HKSAR v. Leung Kwok Chung
Read the full judgment text of CACC 216/2023 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 11 February 2025.
1. On 15 November 2023, following a trial before Barnes J (the Judge) and a jury, Leung Kwok-chung, nicknamed “Man Sun Chung” (the applicant), was convicted of the murder of Lee Tai-lung, nicknamed “Tai Lung” (the deceased) by unanimous verdict of the jury. He was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his conviction.
Cites 1 case
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CACC 216/2023 [2025] HKCA 138 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 216 OF 2023 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 252 OF 2020) _______________
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________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ 1.On 15 November 2023, following a trial before Barnes J (the Judge) and a jury, Leung Kwok-chung, nicknamed “Man Sun Chung” (the applicant), was convicted of the murder of Lee Tai-lung, nicknamed “Tai Lung” (the deceased) by unanimous verdict of the jury. He was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his conviction. 2.Before the leave hearing, the parties had been informed that when I was the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and Director of Public Prosecutions between 2008 and 2013, this case came within the purview of my office. In response, the parties raised no objection to me hearing the leave application. At the leave hearing, Mr Derek Lai and Mr Dimitri Au-yeung, for the respondent, also mentioned that I had been involved in the grant of immunities in this case, which would have been in respect of an earlier related trial in 2011. Mr Lai informed Mr Joseph Tse, SC, and Mr Charles Chan, for the applicant, of my involvement in the case. Mr Tse was given the opportunity to obtain instructions from the applicant on the matter, and he confirmed that the applicant had no objection to me hearing the leave application. The case at trial 3.This case concerned a triad killing between rival gangs. It was alleged that, on 4 August 2009, the applicant, together with Lee Wan-kong (known as “Kong Chai”), Lo Chin-wang (known as “Mao Chai”), Lee Chun-kong (known as “Po Chai”) and other persons, murdered the deceased.[1] 4.It was common ground at the trial that the deceased was a senior triad member of Sun Yee On Triad Society, who was attacked and killed outside the Kowloon Shangri-La Hotel in the early hours of 4 August 2009. The attack involved running down the deceased with a vehicle, followed by a group of men chopping him as he lay on the ground. 5.The principal issue at the applicant’s trial was whether he was connected in any way to this attack and guilty of the murder of the deceased. The jury were also directed that should they find him not guilty of murder, an alternative verdict of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act might be considered, on the basis that the intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm was not proved against the him.[2] 6.The key witness in the prosecution case was Lam Ka-chun (Lam), PW1 at trial, who testified as an accomplice witness under immunity. He was a former member of the Tai Kok Tsui faction of the Wo Shing Wo Triad Society. He had previously testified as an immunised witness in an earlier related trial in 2011 (the 2011 Trial). He was the only witness who testified as to the involvement of the applicant in the killing of the deceased.[3] 7.The prosecution also called another immunised witness, Man Pui Ying (Man), PW2 at trial, a triad follower of the deceased. He testified as to the background of the deceased and what occurred at the scene of the murder. 8.In the late 1990s, when Lam was around 12 years of age, he followed his childhood friends nicknamed “Ng Tung”, “Sor Kai” and “Po Chai”, and joined the Tai Kwok Tsui faction of the Wo Shing Wo. Ng Tung was Lam’s “big brother”. 9.On 23 July 2006, there was a fight at a bar in Tsim Sha Tsui between two rival triad societies. It involved on one side, the deceased, a senior member of the Sun Yee On, and other members, including Man; and on the other side, the applicant, a senior member of the Wo Shing Wo, and other members. During the fight, the deceased struck the applicant with a bottle, leaving a long scar on his face. After the fight, members of the Wo Shing Wo, including Lam, were instructed to locate the deceased but were unable to find him. 10.Lam testified as to how he came to know the applicant, whom he knew by this nickname, Man Sun Chung. During the period between 2004 and 2009, Lam was assigned to act as a lookout at the gambling stall at Tung Chau Street Park, which was run by the Wo Shing Wo. According to Lam, the applicant and Mao Chai, another senior member of the Wo Shing Wo, were managers of the gambling stall. The applicant would come to the gambling stall 4 to 5 times a week, staying there from less than an hour to several hours. 