Begum Mst Parvin v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 3591/2019

[2025] HKCFI 1029

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 3591 of 2019

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Teresa Wu:

The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By Form 86 (“Form 86”) dated 3 December 2019, the Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 29 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 November 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), which rejected her non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds (“the Grounds”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM).

Background

2.The Applicant’s personal background, the incidents alleged to show that she would be harmed or killed in Bangladesh by her husband, and the immigration and procedural history, etc. were set out in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to restate them here. For completeness’ sake, reference can be made to the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink to which is included below[1]. The Board’s abbreviations and descriptions are adopted below unless otherwise indicated.

Discussion

3.After the oral hearing, the Applicant sought to withdraw the Leave Application on 3 March 2025, asserting that her “problems” are supposedly resolved by now and also mentioning her mother’s sickness as a reason for her desire to return as soon as possible. I accede to her request.

4.Even though I am not required to make any adjudication of the merits of the case in these circumstances (see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 at §19), I see it both necessary and appropriate to state a few words for the record to express my criticism of the Applicant’s utterly abusive conduct in wasting the judicial time and resources that could have been far better deployed and utilized.

5.The Leave Application is entirely unmeritorious. The Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success at all: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Another (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. She is unable to state her grounds for the intended judicial review: see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (22 December 2016) at §142. She has completely altered the substratum of her claim, shifting from having fear of being killed by her “husband” to her “enemy”. She has not provided any justification or explanation for this, breaching her onerous duty of full and frank disclosure: see Re Leung Kwok Hung, HCAL 83/2012 (28 September 2012), at §35. She has also fundamentally mistaken in believing that the Court will intervene when she simply fails to show any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160; Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152; Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162; Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246 and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163.

Conclusion

6.I accordingly make an order that the Leave Application herein be dismissed.

Dated the 28^th day of April 2025

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1