Alkassoum Moussa Alfarouk v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 721/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 July 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26 April 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1493 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 721/2024 [2024] HKCFI 1744 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 721 of 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26 April 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1493 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 5 June 2024. Before the Court, the applicant admitted that he had not provided additional materials in support of his application to the immigration officer. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Niger. He entered Hong Kong on 14 July 2015 as a visitor. He overstayed, surrendered to the Immigration Department and lodged a non-refoulement claim on all applicable risks[1] for the reason that he would be harmed or even killed by his uncle over a land dispute if he returns to his country. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 3 March 2017, the Director rejected his claim as they were not substantiated. 6.He appealed to the Board. Having considered his evidence, the Board did not believe his evidence on the facts of his claim. It further found that internal relocation was a viable option for him. 7.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed his application. 8.He applied for leave to appeal against the Court of the First Instance’s decision out of time. The Court of the First Instance refused his application. He pursued the matter further to the Court of Final Appeal, which dismissed his application for leave to appeal on 29 September 2023. 9.By a letter of 13 October 2023, he applied to the Director for a subsequent claim. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 12.By letter of request of 16 November 2023, the immigration officer requested the applicant to provide him with fresh information or document in support of his request on or before 30 November 2023. The letter also informed him that if he failed to comply with the request, his request would be assessed, based on all available information. 13.The applicant failed to supply further information to the immigration officer, who thereupon assessed his application on the available information and found that there had not been significant change of circumstances since the applicant’s previous claim was finally determined. The Director thus refused the applicant’s application for the subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 14.The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 7 March 2024 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 15.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant did not raise any specific ground. Discussion 16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he did not provided further materials in support of his request to the immigration officer. He did not explain why he did not do it. 18.I agree with the immigration officer that there has not been significant change of circumstances, which taken together with the previous claim, will give a realistic prospect of success in his intended subsequent claim. 19.There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 20.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 25.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 26.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 27.RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant. Dated the 18th day of July 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable risks refer to :
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Cases cited in this judgment