11.Shortly after midnight on 4 August 2009, Lam received a call from Ng Tung, who told him that “something had to be done”.[4] Lam met other triad members, including Kong Chai, who was driving a salon car (Car A).[5] They went to Lo Kwan Street Park, where other triad members, including the applicant and Mao Chai, were present. Lam heard Mao Chai instruct Ng Tung and Sor Kai, “Don’t chop the head. Don’t chop the neck. Don’t chop the main artery.”[6] He heard the applicant give a similar instruction to them, “Don’t chop vital parts.”[7] Lam agreed in cross-examination that these remarks could mean that it was just to teach a person a lesson and not to kill. As for this exchange, the Judge explained to the jury that the evidence they had to consider was what was seen and heard by Lam.[8] 12.Mao Chai also instructed Kong Chai to act as a lookout. Ng Tung then told Lam that the target was the deceased and that he was to act as a lookout.[9] 13.The group of twelve men remained in Lo Kwan Street Park for about two hours, when the applicant ordered “Let’s go” and everyone got into the three vehicles.[10] Lam, Kong Chai and two others got in one saloon car (Car A). The applicant and three others got into another saloon car (Car B). While Mao Chai, Ng Tung, Sor Kai and Po Chai got into a 7-seater car (the 7-seater). The three vehicles went to the Chinachem cinema at Tsim Sha Tsui East, where they waited for about an hour.[11] Kong Chai then received a telephone call and drove to the slip road next to the Kowloon Shangri-La Hotel, acting as a lookout.[12] A short while later, the 7-seater sped into the forecourt of the hotel and knocked down the deceased. Ng Tung, Sor Kai and Po Chai alighted from the 7-seater, each holding a 50 cm long knife, walked towards the applicant and chopped him repeatedly.[13] Two men alighted from Car B and witnessed the attack.[14] The men got back into their vehicles and fled the scene. The three vehicles had been stolen and they were set on fire after the attack on the deceased.[15] 14.The deceased was certified dead shortly after he was conveyed to the hospital. The forensic pathologist performed an autopsy on the deceased and determined that the cause of death was “multiple injuries”.[16] 15.The applicant did not testify at the trial, his case was that he was out of the jurisdiction at the time of the offence, and he had no connection with the attack. It was alleged against Lam that he never met or knew the applicant, although he knew his name. Grounds of appeal against conviction Ground 1: Imbalanced jury directions 16.Mr Tse contends that the Judge’s directions to the jury were overall seriously imbalanced in favour of the prosecution, and she was unfairly antagonistic to the defence, thus conveying to the jury an irresistible impression of guilt on the applicant, rendering the conviction unsafe or unsatisfactory. He argues that this ground is supported by the following matters:
17.By way of general observation, when making an allegation that a judge’s directions to the jury were imbalanced, it is incumbent on counsel to frame the ground of appeal put forward with care and accuracy based on clearly reasonable and supportable arguments. The ground should be expressed in accurate and precise terms devoid of any extreme or emotional language. Moreover, it should not be a nit picking exercise conjuring up as many points as possible in an attempt to substantiate an argument of imbalance. Even when there is a basis to take issue with a passage in a judge’s summing-up it is imperative that it be addressed and considered in its proper context. Therefore, the passage complained must not be looked at in isolation but examined in context by reading the summing-up as a whole against the relevant issues and circumstances at trial. With that in mind, I turn to consider the matters raised under this ground. 18.By Ground 1(1), it is complained that the Judge highlighted evidence favourable to the prosecution, emphasising Lam’s reliability as a witness. Mr Tse complains that the Judge did not explain that Lam’s lies were relevant to the defence case that Lam had framed up the applicant. He argued that when Lam initially told the police that the applicant was one of the knifers in the attack, this was his attempt to frame him up. Lam, in his evidence, acknowledged that this was incorrect and explained that the applicant was not one of the knifers. He also argued that Lam had initially stated to the police that someone else had picked him up from his home on 4 August 2009 but later stated it was his “big brother”, Ng Tung. He contended that this showed that Lam was trying to protect Ng Tung. However, Lam gave details of the involvement of Ng Tung in the attack on the deceased. 19.The fact that Lam had previously lied to the police and his probation officer had been extensively addressed by the Judge in her summing-up. She comprehensively summarised Lam’s testimony with appropriate references to the defence challenges of his evidence. This included the Judge detailing Lam’s criminal record and his involvement in triad criminal activities.[29] She emphasised with the jury Lam’s admission that he had previously lied and explained it was for them to decide whether or not he was telling the truth in court:[30]
20.The Judge also reminded the jury that he was giving evidence under immunity and that he had made four previous statements in relation to the case.[31] She went into detail in explaining the defence attack against Lam, that he was giving evidence under immunity to avoid prosecution for the murder, and that he was prepared to lie in his evidence against the applicant to protect himself. She instructed the jury: [32]
21.Whilst Mr Tse acknowledges that the Judge did emphasise the defence case that Lam’s evidence against the applicant was a fabrication, he complains that she did not explain in appropriate detail that the defence case was one of a frame up. It is difficult to see in the circumstances of this case the difference between an allegation that Lam fabricated his evidence to falsely accuse the applicant as a party to the killing of the deceased and that Lam framed up the applicant as a party to the killing. 22.The evidence that Mr Tse refers to that showed Lam framed up the applicant was all before the jury, and it was clear to them that the defence were alleging that Lam was falsely accusing the applicant of being a party to the killing. I do not find merit in this complaint. 23.By Ground 1(2) and (3), it is argued that the Judge “excessively emphasised” that this was a triad revenge attack by the applicant and should have restricted the triad references as this was prejudicial to the applicant’s fair trial. 24.Mr Tse accepted that the triad factor was relevant but contended that the Judge overly emphasised the subject. Once it was established that this case involved an attack between rival triads, it would seem that the references to triads were only a reflection of the evidence presented at trial. It was open to the prosecution, based on the evidence, to put its case on the basis that this was a revenge attack by the applicant. It is to be noted that there was no objection to the triad evidence being presented before the jury, except for the applicant being a senior triad. It should be noted that there were occasions when the defence relied on the triad involvement of the prosecution witnesses, Lam and Man. I do not consider that this argument has any merit, bearing in mind the subject matter of the case. 25.Relevantly, the Judge gave an appropriate warning about the triad evidence to the jury.[33] Mr Tse, nevertheless, submits it was not sufficient and did not address the issue of propensity. He refers to the judge’s direction in the 2011 Trial, in which he specifically addressed associating propensity for violence with triads. However, the Judge’s direction was appropriate in the circumstances. She told the jury:[34]
26.By Ground 1(4), it is complained that the Judge allocated comparatively little time in the summing-up to the defence case. It needs to be remembered that most of the evidence came from Lam, and to a lesser extent Man, and there was no evidence from the defence, although there were the Admitted Facts and the cross-examination by the defence of the prosecution witnesses. Consequently, the Judge’s summing-up reflected the focus at trial on Lam’s evidence and the defence challenges to the prosecution case. It cannot be said that the defence case was not appropriately reflected in the Judge’s summing-up, nor was there any complaint by defence counsel that the Judge had not put the defence case to the jury. 27.Mr Tse relies on the remaining sub-grounds to support his complaint under Ground 1(4):
28.It is generally complained that the Judge spent little time and made few remarks regarding the defence case, and that when she did, she was dismissive of the points advanced by the defence. In my reading of the summing-up, there is no basis for this complaint. The defence case was properly reflected in the summing-up by the Judge. Mr Tse illustrates his argument by pointing out that there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence against the applicant, which was a point in the applicant’s favour that was not mentioned by the Judge. The applicant was in Car B, the Honda car, and that this and the other two vehicles had been stolen, which were discarded and set on fire after the attack. The evidence was that the applicant was a passenger in the Honda car and was not involved in the attack. It was stated in the admitted facts that certain items, including the Honda car, had been examined for fingerprints and DNA. The only items from which fingerprint impressions or DNA could be retrieved were in the boot of the Honda car. It was noted that the applicant’s DNA or fingerprints were not found on these items. The Judge drew the jury’s attention to the admitted facts in her summing-up. She mentioned that the applicant’s DNA and fingerprints were not found on any of the items.[36] 29.When addressing the expert evidence on the fingerprints and DNA the Judge explained to the jury:[37]
30.In the above passage, the Judge properly described and explained the expert evidence, having previously reminded the jury that the applicant’s fingerprints and DNA were not found on the items retrieved from the boot of the Honda car. 31.There was a previous history in this case between the two antagonists, the applicant and the deceased. There had been a fight between them during which the deceased had struck the applicant with a whiskey bottle and scarred his face. It was in this context, that the Judge made a concluding remark, which Mr Tse takes issue. Having referred to the prosecution case that this was a revenge attack because of the previous fight, the Judge said:[38]
32.Mr Tse complains that the Judge’s remark “if you want to” reflected a dismissive attitude on her part to the defence case. However, the impugned remark was directed to the comparison in the respective ranks of the applicant and the deceased, and in any event, the Judge went on to explain to the jury:[39]
33.There is no substance to this complaint. First, the Judge only made the impugned remark in respect of the comparison point which she went on to explain further to the jury in the following passage. Secondly, the comparison point seems to have little, if any significance, given there had been a previous fight between them. 34.It is complained that the Judge did not properly highlight that there had been a deviation in the plan to attack the deceased, which included running him down as well as chopping him. The Judge addressed this defence point as follows:[40]
35.However, the Judge continued to address this matter in assisting the jury on this issue:[41]
36.The Judge went on to discuss the issue of murderous intent and joint enterprise. She specifically addressed the question of the joint plan and instructed the jury to evaluate the evidence as to whether the applicant had taken part in the attack, including giving instructions and overseeing the attack.[42] 37.This is yet another minor and inconsequential complaint. It is submitted that the Judge made a factual error about the 2011 Trial, primarily that she ignored that Lam had given evidence for the prosecution under immunity in that trial, at which one of the defendants was acquitted. Particulars of the 2011 Trial were set out in the admitted facts.[43] Whilst the Judge had not gone into the details of these admitted facts, she did remind the jury that some of the arrested persons had been charged, and the results of the trial were in the admitted facts.[44] Mr Tse seems to be making a point that one of the defendants, Sor Lo Ting (D4), who was at the park and got into Car B, was acquitted. The involvement of Sor Lo Ting had been mentioned by the Judge in her summing-up.[45] How his acquittal is relevant to the fact that Lam gave evidence at that trial is difficult to understand. Nothing further is said about the matter, and as noted in the admitted facts, other witnesses also gave evidence for the prosecution under immunity. It was an admitted fact that Lam gave evidence in the 2011 Trial, and it appears that no cross-examination on this point was made by the defence at trial. Even if there had been, given the reference to Lam as a witness in the 2011 Trial was in the admitted facts, it would have been a matter that the jury knew. However, the fact that a witness had previously given evidence in another trial, could and would not be an issue unless it was the subject of cross-examination, a prior inconsistent statement or an issue at trial. As already noted, the indications are that there was no cross-examination. There is no substance to this point. 38.I am not persuaded at all that any of these matters, either individually or collectively, support the applicant’s contention that the Judge’s summing-up was imbalanced, or that the Judge has erred in any way in respect of the individual matters. I do not find this ground or the sub-grounds to be reasonably arguable. Ground 2: False alibi 39.Mr Tse submits that the Judge, in the summing-up, erred in adopting an erroneous circular approach on the issue of whether the applicant’s alibi was false. He points out that the Judge directed that Lam’s identification (or recognition) of the applicant could prove that the applicant’s alibi was false, and yet she also directed that if the applicant’s alibi was false, that could be used to support Lam’s identification of the applicant. He argues that the Judge’s direction on alibi would only serve to generate confusion and unnecessary difficulties for the jury.[46] 40.The respondent argues that there was no confusion or difficulty on the part of the jury. It is submitted that when considering whether the alibi was false, the jury, as instructed, would be required to consider all the relevant evidence. The respondent submits that the evidence that the alibi was false came from the applicant’s travel records. He left Hong Kong through an Immigration control point on 1 August 2009 without any proper re-entry record. However, he attended the Wanchai Police Station after more than 10 years on 21 January 2020, when he surrendered himself to the authorities. The respondent further submits that there was no real issue of misidentification by Lam of the applicant. In this regard, the jury did not require any assistance to determine whether Lam might have misidentified the applicant. Lam had known the applicant for 5 years and had contact with him on numerous occasions. The respondent finally submits that there was no issue of misidentification as the defence case was that Lam did not know the applicant and that he was lying and framing up the applicant in the murder. 41.The Judge, when directing the jury on alibi, followed the standard direction.[47] She explained to the jury that the applicant was relying on his alibi that he was not in Hong Kong at the material times, adding that if they were to conclude the alibi was false, that in itself did not prove his guilt, which may be invented to bolster a genuine defence.[48] She said:[49]
42.The Judge then summarised the circumstances that the prosecution relied on to infer that the alibi was false:[50]
43.The Judge listed further matters that the prosecution relied on to show that the alibi was false.[51] She referred to the absence of any record of the applicant either entering or leaving Hong Kong after he was recorded leaving Hong Kong on 1 August 2009; the triad expert evidence that triad members were able to leave and enter Hong Kong illegally; and the applicant entering Hong Kong illegally by appearing over 10 years later in Hong Kong. She pointed out that the prosecution were submitting that with these matters in mind, the jury could be sure that the alibi was false and that the applicant came back to Hong Kong to be present for the attack on the deceased on 4 August 2009. She concluded with the following instructions to the jury:[52]
44.Mr Tse developed his argument in respect of this ground in oral submissions as follows. He explains that whilst there is no record of when the applicant returned to Hong Kong, at the same time, there is nothing to indicate when he actually returned other than some time before the day he surrendered to the police on 21 January 2020. As the sole evidence that the applicant was present at the park and the attack on the deceased comes from Lam, it is only on this evidence, if accepted, that the applicant’s alibi could be false. He argues that it was wrong to direct the jury that if they found the alibi was false, they could use that evidence to support Lam’s identification of the applicant. This is the basis of his circularity argument. 45.The respondent has not addressed this argument except to rely on the Judge’s final comments in the above quoted passage. 46.The Judge’s introductory directions on alibi were correct. She told them that if the applicant’s alibi was false, that did not prove that Lam’s identification was right; that if they decide that the applicant had no innocent reason for putting forward the alibi, then they may treat it as false as providing some support for Lam’s identification; and that if they were sure of Lam’s identification, it would follow that the applicant’s alibi was false.[53] However, as noted above, when the Judge listed the matters that the prosecution were relying on to show that the alibi was false, the first matter she mentioned was Lam’s testimony that he saw the applicant at the park and at the Chinachem, and that they could infer that he was also at the Kowloon Shangri-La Hotel. After listing other matters, she reminded the jury, “So the prosecution ask you to bear all this in mind to decide whether you can be sure that the alibi was false, that he created the alibi saying that he left Hong Kong on the 1st, in fact he sneaked back in Hong Kong after the 1st, definitely before 4 August.”[54] She then proceeded to direct the jury that if they find that the alibi was false “then you can use that as part of the alibi to support the identification by Lam.”[55] 47.The issue is whether the jury would have impermissibly reasoned that the alibi was false, taking into account Lam’s evidence of identification before they had accepted his evidence, and then relied on the false alibi to prove Lam’s evidence of identification. I find this ground of appeal to be reasonably arguable. Ground 3: Wrongful admission of hearsay evidence 48.It is pointed out by Mr Tse that the bulk of the prosecution’s evidence that the applicant was a senior member of a triad society was from Lam. He contends that this evidence was hearsay or opinion evidence.[56] He argues that there were occasions when this evidence was given to assert the truth of the applicant’s status within the triad society, and was therefore inadmissible hearsay, which the Judge had a duty to exclude from the jury’s consideration, and to give an appropriate and adequate direction for them to ignore it. He submits that the Judge was in error in failing to do so. 49.The evidence before the court was that Lam did not specifically know that the applicant was a senior triad, other than from his dealings with him and observations as to how the applicant conducted himself in the operation of the gambling store and amongst other triad members.[57] Lam said he had been told by his big brother, Ng Tung, that the applicant was a senior triad.[58] However, as already noted, there was other evidence from which to draw the inference that the applicant was a senior triad. It is not without significance that both Lam and Man gave direct evidence of their membership in the triad society to which they belonged and the involvement and activities of others. It was also relevant how they regarded or treated others in the factual matrix of this case, which evidenced their state of mind or belief and would not have offended the hearsay rule[59]: Oei Hengky Wiryo v HKSAR (No 2). As I have already noted, the Judge dealt with Lam’s evidence as to why he regarded the applicant as a senior member of the Wo Shing Wo and the other evidence from which to draw such an inference. 50.I am not satisfied that this ground is reasonably arguable. Ground 4: Conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory 51.This is a general ground that in the circumstances the conviction is unsafe or unsatisfactory. 52.I do not find this ground reasonably arguable. Conclusion 53.It follows from what I have said that I do not find the grounds of appeal to be reasonably arguable, except for Ground 2. The application for leave to appeal against conviction is accordingly granted, but only for Ground 2.
Mr Derek Lai, SADPP and Mr Dimitri Au-yeung, PP, of Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr Joseph Tse, SC, and Mr Charles J Chan, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co, for the applicant [1] Appeal Bundle (AB), 26M-27E. [2] AB, 30K-30Q. [3] AB, 36C-E. [4] AB, 38T and 42O-P. [5] AB, 39F-G. [6] AB, 39M. [7] AB, 39N. [8] AB, 40A-I. [9] AB, 39Q. [10] AB, 43F. [11] AB, 43F-Q. [12] AB, 43R-S. [13] AB, 44E-K. [14] AB, 45G-H. [15] AB, 10. [16] AB, 9, Admitted Facts, at [9]. [17] AB, 59J-N, 59O-T, 60A-C, 60F-L, 60M-S, 60T-61F, 61LR, 63N-U and 64C. [18] AB, 20S, 21E, 37Q, 38I, 58B-D, 59N, 69E and 69K-M. [19] AB, 67O-R. [20] AB, 21E, 24Q, 42S, 67S and 68K-69B. [21] AB, 69K-Q. [22] AB, 21P-T, 47B-D, 56A, 56T, 68Q, 68R, 70F and 76K. [23] AB, 59E-G. [24] AB, 66A-D. [25] AB, 68R-69B. [26] AB, 76P-77B. [27] AB, 69G-H. [28] AB, 16. [29] AB, 45I-47D. [30] AB, 47E-I. [31] AB, 47N-S. [32] AB, 62B-63A. [33] AB, 24Q-25F and 86E-F. [34] AB, 24S-25F. [35] AB, 68R-69B. [36] AB, 35F. [37] AB, 59B-I. [38] AB, 68P-69B. [39] AB, 69C-F. [40] AB, 76K-77B. [41] AB, 77B-Q. [42] AB, 77S-79E. [43] AB, 15-17, at [27]-[29]. [44] AB, 35L-O. [45] AB, 39F-K and 43K-L. [46] AB, 72R-73B and 73P-74B. [47] Specimen Directions in Jury Trials: Volume 2, Chapter 108-7. [48] AB, 70B-M. [49] AB, 70I-Q. [50] AB, 70R-71G. [51] AB, 71G-72F. [52] AB, 72M-73A. [53] AB, 70M-Q. [54] AB, 72B-C. [55] AB, 72Q. [56] AB, 37P-Q, 59O, 60J-L, and 86F-G. [57] AB, 59O. [58] AB, 37P. [59] Oei Hengky Wiryo v HKSAR (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 98, at [39] and [43] |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACC 216/2023