Liyas Masih v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2436/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 March 2025.

1. The Applicant is a 36-year-old national of India who arrived in Hong Kong on 27 June 2024 but when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by some of his Sikh neighbours over their religious dispute.

Cites 4 cases

Case No.HCAL 2436/2024[2025] HKCFI 987
Court
High Court CFI
Date25 Mar 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 2436/2024

[2025] HKCFI 987

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2436 OF 2024

BETWEEN    
Liyas Masih Applicant
and
Torture Claims Appeal Board Putative Respondent
and  
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;            or
    consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 36-year-old national of India who arrived in Hong Kong on 27 June 2024 but when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by some of his Sikh neighbours over their religious dispute.  

2.The Applicant was born and raised as a Christian in a Christian family in Hardowal Khurd, Gurdaspur, Punjab, India. After leaving school he worked as a carpenter, got married and raised a family with a son in his home district.

3.One day in March 2024 the Applicant got into some argument with his Sikh neighbours over some religious issue which led to a fight but he managed to make his escape without serious injury.

4.Several days after the incident he received phone calls from some unknown persons who accused him of spreading Christianity in his Sikh neighbourhood and threatened to kill him if he continued to do so.

5.As those threatening phone calls had persisted for weeks, the Applicant left home in April 2024 to take shelter in a friend’s place in Sarpriwind, but later when he heard that his hostile Sikh neighbours were looking for him everywhere, he fled to District Amritsar, and on 7 June 2024 he departed India for Thailand, and on 26 June 2024 he arrived in Hong Kong, but when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 17 July 2024 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).             

6.By a Notice of Decision dated 13 September 2024 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

7.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his Sikh neighbours upon his return to India as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of any of his Sikh neighbours to seriously harm or kill him over their dispute, that in any event it was a private dispute between him and his neighbours only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India with a large population of 1.4 billion people spread across a vast territory of more than 3.2 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Delhi or Mumbai where it would be difficult if not impossible for his Sikh neighbours to locate him.

8.On 24 September 2024 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 15 November 2024 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 19 November 2024 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

9.In its decision the Board found on the factual basis of even his own case that the Applicant’s problem with his Sikh neighbours was just some private religious dispute between them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to India if resorted to as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by anyone that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.    

10.On 11 December 2024 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward various grounds for his intended challenge, of which he confirmed at the hearing as follow:

(1) That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;

(2) That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim;

(3)  That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;

(4) That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5) That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;

(6) That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.       

11.These are however all just bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was a private religious dispute between him and his Sikh neighbours only without any official involvement or political element at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

12.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

13.In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of India, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.                

14.In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

15.For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Dated the 25th day of March 2025

  (Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court


Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant on 25 March 2025
 
Liyas Masih
 
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 25 March 2025

Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 24627

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 1779/24 (formerly RBCZ/5001444/24)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)


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