Nurmaisa Pardede v. Director of Immigration
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HCAL 1297/2024 [2024] HKCFI 2626 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1297 OF 2024 _____________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 23 July 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1434 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 16 September 2024 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The procedural history 4.The applicant, aged 38, is a national of Indonesia. She last entered Hong Kong to work as a foreign domestic helper on 28 August 2014. She overstayed since 15 September 2014 and remained unlawfully in Hong Kong until the police arrested her on 6 March 2015. Subsequently, the applicant was released on recognizance and she lodged a non-refoulement claim on 20 February 2018 on the basis that, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her husband, a pathological gambler because she refused to repay his debts. 5.She raised her non-refoulement claim on the grounds of all applicable risks[1] 6.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated. 7.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board dismissed her appeal. The Board found that the applicant’s evidence was not reliable. The Board further found that state protection would be available and internal relocation was viable if she returned to Vietnam. 8.She applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 7 March 2024. 9.By letter dated 21 March 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 11.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 12.The applicant has submitted a statement to the immigration officer through her duty lawyer. Having considered the additional materials in support of her subsequent claim, the immigration officer said at paragraph 11:
13.The Director therefore dismissed her application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 14.The applicant filed Form 86 dated 7 August 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 15.In her affirmation in support of her application, the applicant did not raise any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. 18.There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 19.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 20.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 21.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 22.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 23.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 24.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she wanted protection. 25.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 26.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 27.RPO in terms of paragraph 25 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1]. All applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment