Brar Sukhwinder Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 895/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 September 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 June 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2832 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 895/2024 [2024] HKCFI 2247 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 895 of 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 3 June 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2832 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 15 July 2024. He admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of India. On two occasions, he attempted to enter Hong Kong but was declined by the Immigration Department because of doubt over his purpose of coming to Hong Kong. On the second attempt on 20 November 2015, upon refusal of entry, he applied for non-refoulement claim, with the assistance of a legal representative. The basis of his claim is that, upon refoulement, he will be harmed or killed by Jagmeet Singh and his friends because he refused to transfer a piece of land to Jagmeet. 5.The Director considered his claim on all applicable risks[1]. In his Notice of Decision, he dismissed his claim on Torture risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk. In his Notice of Further Decision, the Director dismissed his claim on BOR 2 risk. 6.The Director rejected his claim because it was not substantiated. His appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) was dismissed by the Board. The Board dismissed his appeal because it did not accept the applicant’s evidence as to the facts in support of his claim. It further found that the risks were localized and internal relocation was a viable option for him. 7.He applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Court of the First Instance refused his application. He pursued the matter to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal. On 17 August 2022, the Court of Final Appeal dismissed his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. 8.By letter dated 20 November 2023, the applicant applied for subsequent claim. 9.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 10.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realist prospect of success. 11.Through his duty lawyer, he has submitted additional materials in support of his application to the immigration officer. 12.The immigration officer assessed his application on the available information and found that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim application. 13.The immigration officer was not satisfied that there had been a change of circumstances since his previous claim was finally determined and such change, if any, when taken together with the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The Director therefore rejected his application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 14.The applicant has filed Form 86 on 5 June 2024 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 15.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant complained that he did not get justice. He did not raise any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his application for subsequent claim. This shows that the Director was justified to refuse his application for subsequent claim. 18.The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 19.There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 20.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 25.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 26.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 27.RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant. Dated the 10th day of September 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] All applicable risks refer to:
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Cases cited in this judgment