Nguyen Thi Chung v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 796/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 22 August 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 2 May 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2688 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 796/2024 [2024] HKCFI 2067 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 796 of 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 2 May 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2688 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 3 July 2024 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam, aged 64. She entered Hong Kong as a visitor on 20 September 2001 and was allowed to stayed as a visitor until 4 October 2001. She overstayed since 5 October 2001. She was repatriated to Vietnam, but she returned to Hong Kong again. She surrendered to the Immigration Department on 20 October 2014 and claimed that she arrived in Hong Kong on 10 October 2014. She raised her non-refoulement claim by way of a written signification on 20 October 2014 on the grounds of all applicable risks[1]. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). By Decision dated 18 October 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed her appeal. 7.She applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application. 8.She appealed and pursued all the way to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her appeal. 9.Her notice of motion against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 24 October 2023. 10.By letters dated 27 November 2023, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 12.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 13.In her previous claim, the applicant claimed that, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her creditor from whom she had borrowed money for the medical expenses of her husband. She also claimed that she would be harmed by her husband, who is a drunkard. 14.The Director rejected her claim and she appealed to the Board. Having considered her evidence, the Board dismissed her appeal as it found that her claim was fabricated. 15.She submitted 6 documents as additional materials in support of her subsequent claim application. 16.Having considered the additional evidence, the immigration officer did not accept that there had been a significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined and such change, if any, when taken together with the materials previously submitted in support of her previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The Director therefore dismissed her application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 17.The applicant filed Form 86 on 20 May 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 18.The applicant has raised the grounds in support of her application.
Discussion 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. 21.The reasons under paragraph 18 are only her personal opinions without any evidence in support. With her admission before the Court, I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 23.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 26.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 27.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 28.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 29.RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the applicant. Dated the 22nd day of August 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] All applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment