Bah Ebrima v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 3618/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 14 April 2025.
1. By Form 86 (“ Form 86 ”) filed on 4 December 2019, the Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application ”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board ”) dated 31 October 2019 (“the Board’s Decision ”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director ”) dated 21 September 2018 (“the Director’s Decision ”), which rejected his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds (“the Grou
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HCAL 3618/2019 [2025] HKCFI 1382 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 3618 of 2019
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Teresa Wu:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 (“Form 86”) filed on 4 December 2019, the Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 31 October 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 September 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), which rejected his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds (“the Grounds”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM). 2.On my own motion, I have amended Form 86, correctly naming the Board as the proposed respondent and the Director as the proposed interested party. Background 3.The Applicant’s personal background, the facts alleged by him in support of his non-refoulement claim that he would be harmed or killed by his paternal uncle, etc. in Gambia, and the immigration and procedural history, etc. can be found in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to restate them, and where appropriate, reference can be made to the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink to which is included below[1]. Unless otherwise specified, I shall adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions herein. Discussion 4.The requirement for leave to apply for judicial review operates to filter out unarguable challenges: see section 21K(3) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 and Order 53 rule 3(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A. The Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is obviously not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Another (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 and leave should be refused. 5.In this case, the Applicant has failed to identify his grounds of judicial review in Form 86 as required: see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (22 December 2016) at §142. 6.The Applicant has also breached his duty to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts known to him and potential legal answers to his claims: see Re Leung Kwok Hung, HCAL 83/2012 (28 September 2012) at §35. The Applicant has completely failed to meet the required standard of providing the Court with all relevant information and adequate assistance in the papers filed for the filtering process to be properly performed. The fact that he acts in person does not relieve him of the relevant duty nor provides answer for his non-compliance. It is inadequate for him to merely exhibit a copy of the Board’s Decision in his supporting affirmation in the hope that the Court may adjudicate the matter afresh in the absence of any valid public law grounds. As has been repeatedly emphasized in previous cases, the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. 7.Very importantly, I remind myself of the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issues at hand: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, based on the analysis set out in §§48-65 and the application of the relevant law and legal principles, the Board concluded that there was no persecution risk. Neither was the Board satisfied, on the totality of evidence, that the Applicant would face any BOR 2 risk (§§33-35, 67-68), BOR 3 Risk (§§36-41, 70-73), or torture risk (§§42-46, 75-83). 8.The assessment of the evidence, COI materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation were primarily within the province of the Board. The Applicant has been unable to show any errors of law committed by the Board, or that there was any procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. Unless there are sufficient public law errors or grounds, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board or intervene by way of judicial review: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160; Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152; Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162; Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246 and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163. Conclusion 9.For the above reasons, I make an order that Form 86 be amended as described and the Leave Application be dismissed. Dated the 14th day of April 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 3618/2019