Suwarni v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2060/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 February 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 October 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1542 of 2020 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 2060/2024 [2025] HKCFI 295 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2060 OF 2024 _____________ BETWEEN
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_____________ JUDGMENT _____________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 October 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1542 of 2020 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 18 December 2024 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The procedural history 4.The applicant, aged 44, is a national of Indonesia. She raised her non-refoulement claim on the grounds of all applicable risks[1] on the basis that, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her husband because of her failure to remit money to him. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that she was not a truthful and rejected her evidence, and thus dismissed her appeal. 7.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 11 January 2024. 8.On 9 August 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 9.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 10.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 11.The applicant has submitted a letter dated 9 August 2024 in support of her application. In the letter, the applicant raised that, if refouled, she will be tortured by her husband; she will be discriminated because she is a lesbian; and her father threatened to kill her. 12.The immigration officer found that her fear of her husband had been considered and rejected in her previous claim. As to other grounds, the immigration did not believe her evidence for the reasons that she had not raised her sexual orientation in her previous claim and she was unable to give an explanation for such omission. The immigration made research on the country of origin information (“COI”), which showed that she would be protected by the government and non-governmental organizations in Indonesia. Furthermore, the immigration found that she can relocation herself in other parts of Indonesia. 13.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 14.The applicant filed Form 86 on 7 November 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 15.In her affirmation in support of her application, the applicant attached a statement, in which she reiterated her story of coming to Hong Kong, but she did not raise any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reason in her previous claim in support of this application. 18.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicant does not have any realistic prospect of success in her intended application for subsequent claim. 19.There is no valid reason from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision. 20.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 25.The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 26.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 27.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] All applicable risks are:
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