Re Indah Mayasari
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 272/2023 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 8 May 2025.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 21 July 2022 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 12 April 2019 (“the Board’s 2 nd Decision”) dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Directo
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CAMP 272/2023, [2025] HKCA 400 On an intended appeal from [2022] HKCFI 2220 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 272 OF 2023 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 1086/2019) ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 21 July 2022 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 12 April 2019 (“the Board’s 2nd Decision”) dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 10 April 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim (“the Director’s 2nd Decision”) based on the BOR 2 risk[1]. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She entered Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper on 12 November 2011, but she did not depart upon the premature termination of employment, and was arrested by the police on 18 February 2014. Thereafter, she lodged a non-refoulement claim by way of a written signification, which was received by the Immigration Department on 26 February 2014. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by a loan shark due to a debt related dispute. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [4] to [5] of his decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[2]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 17 April 2015 (“the Director’s 1st Decision), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s 1st Decision covered the torture risk[3], persecution risk[4] and the BOR 3 risk[5]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Board against the Director’s 1st Decision. After a hearing on 28 December 2015, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal by a decision dated 21 December 2016 (“the Board’s 1st Decision”). In dismissing the appeal, the Board found material parts of the applicant’s evidence (on which her claim was based) to be incredible, such as the alleged physical ill-treatment at the hands of the loan shark. 6.By the Director’s 2nd Decision, the Director also decided against the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk. The applicant appealed to the Board against the Director’s 2nd Decision. After a hearing on 20 February 2019, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal by its 2nd Decision. The Judge’s decision 7.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 18 April 2019, seeking to judicially review the Board’s 2nd Decision (but not the Board’s 1st Decision), without setting out any grounds for review. In her supporting affirmation, the applicant merely exhibited a copy of the Board’s 2nd Decision. 8.After summarising the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s and the Director’s Decisions, the Judge refused to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave at [15] to [21] of the CALL-1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 9.The applicant’s last known address at the time of the Judge’s decision was at 71 Woosung Street, Jordan (“the Address”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the Address on 21 July 2022, and were not returned undelivered. 10.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 21 July 2022. 11.The applicant thereafter took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 30 June 2023 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which her address was stated to be at Shanghai Street, Yau Ma Tei (“the New Address”). In her Summons and supporting affirmation filed on the same date, she claimed that she did not receive the Judge’s decision in the post. 12.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by the Judge on 1 August 2023[6]. 13.By a summons filed on 7 August 2023, the applicant renewed her application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons and her supporting affirmation, the applicant merely contended that the court did not give her “a chance to appeal”. 14.In breach of the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant failed to lodge written submissions with the court. She is therefore deemed to have abandoned her right to rely on the same. Discussion 15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. 16.As noted above, the Judge’s decision was sent to the last known address of the applicant, i.e. at the Address, but was not returned undelivered. The inference to be drawn is that she has had notice of the Judge’s decision within the period which she was permitted to lodge an appeal. It was also incumbent upon the applicant to notify the court of any changes in address, in this case to the New Address, and the consequences of failure to do so lie with her alone. 17.We are therefore of the view that the applicant has proffered no reasonable reason or explanation for the delay in bringing the intended appeal, nor has she explained when she had come to learn of the Judge’s decision. 18.In any event, the applicant has not condescended to any particulars, in the Form 86 or otherwise, as to on what basis the Board is said to have acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 19.The applicant has failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 20.It is well-established that an appeal against a refusal to grant leave for judicial review is not a fresh application for leave, and that an applicant must point to errors on the part of the Judge. This has clearly not been done here. 21.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. This court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 7 August 2023 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [4] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [5] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
Cases cited in this judgment