself. The fact that the decision might have been to impose the lesser and private sanction option does not seem to me to make it arguably irrational to have imposed the next more serious sanction, where part of its very purpose was to ensure bringing to public attention the importance of the public disclosure requirements, which is a clear and obvious enforcement objective. 56.Grounds 2 and 3 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. H. Result 57.In the circumstances, I refuse the Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review. Even had I granted leave on any ground, I would have dismissed the substantive application. 58.I see no reason why the costs should not follow the event. Therefore, the Applicants shall pay the Exchange’s costs of these proceedings, to be summarily assessed if not agreed. 59.The Exchange has already provided a statement of costs for summary assessment, and the Applicants shall have 14 days within which to file any list of objections. Thereafter, if costs cannot be agreed between parties within the further following 14 days, I shall perform the summary assessment on the papers.
Mr Jeffrey Tam and Ms Yvonne Leung, instructed by O Tse & Co., for the applicants Mr Victor Dawes SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by the MinterEllison LLP, for the putative respondent | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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