Robert Scott Woods, The Trustee-in-bankruptcy of Phillip James Kingston v. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1789/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 October 2024.
1. By Originating Summons dated 16 September 2024 (“ OS ”)Mr Robert Scott Woods, the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the property of Philip James Kingston (“ Bankrupt ”) appointed pursuant to the Order of the Federal Court of Australia (“ Federal Court ”) dated 14 December 2023 (“ Trustee ”), seeks an order for recognition of his appointment with powers to assist him in the investigation of the Bankrupt’s affairs. After hearing the submissions, I made an order in the terms set out in §44 below. These
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HCMP 1789/2024 [2024] HKCFI 3311 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1789 OF 2024 ________________________
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________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ________________________ 1.By Originating Summons dated 16 September 2024 (“OS”)Mr Robert Scott Woods, the trustee-in-bankruptcy of the property of Philip James Kingston (“Bankrupt”) appointed pursuant to the Order of the Federal Court of Australia (“Federal Court”) dated 14 December 2023 (“Trustee”), seeks an order for recognition of his appointment with powers to assist him in the investigation of the Bankrupt’s affairs. After hearing the submissions, I made an order in the terms set out in §44 below. These are the reasons for my judgment. A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2.The Bankrupt was born in Australia and is an Australian citizen. He holds an Australian passport. 3.Between 28 November 2017 and 28 September 2018, the Bankrupt entered into 5 loan agreements (“Loan Agreements”) with China Insurance Group Finance Company Limited (“CIG”) pursuant to which HK$653 million was advanced to him. The loans were advanced in connection with the business of the Bankrupt’s companies in Australia. 4.In September 2019, the Bankrupt was in default of his obligations under the Loan Agreements. This led to appointment of receivers over the companies whose shares had been pledged by the Bankrupt as security for the obligations under the Loan Agreements. 5.In August 2020, CIG commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria against the Bankrupt to seek repayment under the Loan Agreements. The trial took place before Delany J over 9 days in May to July 2022. 6.In August 2022, the Bankrupt left Australia and has not returned since. It appears that his current residence varies and that he is working in both Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates[1]. 7.On 19 January 2023, Delany J handed down a 139-page judgment in favour of CIG and dismissed the Bankrupt’s counterclaim (“Judgment”). In the order dated 14 February 2023, the Bankrupt was ordered to pay HK$664,900,126.57 together with interest in the sum of HK$131,524,242.64 and costs (“Judgment Debt”). The Bankrupt did not make any payment. 8.On 20 September 2023, CIG filed a creditor’s petition in the Federal Court seeking a sequestration order against the estate of the Bankrupt on the ground that he had failed to pay the Judgment Debt which then stood in the amount of AUD154,364,350.25. 9.On 14 December 2023, the Federal Court made a sequestration order against the Bankrupt and held that the date of commission of the act of bankruptcy is 17 August 2023. The Trustee was appointed as the trustee of the property of the Bankrupt in the same order. 10.Following his appointment, the Trustee carried out investigation into the Bankrupt’s affairs (with some assistance from the Bankrupt) which revealed that:
11.To-date, there are withdrawals from the Accounts totaling HK$85,745,395.29 and deposits into the Accounts totaling HK$1,109,673.09 which remain unaccounted for, the particulars of which are set out in the spreadsheets prepared by the Trustee (collectively “Unexplained Transactions”). 12.By letter dated 2 July 2024, the Trustee’s solicitors requested ICBC to provide details and documents relating to the destinations or sources of the Unexplained Transactions. 13.On 9 July 2024, ICBC through its solicitors stated that it owed a duty of confidentiality to the customer and, therefore, was not in a position to consent to the Trustee’s request without a court order, presumably because the Trustee was not appointed by an order of the Hong Kong court. I say this because if a person is adjudged bankrupt by an order of the Hong Kong court, by virtue of s.58 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (“BO”), the property of the bankrupt shall vest in the Official Receiver or any provisional trustee and trustee thereafter appointed over the bankrupt’s estate. The Official Receiver/trustee would be able to assert any rights (including any amounts owed by any third parties arising out of such rights) in respect of the property of the Bankrupt against any third party including the bank. 14.On 22 July 2024, the Trustee applied to the Federal Court for a letter of request. The Bankrupt had been notified of the application, and stated that he did “not intend to appear” and did “not have the funds for legal representation”. 15.On 21 August 2024, O’Callaghan J of the Federal Court ordered the issue of a letter of request pursuant to s.29(4) of the Bankruptcy Act (1966) (Cth) requesting the Hong Kong court to act in aid of and be auxiliary to its bankruptcy proceedings in the manner set out in the Letter of Request (“LOR”). As stated in the LOR, the Trustee requires the statements and information concerning the Unexplained Transactions to assist his investigations and realisation of the Bankrupt’s property for the benefit of the creditors. 16.On 16 September 2024, the Trustee issued the present application against ICBC. On 20 September 2024, the Trustee informed the Bankrupt about the application and inquired whether he intends to oppose it. By an e-mail of the same day, the Bankrupt “acknowledged receipt” of the application papers and stated that he was not in a “financial position to do anything about this petition”. 17.By letter dated 15 October 2024, ICBC informed the Trustee that it would adopt a neutral position in respect of the present application, subject to certain proposed changes to the draft order concerning the time limit and costs for compliance with the order. B. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES 18.The relevant principles governing an application for recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings have been comprehensively set out in the skeleton submissions of Mr Lai Chun Ho, counsel for the Trustee, and may be summarised as follows:
19.The approach of the court in considering an application for recognition and assistance of foreign bankruptcy proceedings is materially the same as recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. The doctrine of “modified universalism” provides a common basis for recognition and assistance of both types of proceedings (Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, §6, per Lord Hoffmann; Rubin, §§16-19, per Lord Collins; Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675, §16, per Lord Sumption). 20.The principles governing an application for recognition and assistance of foreign insolvency proceedings may be summarised as follows (Re Guangdong Overseas Construction Corporation [2023] 3 HKLRD 262, §17):
(3) As to the extent and terms of assistance to be provided to the office-holder, the authorities show that the court has granted assistance to a foreign office-holder to, inter alia, obtain and gather information and documents relating to the company from third parties (see also Bridge Global, §15(3)). C. DISCUSSION C1. Bankruptcy proceedings collective in nature 21.The bankruptcy proceedings in the Federal Court are materially the same as bankruptcy proceedings under the BO, which are collective in nature, with the Trustee being appointed to take charge of the collection and realisation of the Bankrupt’s property and investigation of his affairs for the benefit of the general body of creditors. 22.As explained in Australian Gypsum Industries Pty Ltd v Dalesun Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] WASCA 95, §§205 to 206, 210 to 215, per Newnes and Murphy JJA, a sequestration order (once made) provides a statutory scheme under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 by which individual rights of creditors are replaced by rights to prove their debt in “collective proceedings” against the bankrupt’s estate; and creditors are not competent to enforce remedies against the person or property of the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt. 23.This is reinforced by the LOR, which states that pursuant to ss.58(1) and 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, if a person becomes bankrupt in Australia, his real and personal property vests in the trustee who is authorised to sell that property and distribute the proceeds of sale amongst the bankrupt’s creditors. C2. Submission to jurisdiction of Federal Court 24.The question whether there has been submission to jurisdiction is a question of Hong Kong law to be inferred from all the facts, having regard (where appropriate) to the contents and impact of the foreign procedural rules (Rubin, §161, per Lord Collins). 25.Apart from express submission, a party may submit to jurisdiction by way of waiver when it has “taken some step which is only necessary or only useful if” an objection to jurisdiction “has been actually waived, or if the objection has never been entertained at all” (Rubin, §159). 26.The general approach on submission to jurisdiction has been applied in foreign bankruptcy context. See for eg., Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2021] BPIR 1465, §118, per Snowden J (as he then was). 27.Although the Bankrupt did not personally appear in the Federal Court to contest CIG’s petition, he has submitted to its jurisdiction at least by way of waiver by reason of the following facts and matters:
C3. Bankrupt’s domicile 28.As the Bankrupt has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, it is not necessary to consider whether his domicile was in Australia at the time the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced. Nevertheless, in deference to counsel, who has made extensive submissions on the question of domicile, I would set out my view on the issue. 29.The rationale for placing emphasis on the bankrupt’s domicile has been explained by Professor Fletcher in Insolvency in Private International Law, 2nd ed, Section 2.6.1, §2.108 in this way:
30.The relevant time of assessing the debtor’s domicile is the time of the presentation of the petition (Muir Hunter on Personal Insolvency, §3-3002). 31.The question of domicile is determined by the Domicile Ordinance (Cap. 596) (“DO”). In particular, s.3(3) of the DO provides that “where the domicile of an individual is in issue before any court in Hong Kong, that court shall determine the issue in accordance with the law of Hong Kong”. The following provisions under the DO are relevant:
32.In ascertaining whether a person intends to make a home for an indefinite period, the court will take into all relevant circumstances (Zeng Lifan v Zeng Xingguo [2019] HKCFI 144, §§17-18, per DHCJ Douglas Lam SC). 33.Cases decided prior to the coming into effect of the DO still have guidance value although they are now subject to the express provisions of the DO (Re Estate of Kwok Leung Lam[2019] HKCFI 2856, §31, per DHCJ Leung). The following pre-DO cases are of relevance to the present case: (1) To acquire a domicile in a country, a person must freely choose to reside there and must not reside there because he is prescribed or dictated by external factors such as the duties of office, the demands of creditors or the need to seek medical treatment (Re Ku Chu Keung [2007] 2 HKLRD 292, §33, per DHCJ L. Chan). (2) A person does not abandon his domicile simply by changing residence (Re Ku Chu Keung, §40). (3) Change of domicile is not to be lightly inferred from casual language or even long period of residence (Re Chow Kam Fai [2004] 1 HKLRD 161,§17, per DHCJ Anthony To (as he then was)). (4) The existing domicile of a person is deemed to continue until it is proved that he has acquired a new domicile; he who asserts a change of domicile bears the burden of proving the truth of the assertion (Re Cao Zhong [2021] HKCFI 3143, §52(6), per Recorder William Wong SC). 34.In my view, the Bankrupt was domiciled in Australia at the time the petition was filed at the Federal Court having regard to the following facts and matters. 35.First, the evidence shows that the Bankrupt was domiciled in Australia until at least August 2022:
36.Second, although the Bankrupt left Australia in August 2022 and has not returned since, there is no evidence to show that he has abandoned Australia as his domicile. To the contrary, the evidence shows that his domicile remains in Australia:
37.The above facts and matters are sufficient for the court to conclude that the Bankrupt’s domicile has always been and remains in Australia. For completeness, I deal with 2 other matters. 38.After the hearing, by email dated 29 October 2024 to the Trustee[3], the Bankrupt complains that the Trustee has made “numerous errors” in the skeleton submissions in that (1) he is not on the Electoral Roll and attaches a letter from the Australian Electoral Commission (“AEC”) dated 17 April 2023 which stated that the AEC would remove him from the Electoral Roll; and (2) he has acquired “Ukrainian residency” and attaches copy of a Temporary Residence Permit issued to him. 39.I do not think that the complaints are justified. As stated by the Trustee:
40.In his correspondence with the Trustee and his SOA, the Bankrupt asserts that he left Australia due to limited opportunities and safety concerns and provided other correspondence addresses in Ukraine and United Arab Emirates to the Trustee. On 19 January 2024, the Australian Financial Security Authority directed that certain of the Bankrupt’s personal particulars be suppressed on the National Personal Insolvency Index on the basis that the publication of such particulars would jeopardise, or is likely to jeopardise his safety. This at most only goes to show that the Bankrupt’s departure from Australia was partly the result of “external factors” or “demands of creditors”, rather than an intention to abandon Australia as his domicile. C3. Recognition and assistance sought is necessary 41.As stated in the LOR, pursuant to ss.58(1) and 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, if a person becomes bankrupt in Australia, his real and personal property vests in the trustee who is authorised to sell the property and distribute the proceeds of sale amongst the bankrupt’s creditors. 42.The order sought is necessary to facilitate the Trustee in carrying out his functions as trustee of the Bankrupt’s property including taking control over his property, commencing proceedings in the name of the Bankrupt[4] and investigating his affairs in Hong Kong. The assistance sought includes an order requiring ICBC to produce documents relating to the Accounts.
43.For the above reasons, this Court made an order in the following terms:
Mr Lai Chun Ho, instructed by Baker & McKenzie, for the Plaintiff Attendance of Stevenson, Wong & Co. for the Defendant is excused [1] See Letter of Requested issued by the Federal Court, §10 [2] Email from the Bankrupt dated 4 July 2024 [3] Which was brought to the attention of the court under cover of the letter from Baker & McKenzie dated 8 November 2024 [4] Under s.116(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the right to commence proceedings on behalf of the Bankrupt also vests in the trustee. Where the foreign trustee has, under the law of the country in which he was appointed, a right to sue in his own name to recover such debts, the Court will recognise his right thus to sue (Chen Li Hung, §20). [5] The Trustee may apply to the Official Receiver to request a notice be issued to a person requiring the person to give information required for the purposes of, and to produce all books in the person’s possession relating to any matters connected with, the performance of the functions of the Official Receiver or a trustee. Section 77C is specifically “designed to enable the trustee to make the fullest investigations into the bankrupt’s property, dealings and affairs” (Karas v Page, Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (Vic) [1997] FCA 1257 per Tamberlin J). |
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