Ihsan Ul Haq v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1787/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 December 2024.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 23 May 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1563 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1787/2024 [2024] HKCFI 3295 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1787 OF 2024 _____________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 23 May 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1563 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 6 November 2024 and admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of his subsequent claim. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong illegally and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 6 May 2015. On 16 September 2015, he lodged a non-refoulement claim. His claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (“PML-N”) supporters and the police. 5.By Notice of Decision dated 22 November 2018, the Director refused his claim on the applicable risks[1]. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). The Board, by the Board’s Decision dated 27 July 2018, dismissed his appeal on all applicable risks. 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance. His application for extension of time to appeal was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance and the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had also dismissed his Notice of Motion for leave to the Court of Final Appeal. His application for appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 22 September 2023. 8.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 19 January 2024. 9.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 10.The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated. 11.The Board did not accept his evidence and came to a conclusion that he was not a reliable witness. On that basis, the Board dismissed his appeal. 12.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 13.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer his statement together with some materials. The immigration officer said:
14.The immigration also raised doubt on the authenticity of the documents submitted. 15.For the reasons above, the Director therefore found that the applicant relied upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, would not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicant has filed Form 86 on 9 October 2024 to apply for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.In the affidavit in support of his application, the applicant did not raise any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same facts in his previous claim in support of his application for subsequent claim. He further submitted that he has a wife who is a Hong Kong resident. He had applied for dependent’s visa, but failed. This does not constitute a reason in support of his application. 20.There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for leave for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 21.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 23.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he raised the query if the Hong Kong can guarantee his safety if he returns to his country. Again, this is not a valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 26.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 27.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment