Mahilum Arlyn Aropo and Others v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1629/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 March 2025.
1. The 1 st applicant, aged 41, is the mother of the 2 nd applicant, son, aged 9 and the 3 rd applicant, daughter, aged 7. The 1 st applicant will be called “the mother” and the 2 nd and the 3 rd applicants, “the children”. This is their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Notice of Decision dated 5 September 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their application for subsequent claim of HCAL 1894 of 2018 (“the mother’s previous claim) and HCAL 2601 of 2018 (“the
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HCAL 1629/2024 [2025] HKCFI 738 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1629 OF 2024 _____________ BETWEEN
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_____________ JUDGMENT _____________ THE APPLICATION 1.The 1st applicant, aged 41, is the mother of the 2nd applicant, son, aged 9 and the 3rd applicant, daughter, aged 7. The 1st applicant will be called “the mother” and the 2nd and the 3rd applicants, “the children”. This is their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Notice of Decision dated 5 September 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their application for subsequent claim of HCAL 1894 of 2018 (“the mother’s previous claim) and HCAL 2601 of 2018 (“the children’s previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against them since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicants may take out further proceedings to assert their non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.Since the son and the daughter are minors. The Court has advised the mother to obtain legal aid from the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”) for them. However, they were not represented before the Court on 12 February 2025 because, as the 1st applicant explained, the Director of Legal Aid had refused their application. 4.The children’s claims will rely on the facts relating to the mother. The procedural history The mother’s previous claim (HCAL 1894 of 2018) 5.The mother is a Filipina national. She came to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper. Upon termination of her contract, she did not depart and overstayed. She lodged her non-refoulement claim on 4 December 2015 on the basis that, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her ex-boyfriend because of a break-up with him. 6.The Director refused her claim as it was not substantiated. She appealed to the Board. The Board was of the view that her evidence was unreliable and found that her purpose of coming to Hong Kong was economic, rather than to avoid her boyfriend. It dismissed her appeal. 7.She applied to the High Court for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. She failed all the way to the Court of Final Appeal, which dismissed her application for leave to appeal on 15 March 2022. The children’s previous claim (HCAL 2601 of 2018) 8.The mother, acting as the guardian, made non-refoulement claims for her children. Before the Director, the children were legally represented. The Director refused their claims. They jointly appealed to the Board. By the Board’s Decision dated 23 August 2018, the Board dismissed their appeal. The children applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance refused their application. They pursued the matter to the Court of Appeal and finally to the Court of Final Appeal, which dismissed their application for leave to appeal on 15 March 2022. The subsequent claim application 9.The mother and the children applied to the Director by letter dated 26 March 2024 to apply for subsequent claim for non-refoulement. The Director rejected their joint application for the reason that their claim was not substantiated. 10.Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, the applicants have to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 11.In support of their subsequent claim, the duty lawyer, acting on their behalf, submitted supporting documents to the immigration for consideration. Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer made these comments at paragraph 10:
12.For the above reasons, the Director refused their application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 13.The applicants have filed Form 86 on 19 September 2024 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 14.The 1st applicant has filed an affidavit in support of their application and said that the Director had disregarded her dangerous situation. DISCUSSION 15.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 16.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the 1st applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons of her previous claim. 17.The immigration officer had given separation consideration for the minors. See paragraph 12 of the Director’s Decision. 18.There is no realistic prospect of success in their subsequent claim. I dismiss their application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 19.The Director’s findings show that the applicants are attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of their previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicants from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against them. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 20.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 21.In my view, the fact that the applicants are entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as their intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 22.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against them. The 1st applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 23.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against them, the 1st applicant said she had nothing to say. 24.Having considered the 1st applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicants would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below. The reference to the Applicant will cover the 1st applicant and the other applicants or anyone of them in this case.
DISPOSITION 25.The applicants’ joint application is dismissed. 26.RPO in terms of paragraph 24 be made against the applicants.
The applicants appeared in person. |
Cases cited in this judgment