Nguyen Tuan Vinh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of CACV 25/2024 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 August 2024.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“ Judge ”) on 8 January 2024 [1] refusing to grant an extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review and refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 13 January 2023. In that decision, the Board upheld the decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”
Cites 8 cases
|
CACV 25/2024, [2024] HKCA 795 On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 122 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 25 OF 2024 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1626 OF 2023) ____________
____________
_________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Hon G Lam JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“Judge”) on 8 January 2024[1] refusing to grant an extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review and refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 13 January 2023. In that decision, the Board upheld the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 6 January 2022 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Vietnam born in 1984. He claimed to have illegally entered Hong Kong from Mainland China on 14 October 2020 and was arrested by police on 14 July 2021. He submitted a written signification indicating his intention to lodge a non-refoulement claim on 23 July 2021. The applicant’s claim was made on the basis that if he returned to Vietnam, the money lender (Luu Dinh Duy) would harm or kill him due to his inability to repay a loan. The factual background of the applicant’s claim was set out at [37] to [74] of the Board’s decision. 3.By notice of decision dated 6 January 2022, the Director assessed the applicant’s claim in relation to all applicable risks and determined it against him. Those grounds are BOR 3 risk,[2] persecution risk,[3] torture risk[4] and BOR 2 risk.[5] 4.The applicant appealed to the Board against the Director’s decision. An oral hearing was held on 24 November 2022, during which the applicant gave evidence and answered questions from the Board. The applicant did not have any experience or knowledge in the business of trading wooden artifacts, and he could not provide any pertinent details about why he would invest substantial capital into a business he was not familiar with. The Board found that it was implausible that the money lender would have lent such a large loan to a rural applicant without any collateral or guarantee and charged a much lesser interest rate than what was common of loan sharks, and that there was inconsistency or conflict between his evidence and the available country of origin information (“COI”). Further, the Board found that the applicant was not a credible witness, because his evidence was sketchy and minimalistic in nature bordering on being bald assertions, he delayed filing his claim for non-refoulement protection, and he lacked documentary support of his assertions. 5.According to the Board’s findings of fact, it found that the applicant did not borrow money from Duy, he did not pay any interest owed, he was not mistreated by the Duy or anyone else, and Duy was a fictitious character. As such, the Board found that the applicant would not face any risk or danger upon returning to Vietnam in the future. For completeness and on the assumption that the applicant’s evidence was accepted, the Board found that there was no risk of harm faced by the applicant upon refoulement to Vietnam, reasonable state protection was available, and internal relocation was a practicable option for the applicant. 6.In conclusion, the Board held that the applicant was not at risk in the event of refoulement to Vietnam. By its written decision dated 13 January 2023, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal in respect of all the applicable grounds and confirmed the Director’s decision. The Judge’s decisions in the court below 7.Long after the time limit of 3 months for applying for leave for judicial review as prescribed by Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), on 13 September 2023, the applicant filed a Form 86 to seek leave from the Court of First Instance to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision. In the Form 86, his grounds of appeal were that the decisions of the Director and the Board were unreasonable and unfair, that the Director failed to give weight to the presence of state acquiescence, that the Board placed too much reliance on COI and failed to take into account the personal background and experience of the applicant, that the Board unreasonably required the applicant to respond to questions that he was not in a position to answer, that the Director showed an unfair attitude by failing to give sufficient weight to the corruption and incompetency of the administration of his country, and that the Board should have allowed the appeal based on its findings. In the accompanying affirmation, he simply annexed the Board’s decision. 8.An oral hearing was held on 8 December 2023, where the applicant was asked questions and was invited to make submissions. The Judge considered the application on the basis of the documents and the applicant’s oral submissions. On 8 January 2024, the Judge issued his decision, refusing to grant extension of time for leave for judicial review and refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review. The reasons were set out in [3] to [5], [17], [20] to [30] of the Form CALL-1 (as amended by Corrigendum dated 24 July 2024) as follows:
Appeal to this Court 9.On 18 January 2024, the applicant filed his Notice of Appeal against the Judge’s decision. His stated grounds of appeal were essentially that his late filing of the application for leave to apply for judicial review was due to being in prison since 28 December 2022, that he was detained and did not have the funds to engage a private lawyer, that he disagreed with the decisions of the Director and the Board as his case was determined unfairly, that the Director and the Board did not fairly take his unique situation into account, and that he did not have legal or language assistance in these legal proceedings. 10.The applicant has given consent in writing for this appeal to be disposed of on paper without an oral hearing, and we shall accordingly determine the appeal on the basis of the available documents and materials. 11.The applicant has not lodged any written submissions as directed by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, but we have considered his “written submissions” attached to his notice of appeal. Discussion 12.In assessing the merits of the appeal, we shall have regard to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. In particular, the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. In the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review. 13.In the present case, the Board found that there was no real risk of harm upon refoulement as alleged, because it found there was no loan procured by the applicant from Duy as alleged, the applicant was never mistreated by Duy as alleged, and Duy was a fictitious character. The Board found that the applicant was not credible and his alleged harm or risk of harm did not exist. These are findings of fact open to the Board based on the evidence it received and for the reasons it gave. As for the ground advanced relating to unfairness of the decisions, it consists of mere general and bald assertions regarding the decision of the Director and the Board without any particulars. They do not constitute viable grounds of appeal: see Re Salim Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244 at [20]. 14.As to the complaints about lack of language and legal assistance, it has also been repeatedly stated by the Court of Appeal that as a matter of law, a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to free legal representation at all stages of the process and that the high standard of fairness required by law does not entail interpretation service being made available to an applicant all the time as he desires: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [18]; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15 at [11] and Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17 at [11]. We note that all the Court documents filed in this appeal and in the Court below were in English. It is thus clear that either the applicant was himself conversant with the English language or he had access to language assistance of his own if he found it necessary. Further, we note that the applicant was legally represented in the initial preparation of his case by the completion of the non-refoulement claim form and screening interview with the Director, which formed the basis of his claim. We do not find the non-availability of legal representation in the processes before the Board or the court to amount to any procedural unfairness. 15.Equally, the applicant has not been able to demonstrate any error in the decision of the Judge or advance any viable ground of appeal against the Judge’s decision. We are not satisfied that there is any error in the Judge’s decision. 16.The applicant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.
The Applicant, unrepresented, acting in person [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115). [5] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment