Unique Realty Ltd and Another v. Hong Kong Real Estate Agencies General Association Ltd and Others

Read the full judgment text of CACV 74/2024 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 May 2025.

1. By an originating summons dated 19 July 2023, the plaintiffs sought a summary determination of the validity of an election of the 16 th Executive Committee (“EC”) of the 1 st defendant’s Central-Western District Branch (“CW Branch”), held on 11 April 2023, at its Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”). The CW Branch is one of the 12 branches of the 1 st defendant. The plaintiffs were not elected at the said EGM but claimed that they were instead validly elected as members of the EC in another

Cited by 1 case · Cites 4 cases

Case No.CACV 74/2024[2025] HKCA 473
Court
Court of Appeal
Date27 May 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACV 74/2024, [2025] HKCA 473

On appeal from [2024] HKCFI 418

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 74 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCMP NO 1132/2023)

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  IN THE MATTER of the HONG KONG REAL ESTATE AGENCIES GENERAL ASSOCIATION LIMITED (香港地產代理商總會有限公司) (the “Association”);
  IN THE MATTER of Order 102 of the Rules of High Court (Cap 4A);
  and
  IN THE MATTER of Sections 728‑730 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622).

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BETWEEN

  UNIQUE REALTY LIMITED
(譽林地產有限公司)
1st Plaintiff
  UNITED PROSPER REAL ESTATE CO LTD
(協榮物業有限公司)
2nd Plaintiff
  and  
  HONG KONG REAL ESTATE AGENCIES GENERAL ASSOCIATION LIMITED
(香港地產代理商總會有限公司)
1st Defendant
  YU CHUNG LIT (余忠烈) trading as
PO SHING PROPERTY CO (寶盛地產公司)
2nd Defendant
  YING LOK PROPERTY LIMITED
(盈樂地產有限公司)
3rd Defendant
  SILVER POWER PROPERTY AGENCY LIMITED
(銀力地產代理有限公司)
4th Defendant
  LEUNG MO LIN (梁慕蓮) trading as
HANG FUNG PROPERTY AGENCY CO
(恆豐地產公司)
5th Defendant
  WONG MAN LING (王曼玲) trading as
DAIRY ESTATE DECORATION ENG CO
(大利地產裝飾工程公司)
6th Defendant
TUNG SHU MEI (董澍媚) trading as
KIN YIP PROPERTY DECORATION WORKS
(建業地產裝修工程公司)
7th Defendant
  HUNG CHIU YEUNG (洪朝陽) trading as TIME’S PROPERTY CO
 (時代地產)
8th Defendant
  KWOK YING ELAINE (郭盈) trading as
GRAND PROPERTY (尊尚物業)
9th Defendant
  KAMSON PROPERTY AGENCY LIMITED
(金誠物業代理有限公司)
10th Defendant
  WISE CONSULTANCY LIMITED
(蔚城顧問有限公司)
11th Defendant
  CHUP WANG AGENCY LIMITED
(捷宏代理有限公司)
12th Defendant
  YAU WO YAU (邱和友) trading as
KAM HUNG PROPERTY CO (錦鴻地產公司)
13th Defendant
  LAND MOBILE PROPERTY CONSULTANT LTD
(中大策略物業顧問行有限公司)
14th Defendant
WONG CHING KUM (黃靜琴) trading as
WINFAIR ESTATE AGENCY (永暉地產代理)
15th Defendant
  CHAN PIK YUK (陳碧玉) trading as
GOLDEN PALACE PROPERTY  (金鑾物業)
16th Defendant
  ONE PROPERTY CONSULTANT LIMITED
(匯一物業代理有限公司)
17th Defendant
  CITY PROPERTY LIMITED
(城巿地產代理有限公司)
18th Defendant
  CHEE SHING PROPERTIES LIMITED
(置城物業有限公司)
19th Defendant
  CHONG STRONG LIMITED
(莊細莊有限公司)
20th Defendant
  BEST HOME AGENCY LIMITED
(安家代理有限公司)
21st Defendant

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Before: Hon Poon CJHC and Barma JA in Court
Dates of Written Submissions: 2, 16, 22 & 23 July 2024
Date of Judgment: 27 May 2025

___________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________

The Court:

Introduction

1.By an originating summons dated 19 July 2023, the plaintiffs sought a summary determination of the validity of an election of the 16th Executive Committee (“EC”) of the 1st defendant’s Central-Western District Branch (“CW Branch”), held on 11 April 2023, at its Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”). The CW Branch is one of the 12 branches of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs were not elected at the said EGM but claimed that they were instead validly elected as members of the EC in another apparent Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) held by the CW Branch two days later on 13 April 2023. They contended that the election of the 16th EC at the EGM was invalid for breach of the 1st defendant’s articles of association.

2.By a judgment dated 1 February 2024, (the “Judgment”), Mr Justice Anthony Chan ruled against the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs. He held that the election held at the EGM of the CW Branch was not invalid for breach of the 1st defendant’s articles of association. The plaintiffs were thus held not to be validly elected as members of the EC of the CW Branch at its subsequent AGM.[1]

3.The plaintiffs then appealed.

4.By a summons dated 26 April 2024, the 2nd to 21st defendants, who were the elected members of the 16th EC pursuant to the EGM of the CW Branch held on 11 April 2023, seek security of costs in relation to the plaintiffs’ appeal in the amount of HK$198,600.[2] By a summons dated 10 May 2024, the 1st defendant also seeks security of costs in relation to the plaintiffs’ appeal in the amount of HK$535,000. Both applications are made on the ground that the plaintiffs are impecunious.

5.Having considered the papers, we are of the view that it is appropriate to deal with the two applications based on written submissions only, without an oral hearing, pursuant to Order 59 r14A(1) of the Rules of the High Court (RHC) (Cap 4A).

Discussion

6.The principles giving the Court’s exercise of the discretion in ordering security for costs of appeal under Order 59 rule 10(5) of the RHC are well established:

(1)  The “special circumstances” referred to in the rule which justify the ordering of security include cases of insolvency or impecuniosity and difficulty or expense of enforcing an adverse costs order. The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the plaintiff is impecunious.

(2)  In discharging the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff is impecunious, the defendant is not expected to produce conclusive evidence of the plaintiff’s lack of means. It is sufficient for the defendant to point to the surrounding circumstances or adduce some credible evidence in support of his belief that the plaintiff will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs. It is then up to the plaintiff to adduce such evidence as he thinks fit to demonstrate his means or to contradict the defendant’s evidence. The court shall decide whether a reasonable person with ordinary experience of daily life would consider the plaintiff unable to pay such costs. The threshold is just one of adducing credible evidence for the belief and falls short of proof of lack of means to pay: Re Estate of Nina Kung (Security for Costs) [2023] 2 HKLRD 1221 per Cheung JA at [7].

(3)  As a matter of practice, once an applicant for security can demonstrate that impecuniosity (or some other factor such as difficulty or expense in enforcing a costs order) exists, while the Court retains an overall discretion whether or not to make the order, it would then generally be up to the party resisting the application for security to demonstrate countervailing factors which would militate against such an order being made. A common countervailing factor to resist applications for security are the merits of an appeal. On consideration of the merits of the appeal, while a detailed examination is not required, the Court should form some sort of preliminary, even instinctive view. Where the merits appear to go strongly one way or the other, this may, by itself, be a decisive factor. However, if the Court takes the view that the appeal could really go either way, then generally it will look to the existence of any other factors to tilt the balance, in the absence of which security will be ordered: Chung Kau v Hong Kong Housing Authority & Ors [2004] 2 HKLRD 650 per Ma CJHC (as he then was) at [14].

7.Here, the defendants contend that based on the evidence before the court, an inference ought to be made that the plaintiffs are impecunious and that they would likely encounter undue delay or be put to undue expense in enforcing any order for costs in relation to the plaintiffs’ appeal.

8.The 1st defendant points to the following in support of its case of the plaintiffs’ impecuniosity:

(1)  On the face of the evidence, it does not appear that the plaintiffs have substantial assets. The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs have small paid-up capitals, being HK$10,000 and HK$1000 respectively. The registered office addresses of the plaintiffs do not appear to belong to the 1st or 2nd plaintiff on the basis of a land search conducted at the Land Registry. There are no known assets of the plaintiffs.

(2)  There was no information whatsoever of any matters or information relating to the plaintiffs’ current financial position. There is no evidence of any business dealings, bank statements or even unaudited management accounts. No audited accounts of either the 1st or 2nd plaintiff were disclosed. The only evidence produced by the plaintiffs were of various business licences and certificates, which are insufficient evidence of the plaintiffs’ financial condition.

9.The 2nd to 21st defendants similarly point to a lack of evidence showing that the plaintiffs have sufficient means to pay the costs below and of the appeal, pointing out that the operation of the plaintiffs’ business as estate agents are as service providers and do not require owning of any assets. They also refer to the expiration of the plaintiff’s status as members of the 1st defendant on 30 November 2023 and 31 March 2024 respectively and claim that they no longer have locus standi to sue and that the matter under appeal is in any event academic.

10.The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that the defendants have not been able to discharge the burden of establishing that the plaintiffs are allegedly impecunious or that this case falls under the “special circumstances” under Order 59 rule 10(5) RHC. They also claim that their intended appeal is meritorious and not academic.

11.In our view, the fact that the plaintiffs’ small paid up capital; that the lack of apparent ownership of assets, that the fact that the plaintiffs do not require the holding of any assets for the operation of their businesses, and that the complete absence of any evidence relating to the plaintiff’s current financial information or business returns, do cast serious doubt on whether the plaintiffs have means of pay an adverse costs order.

12.We also find it telling that when the defendants raised doubts as to the plaintiff’s ability to pay costs in correspondence, the plaintiffs have not produced any meaningful evidence to address their concerns. The plaintiffs could only assert that they were “running their business of an ongoing concern in the industry of estate agency” and that they intended to continue to do the same, without, however, producing any evidence or information of their business dealings, bank statements, or audited accounts. When the solicitors of the 1st defendant requested for copies of the plaintiffs’ audited reports in the past two years to support the plaintiffs’ assertion of their “ongoing concern”, the plaintiffs refused to provide the same. They only produced ongoing business licences and certificates but that falls far short of showing that they have the requisite financial ability.

13.In our view, from the available evidence, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that the plaintiffs are indeed impecunious.

14.As to the merits (or lack of merits) of the appeal, we do not find them to be such as to be decisive on the issue of security for costs either way.

15.We also do not see any other factors that will tilt the balance in favour of not ordering security against the plaintiffs.

16.In conclusion, we find it just to exercise our discretion to order the plaintiffs to pay security for the defendants’ costs of the appeal.

17.Turning to quantum, the principles concerning the assessment of the quantum of security for costs are summarised in Thapa Hari Bahadur v Paramount Engineering & Manpower Services Ltd [2022] HKCA 1516, per Au JA at [40]:

(1)  First, the Court normally takes a broad-brush approach and does not conduct a taxation of the respondent’s costs in fixing the quantum of security. Instead, the exercise on which it is engaged is to arrive at an appropriate estimation of the likely amount of costs which would be ordered to be paid by the appellant to the respondent on a party and party taxation.

(2)  Second, one of the factors to bear in mind when fixing the amount is the underlying objectives in Order 1A, rule 1 of the RHC, in particular rule 1(c) and (d) which highlight proportionality in conduct of proceedings and fairness between the parties.

(3)  Third, to facilitate the Court’s discretion on the appropriate amount of security, the applicant’s legal representatives must provide a realistic estimate of the time and costs likely to be incurred in each stage of the proceedings which must bear some logical correlation to the complexity of the case and the issues involved. Otherwise, the Court is deprived of the assistance it rightly expects.

18.The 1st defendant seeks the sum of HK$535,000. Having considered the complexity of the case and the issues involved, we consider that the estimated of the solicitors’ costs on the appeal (HK$382,800) to be on the high side and these should be substantially reduced. Taking a broad-brush approach, we consider that the appropriate amount of security should be HK$150,000.

19.The 2nd to 21st defendants seek security in the sum of HK$198,600. We will also reduce this to HK150,000.

Order

20.We therefore make the following orders:

(1)  The plaintiffs do pay into court within 28 days: (i) the sum of HK$150,000 as security for the 1st defendant’s costs of the plaintiffs’ appeal; and (ii) the sum of HK$150,000 as security for the 2nd to 21st defendants’ costs of the plaintiffs’ appeal.

(2)  The appeal is stayed until the sums are paid.

(3)  In default of payment, the appeal is dismissed without further order together with costs to the 1st defendant and the 2nd to 21st defendants.

(4)  The 1st defendant and the 2nd to 21st defendants to have the costs of their present applications, summarily assessed, respectively at HK$80,000 and HK$80,000.

(Jeremy Poon)
Chief Judge of the
High Court
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal

Written submissions by Mr Thomas Yeon, instructed by Christine M Koo & Ip, Solicitors & Notaries LLP, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Written submissions by Mr Joseph Wong, instructed by Li, Kwok & Law, for the 1st defendant

Written submissions by Ms Kitty Tsang, instructed by Paul Kwong & Co. for the 2nd to 21st defendants



[1]  The Reasons for Judgment was handed down on 2 February 2024: [2024] HKCFI 418.

[2]  By the same summons, the 2nd to 21st defendants also seek to adduce new evidence as to the plaintiffs’ expiration of membership in the 1st defendant on 30 November 2023 and 31 March 2024 respectively, which is not opposed by the plaintiffs.