Puji Wartimah v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2470/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 April 2025.
1. This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 13 December 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 19 February 2024 dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) in his notice of decision dated 25 July 2023 dismissing her application for non-refoulement protection.
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HCAL 2470/2024 [2025] HKCFI 1716 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2470 of 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge To:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 13 December 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 19 February 2024 dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) in his notice of decision dated 25 July 2023 dismissing her application for non-refoulement protection. Explanation for the delay 2.The leave application was filed nine months and twenty-four days after the date of the Decision sought to be reviewed. Pursuant to section 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance and Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, the leave application was made almost seven months out of time. Extension of time to file the leave application is required. 3.In AW and Director of Immigration and William Lam[1], the Court of Appeal held that the following factors are relevant in determining whether to grant leave to file an application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time: (1) length of the delay; (2) explanation for the delay; (3) merits of the substantive application; (4) prejudice to the applicant if leave is refused vis-à-vis that to the respondent and public administration if leave is granted; and (5) whether the application raises any questions of general public importance, and whether those questions are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event. Usually, the first three factors, particularly merits, are most crucial and determinative. If the sum total of these three factors are in favour of grant of extension, the court could be more relaxed in the remaining two. Conversely, if it is against the grant of extension, there is no need to consider the remaining two factors. However, where an application is many months out of time, leave may be refused “however strong the complaint might otherwise be”, see Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung[2], per Litton PJ. The delay in this case is so substantial that leave may be refused on this ground alone without considering the merits of the substantive application, unless the Applicant has a reasonable and credible explanation for the delay. 4.Despite clear indication in the Form 86 that an applicant is required to state her grounds for application and reasons for delay, if any, the Applicant provided neither. On 28 February 2025, the Court gave her directions to file an affirmation or statement explaining her reason for the late application, in particular:
In response, the Applicant filed a letter dated 17 March 2025 providing the following reply. 5.In respect of Items (a), she said she never received the Decision from the Board dismissing her appeal. In respect of Item (b), she said she only learned about the outcome of her appeal a year later when she was informed by an immigration officer when she reported her recognizance; then she obtained a copy of the Decision from the Board. In respect of Item (c), she said she had never changed her correspondence address since 25 July 2023 before she filed her Form 86 until she obtained a copy of the Decision from the Board, which by inference would be late November or early December 2024. She did not respond to item (e) which was designed as a means of verification of her explanation. 6.The Applicant’s correspondence address as stated in the Form 86 is Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre (“CIC”). Her answer to Item (c) therefore suggests she was held in CIC from 25 July 2023 before she filed the Notice of Appeal with the Board to 13 December 2024 when she filed the Form 86. To the Court’s knowledge that would be highly unlikely, as claimants are usually released on recognizance after a couple of months’ detention. 7.From the documents discovered from the secretariat of the Board, the Court noted that the Decision was sent to the Applicant by post at her address in Ki Lung Street on 19 February 2024 and again on 7 November 2024 at CIC upon her request for a copy. These documents suggest the Decision had been sent on 19 February 2024 to the Applicant at her address in Ki Lung Street as provided by her to the Board in the normal course of the appeal and a copy of the Decision was resent to her on 7 November 2024 at her address in CIC on her request as she claimed in her answer to Item (b). These documents revealed that she had been released from CIC at some stage before the Board issued its Decision and the Decision was sent to her at her address in Ki Lung Street. These documents flatly destroyed her story that she was in CIC since filing the Notice of Appeal to the date she learned about the Decision from an immigration officer. She had not been honest with the Court in her explanation. The inference is that she has no reasonable explanation for the delay. But instead of drawing such adverse inference, the Court scheduled a hearing to hear her further explanation. 8.At the hearing, the Applicant initially maintained her story. However when confronted with the documents, she admitted her story was not true. She admitted she had been released from CIC at some stage after filing her Notice of Appeal and lived in Ki Lung Street. She admitted she had not informed the Board of her change of address. Obviously, it was for that reason that she did not receive the Decision at the ti the Applicant initially maintained her story. However when confronted with the documents, she admitted her story was not true. She admitted she was released on recognisance from CIC at some stage after filing her Notice of Appeal. She was required to provide her address as a condition of her release and she provided the Ki Lung Street address which was the address of her friend but she did not live there. She said she lived at the address she gave to the Court at the hearing, ie Kwong Shing Street. She said she also updated the Board with her address in Kwong Shing Street. ln answer to the Court's question why would the Board have sent the Decision to her address in Ki Lung Street, she put the blame on the Board for sending the Decision to the wrong address. She was asked how did she update her address with the Board, she said she made telephone calls but no one answered. When queried if she had really called for the past two years and no one answered, she admitted she had never updated the Board with her new address. me it was issued. As was held by the Court of Appeal in Karamjit Singh[3] and Re Hasmi Rizwan Imran[4], it is the applicant’s obligation to keep the court informed of her means of contact. If she does not, she has to bear the consequence which her failure brings. Accordingly, the Court comes to the conclusion that the Applicant has no reasonable explanation for the delay and has to suffer the consequence that her leave application will not be entertained. Thus, extension of time to file the leave application may be refused under the principle in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung without the need to consider the merits of her leave application. 9.As the Applicant has offered no explanation for the substantial delay, the Court could have no factual basis on which to exercise its discretion to grant her extension of time. On the other hand, a person in genuine fear for her safety if refouled would have wasted no time to apply as this is his last opportunity to challenge the Board’s decision. The Applicant’s unexplained delay not only evinced a lack of intention to prosecute her leave application, but also reflects an underlying lack of merits in her leave application and her non-refoulement claim. Her conduct resulted in delay in her refoulement process. The delay is so inordinate as to be beyond the limit which any court could indulge. Her conduct is a clear abuse of legal process. Conclusion 10.For the above reasons, extension of time to apply for leave to apply for judicial review and the leave application are refused. Dated the 28th day of April 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] CACV 63/2015 (unreported) 3 November 2015 [2] (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at 693B to C, per Litton NPJ [4] [2018] HKCA 439 at paragraph 15 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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