Kuruppu Arachchi Appuhamilage Don Kapila Asanka v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1942/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 January 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 9 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1087 of 2019 (“the previous application”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1942 /2024 [2025] HKCFI 122 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1942 OF 2024 _____________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 9 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1087 of 2019 (“the previous application”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 6 November 2024 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. The only difference is that his enemies are more powerful. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Sri Lanka. He entered Hong Kong as a visitor on 11 May 2017 and was permitted to stay until 13 May 2017. On 18 May 2017, he surrendered to the Immigration Department. On 23 May 2017 and 28 May 2017 respectively, he lodged a non-refoulement claim. His claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by Canisious Ranaweera (“CR”) and other members of United National Party (“UNP”). 5.By Notice of Decision dated 27 April 2018, the Director refused his claim on the applicable risks. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). By the Board’s Decision, the Board dismissed his appeal on all applicable risks for the reason that the Board found the applicant not a credible witness and it rejected his evidence. 7.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance. He appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. His motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal. The applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 5 July 2024. 8.The applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 9 July 2024. The subsequent claim application 9.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 10.In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer some supplementary information 11.Having considered the evidence, the immigration found:
12.For the reasons above, the immigration officer refused the applicant’s subsequent claim application. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 13.The applicant filed Form 86 on 29 October 2024 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 14.In his affirmation in support of his application, the applicant raised the ground that the immigration officer had made his decision rejecting his application without going to his country to understand the situation there. He considers that this is unfair to him. Discussion 15.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 16.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that his enemies are more powerful now. 17.The ground that he has raised in paragraph 14 does not advance his application because the immigration may rely on the country of origin information without going to his country himself, which the immigration officer had done. 18.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 19.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 20.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 21.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 22.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 23.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 24.RPO in terms of paragraph 22 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment