Jarnail Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1440/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 22 October 2024.
1. This application is related to HCAL 1388 of 2022, which is a previous application for subsequent claim by the same applicant. The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refused his application and he applied to this Court for judicial review. By a Court Order dated 10 February 2023, this Court granted leave to the applicant to issue originating summons for judicial review of the Director’s decision. By a Court Order dated 29 November 2023, the Director’s previous decision was set aside and
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HCAL 1440/2024 [2024] HKCFI 2764 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1440 OF 2024 _____________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ THE APPLICATION 1.This application is related to HCAL 1388 of 2022, which is a previous application for subsequent claim by the same applicant. The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refused his application and he applied to this Court for judicial review. By a Court Order dated 10 February 2023, this Court granted leave to the applicant to issue originating summons for judicial review of the Director’s decision. By a Court Order dated 29 November 2023, the Director’s previous decision was set aside and the applicant’s application for subsequent claim was remitted to the Director for fresh determination. 2.Accordingly, the immigration officer re-assessed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. By Notice of Decision (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director refused the applicant’s application. 3.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 754 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 4.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 5.The applicant appeared before the Court on 2 October 2024 and admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim. The procedural history 6.The applicant is a national of India. He came to Hong Kong as a visitor on 30 April 2015. He overstayed and surrendered to the Immigration Department. By way of a written representation on 11 August 2015, he lodged non-refoulement claim by written signification of 26 May 2014 on the applicable grounds of the BOR 2 risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the Persecution risk[3] and the Torture risk[4]. 7.By Notice of Decision dated 26 May 2017 (“the Director’s First Decision for the previous claim”), the Director refused his claim on the Torture risk, the BOR 3 risk and the Persecution risk. By notice of Further Decision dated 1 June 2017 (“the Director’s Second Decision for the previous claim”), the Director refused his claim on the BOR 2 risk. The 2 Director’s Decision are collectively called (“the Director’s Decisions for the previous claim”). 8.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decisions for the previous claim to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). The Board, by the Board’s Decision dated 14 July 2017, dismissed his appeal on all applicable grounds of his claim. 9.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 23 April 2018 (“the Court’s Order”). 10.His appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 25 July 2018. 11.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 June 2020. 12.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 11 August 2020. 13.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 14.The applicant’s previous claim was based on the fears that, if he returned to India, he would be harmed or even killed by his uncle because he had a personal land dispute with him. 15.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. 16.The applicant lodged an appeal to the Board against the Director’s Decisions for the previous claim. The Board found that the applicant’s evidence was not credible. Apart from it, the Board also found that the applicant failed to establish the risks he claimed and that he had no real risk if he returned to India. 17.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 18.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer his statement together with some documents. In the materials submitted to the immigration officer, the applicant alleged that his uncle had discovered his involvement in support of Khalistan Movement, which is a movement to fight for the rights of Sikh people in India. 19.The immigration officer summarized the applicant’s fears if he returns to India as:
20.The issue of land dispute had been dealt with in his previous claim. It is a repetition of the same issue. As to issue 2, it was not the issue raised in his previous claim. The immigration officer found at paragraph 37.
21.For the reasons above, the Director therefore found that the applicant relied upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, would not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 22.The applicant has filed Form 86 on 27 August 2024 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 23.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has raised no specific ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 24.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 25.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his application for subsequent claim. 26.The applicant has raised no valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 27.There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 28.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 29.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 30.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 31.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 32.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 33.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 34.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 35.RPO in terms of paragraph 33 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. | |||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment