Manneh Fakebba v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1994/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 January 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 22 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1083 of 2019 (“the previous application”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1994/2024 [2025] HKCFI 90 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1994 OF 2024 _____________
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_______________ JUDGMENT _______________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 22 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1083 of 2019 (“the previous application”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 4 December 2024 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Gambia. He entered Hong Kong as visitor on 23 September 2014 and was permitted to stay until 22 December 2014. He did not depart and had overstayed since 23 December 2014. On 2 January 2015, he surrendered to the Immigration Department. On 27 February 2015, he lodged a non-refoulement claim. His claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his uncle Lamin Sanneh (“LS”). 5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that his evidence was not credible and dismissed his appeal. 6.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 31 May 2022. He intended to appeal, but was out of time. His application for extension of time to appeal was refused by the Court of the First Instance. 7.He applied to the Court of Appeal for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the Court of the First Instance. The Court of Appeal dismissed his application. He sought leave from the Court of Appeal by way of Notice of Motion to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed his application. 8.He applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. On 18 April 2024, the Court of Final Appeal dismissed his application. 9.The applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 10.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 11.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer some supplementary information 12.Having considered the evidence, the immigration found that his fear of harm from his uncle had been considered in his previous claim and rejected. His fear of his brother harming him was not mentioned in his previous claim. He explained that he considered that it was sufficient to support his claim by uncle’s harm only. The immigration officer did not accept this explanation and considered that his story about his brother’s harm was fabricated. On this basis, the immigration officer dismissed his application for a subsequent claim as he failed to satisfy the requirements under section 37ZO of the Ordinance. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 13.The applicant filed Form 86 on 4 November 2024 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 14.In his affirmation in support of his application, he did not raise any specific ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 15.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 16.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim in support of this application. 17.The applicant has raised no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. There is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 18.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 19.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 20.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 21.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had also applied for a dependent’s visa. 22.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 23.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 24.RPO in terms of paragraph 22 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment