李鳳欣 and Another v. Harvest Trade Investments Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCCT 83/2024 on BabelCite. This 高等法院原訟法庭 judgment was delivered on 16 May 2025 before Deputy High Court Judge Jonathan Wong.
仲裁法 — 反仲裁禁制令 — 仲裁協議的效力 — 管轄權挑戰 — 資產保全令 — 既判力 — 受讓人責任 — 本案因股份買賣協議而生的多重仲裁及訴訟爭議。原告尋求阻止被告在CIETAC香港分會的仲裁程序，主張仲裁協議無效、管轄權錯誤、仲裁程序濫用及參加者資格爭議。法院詳列適用於反仲裁禁制令的嚴格標準及程序司法權干預原則，引用多項案例支持將有效性及程序性爭議優先交由仲裁庭裁決。對於重覆於北京仲裁中已決事項，法院認為該部分索償為濫用程序，遂頒出有限禁制令。鄰近利益及程序適當性考量令其他禁制申請未能獲批。最終宣布部分禁制令，駁回被告反對申請，並就訴訟費用達成初步分配。此案有助闡明香港法院對仲裁自主性與司法干預界限的確認。
Legal issues: Whether valid arbitration agreement · Whether Further Condition satisfied and arbitration institution proper · Whether current arbitration is vexatious, oppressive and/or abusive · Locus of the 2nd Plaintiff (whether proper party to arbitration)
Outcome: 就被告對原告提出之違約金申索，授予反仲裁禁制令；其餘申索及禁制令申請駁回。
Cites 10 cases
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HCCT 83/2024 [2025] HKCFI 2004 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS NO 83 OF 2024 _________________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1.Introduction 1.1The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (respectively “P1” and “P2” and collectively “Ps”) are respectively the wife and daughter of the late Mr Gong Guoqiang (“Mr Gong”). By their originating summons dated 11 July 2024 (“OS”), Ps seek an anti-arbitration injunction to restrain the Defendant (“D”) from pursuing the arbitral proceedings (“Current Arbitration”) commenced at the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Hong Kong Arbitration Center (“CIETAC Hong Kong”). 1.2In addition to the OS, before me is also D’s summons dated 9 October 2024 (“Summons”) for leave to adduce and rely on the 2nd Affirmation of Mr Wong Kwok Lik (respectively “Wong 2nd” and “Mr Wong”). 1.3At the hearing, Ps were represented by Mr Kenny Lin (with Mr Victor Lau) and D by Mr Clark Wang. 2.Background 2.1The background matters are largely taken from the Agreed Chronology lodged by the parties. 2.2On 23 July 2012, the following parties entered into a sale and purchase agreement (“Agreement”) in respect of the shares of a Hong Kong company called “华顺达置业有限公司” (“Holding Company”): (1) D and Profit Sheen International Limited (“Profit Sheen”) as the seller (甲方), (2) Mr Wong as the guarantor of the seller, (3) Truetech Investments Limited (“Truetech”) as the purchaser (乙方) and (4) Mr He Zhiqiang (“Mr He”) and Mr Gong as the guarantors of the purchaser. 2.3The sole business of the Holding Company was to hold a Mainland company called “广州市华商贸房产发展有限公司” which held a 74% interest in a real estate project in Guangzhou known as “东湖广场” (“Project”). 2.4On 29 July 2012, the parties to the Agreement entered into a supplemental agreement (“Supplemental Agreement” and together with the Agreement “SPA”). 2.5At the time of the execution of the SPA, D was the overwhelming majority shareholder of the Holding Company. Subsequently in October 2017, Profit Sheen assigned its rights under the SPA to D. 2.6The dispute resolution mechanism under the SPA is set out at Clause 12 of the Agreement:
2.7On 29 April 2016, Mr Gong passed away. 2.8Disputes arose between the parties. On 6 November 2016, D commenced arbitral proceedings against Truetech and Mr He at the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission in the Mainland (“CIETAC”), which proceedings were eventually withdrawn by D on 9 May 2019 (“Withdrawn Proceedings”). Whilst the Withdrawn Proceedings were afoot, Truetech and Mr He had made challenges against the validity of Clause 12.2 of the Agreement. The primary contention raised by Truetech and Mr He was that Clause 12.2 referred to both litigation in court and arbitration (“或裁或審”) and was therefore invalid. Those challenges were dismissed by the Beijing No 4 Intermediate People’s Court on 19 March 2018 (“19/3/18 Judgments”) on the following basis:
2.9Prior to the withdrawal of the Withdrawn Proceedings, on 17 January 2019, D commenced another set of arbitral proceedings against Truetech, Mr He and Mr Gong at CIETAC (“Beijing Arbitration”). In the Request for Arbitration (“Original Claims”), reliance was placed on the 19/3/18 Judgments on the validity of Clause 12.2 of the Agreement. 2.10As Mr Gong had already passed away, on 3 February 2019, D substituted Ps in place of Mr Gong in the Beijing Arbitration. As such, the respondents in the Beijing Arbitration were Truetech, Mr He and Ps (collectively “Beijing Respondents”). 2.11On 15 August 2019, D filed a notice of amendment of the Original Claims in the Beijing Arbitration (“Amended Claims”). 2.12The trial of the Amended Claims and the Beijing Respondents’ counterclaims in the Beijing Arbitration took place on 22 August 2019 and the Arbitral Tribunal published its award on 29 December 2020 (“Award”), by which the Arbitral Tribunal largely found in D’s favour. 2.13On 1 November 2021, D applied to the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court to enforce the Award. In May 2023, the sums awarded to D by the Award were satisfied. D received RMB80,459,321.40 in total. 2.14Thereafter, on 9 February 2024, D commenced the Current Arbitration. The respondents in the Current Arbitration (“Hong Kong Respondents”) are the same as those in the Beijing Arbitration, namely Truetech, Mr He and Ps. 2.15The Hong Kong Respondents have all made jurisdictional challenges to CIETAC Hong Kong which are pending determination (“Pending Jurisdictional Challenges”). However, prior of their determination, Ps issued the OS. On the other hand, without prejudice to the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges, Truetech and Mr He filed their defence and counterclaim in the Current Arbitration. 3.Grounds advanced by Ps 3.1The following grounds are advanced by Ps to justify the anti-arbitration injunction sought. 3.2First, Ps say that Clause 12.2 of the Agreement is not a valid arbitration agreement (“Ground (1)”). 3.3Secondly, in any event, the commencement of the Current Arbitration on the basis that it should be administered by CIETAC Hong Kong is not permissible under Clause 12.2 of the Agreement (“Ground (2)”). 3.4Thirdly, even were Clause 12.2 of the Agreement a valid arbitration agreement, the Current Arbitration is vexatious, oppressive and/or abusive, on the basis that the disputes between the parties have already been decided in the Beijing Arbitration. Even were res judicata in the narrow sense not applicable, the issues raised in the Current Arbitration offend the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 (“Ground (3)”). 3.5Fourthly, P2 is not a proper respondent in the Current Arbitration (“Ground (4)”). 4.The applicable principles 4.1The principles applicable to the grant of an anti-arbitration injunction are set out in 廈門新景地集團有限公司 formerly known as廈門市鑫新景地房地產有限公司 v Eton Properties Limited & Anor [2023] HKCFI 1327:
4.2In the context of the grounds raised by Ps, it is pertinent to note the following further observations. 4.3First, Grounds (1), (2) and (4) essentially raise a dispute over the validity of Clause 12.2 of the Agreement. Where there is a dispute over the validity of an arbitration agreement, it would generally be appropriate for that issue to be left in the first instance to be determined by the arbitral tribunal (Eton Properties §29). Analogously, in respect of an application to stay court proceedings in favour of arbitration, section 20(1) of the AO gives effect to Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 8 of the Model Law provides as follows:
4.4In the above regard, the principles governing a stay in favour of arbitration are well-established. As set out at Mice Engineering Ltd v Johnson Controls Hong Kong Limited [2022] HKCFI 2768 §§17-18 (and the further cases cited therein):
4.5In my view, the above established principles governing a stay application made under section 20 of the AO provide an analogously useful reference. As noted at Eton Properties §29 (citing Claxton Engineering Services Ltd v TXM [2012] 1 CLC 326):
4.6Secondly, in cases where the question of res judicata or issue estoppel is raised (as here by Ground (3)), Eton Properties §53 observes as follows:
4.7It is right, however, to point out that a limited anti-arbitration injunction was granted in Eton Properties (§58), on the bases that the plaintiff in that case had clearly shown that some issues were not covered by and not within the scope of the relevant arbitration agreement and any arbitration of such issues vexatious, oppressive and an abuse of process in seeking to attack various judgments of the Hong Kong courts. 4.8To supplement the preceding paragraph, the following observations are also made in SA v KB [2016] 2 HKLRD 1249:
4.9With the above principles in mind, I turn to address the grounds advanced by Ps. However, before doing so, I should set out a number of preliminary observations. 4.10First, the issues raised by Ps in the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges are identical to those which fall for determination in the OS. Although not addressed in the evidence, I enquired and was told by the parties at the hearing that the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges have been held up due to the fact that one of the arbitrators had to be replaced due to an issue of conflict. There is no suggestion that following the replacement of the conflicted arbitrator, the constituted arbitral tribunal would not then proceed to deal with the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges. 4.11The question the court then raised with Mr Lin was whether there was any justification for the court to determine the same issues in parallel, especially given the principles set out in the preceding section. Mr Lin initially submitted that were the arbitral tribunal to determine the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges against Ps (namely deciding that the arbitral tribunal does have jurisdiction over the Current Arbitration), that decision would be final and Ps would be left without recourse. 4.12The initial position adopted by Mr Lin is plainly incorrect. In the course of the hearing, Mr Lin was referred to section 34 of the AO. Section 34 adopts Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 16(3) provides as follows:
4.13In other words, were the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges determined against Ps, they clearly have recourse pursuant to section 34 of the AO to request the court to decide the matter on a de novo basis. 4.14In the light of the principles set out above, it seems to me that the existence of the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges is a weighty factor against the grant of the injunctive relief sought by Ps, at least in respect of Grounds (1), (2) and (4) which are typical jurisdictional challenges often dealt with in an application made pursuant to section 20 of the AO. Unless there is a clear cut conclusion, it seems to me that Ps have a difficult task of demonstrating that deferring the decision at first instance to the arbitral tribunal would be vexatious, oppressive and/or abusive, which as set out at SA §89, has to be established on the balance of probabilities. 4.15Secondly, whilst I agree with Mr Wang that Ground (3) is a merit issue, I do not agree with his primary position that Ps are asking the court to usurp the function of the arbitral tribunal and Ps should not even be permitted to raise Ground (3). As pointed out at §§4.6-4.8 above, in an appropriate case, the court should not hesitate to halt proceedings which are vexatious, oppressive and/or abusive. 4.16The third preliminary observation is on D’s submission that Ps are estopped from contending against the validity of Clause 12.2 of the Agreement in the Current Arbitration by reason of their participation in the Beijing Arbitration. No direct authority has been cited by Mr Wang in support of this proposition. One can well understand that having participated in the Beijing Arbitration, Ps cannot then turn around to disavow the validity of the Beijing Arbitration, for example in the enforcement stage. But it seems to me that it is an entirely different proposition to suggest that Ps are now estopped from challenging the Current Arbitration, especially where the circumstances between the Beijing Arbitration and the Current Arbitration are different, not least in terms of the disputed issue on the seat of the arbitration. In any event, for the reasons set out below, this part of Mr Wang’s submission is not germane to my resolution of the issues in the present case. 5.Ground (1): Whether valid arbitration agreement 5.1I reproduce here again Clause 12.2 of the Agreement, with my annotations in square brackets:
5.2There is no dispute that the Friendly Negotiation Procedure does not feature in the present deliberation. 5.3Ps rely on a number of matters to contend that Clause 12.2 is not a valid arbitration agreement. 5.4First, Mr Lin argues that by Clause 12.0 of the Agreement (reproduced at §2.5 above), parties have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong court and as such there was no valid arbitration agreement. 5.5I do not agree. As has been held at Tongcheng Travel Holdings Limited v OOO Securities (HK) group Limited [2024] HKCFI 2710 §32, it is eminently arguable that the inclusion of a jurisdictional clause in favour of the Hong Kong court may be construed to mean that the Hong Kong court is to have supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings commenced. 5.6Secondly, Mr Lin argues that by the Dispute Resolution Clause, the parties have agreed to litigate or arbitrate at the Hong Kong Judiciary which is an impossibility as the Hong Kong Judiciary does not conduct arbitration. 5.7I am unable to accept Mr Lin’s construction of the Dispute Resolution Clause is the sensible or only sensible construction. In my view, it is plainly arguable that the Dispute Resolution Clause should be construed as providing the options to either bring litigation in the Hong Kong court or proceed with arbitration. I note in particular that unless the Further Condition is satisfied (upon which CIETAC would be the agreed institution to administer the arbitration), the parties have not agreed on the applicable arbitral rules and procedures. In such circumstances, the Hong Kong court clearly has a role even at the commencement of an arbitration which does not satisfy the Further Condition, for example in the appointment of arbitrators under section 24 of the AO. 5.8Thirdly, Mr Lin argues that Clause 12.2 of the Agreement does not contain a mandatory agreement to arbitrate, in that it contemplates either litigation or arbitration as an option for dispute resolution. 5.9However, as has been held at William Company v Chu Kong Agency Co Ltd [1995] 2 HKLR 139 §§10-15, an arbitration agreement giving the parties the option to have their disputes either through arbitration or litigation is not void for uncertainty. At §14, Kaplan J said as follows:
5.10In the more recent case of G v P [2023] HKCFI 2173, Mimmie Chan J observed as follows:
5.11For the above reasons, I am not persuaded by Mr Lin that Ps have shown that there is no prima facie case that Clause 12.2 of the Agreement amounts to a valid arbitration agreement. As such, I do not regard an anti-arbitration should be granted on the basis of Ground (1). I am not satisfied that deferring Ground (1) to the arbitral tribunal for determination at first instance is vexatious, oppressive and/or abusive. 6.Ground (2): The Further Condition 6.1As I understand Mr Lin, there are two levels of arguments mounted in relation to Ground (2). 6.2First, Mr Lin contends that in order for the parties to resort to arbitration administered by CIETAC, the Further Condition requires (1) that the disputes involve the preservation of assets in the Mainland and (2) that the Hong Kong court has no power to rule on or coordinate the disputes. Mr Lin says that the Further Condition is not satisfied. 6.3Secondly, even were the Further Condition satisfied, the proper arbitral institution to administer the arbitral proceedings is CIETAC, not CIETAC Hong Kong. 6.4In relation to Mr Lin’s first argument, the following factual matters are pertinent. D commenced the Current Arbitration on 9 February 2024. Shortly thereafter, on 15 March 2024, D, in aid of the Current Arbitration, obtained an asset preservation order from the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court against Truetech, Mr He, and Ps (“Asset Preservation Order”). However, it appears that only assets belonging to Mr He were identified in the Asset Preservation Order. 6.5Two points are made by Mr Lin. First, he says that D’s claims in the Current Arbitration do not involve any preservation of assets in the Mainland. Secondly, he argues that the Asset Preservation Order does not identify any assets belonging to Ps. 6.6In my view, there is plainly a prima facie case that the Further Condition is satisfied, therefore entitling it to commence a CIETAC arbitration, for the following reasons:
6.7In relation to Mr Lin’s second argument, I think Mr Wang has fairly accepted that there is a tension between the Beijing Arbitration and the Current Arbitration. Mr Wang explains that, as a matter of practicality, the Beijing Arbitration was instituted in the Mainland since the Arrangement was not in effect at the time of the commencement of the Beijing Arbitration, and as a result, D was unable to obtain any asset preservation order in aid of arbitration in Hong Kong. Prior to the commencement of the Beijing Arbitration, on 15 January 2019, D did obtain an asset preservation order in aid of the Beijing Arbitration. Mr Wang, however, submits that the previous tension does not detract from the clear intention of the parties, namely to arbitrate in Hong Kong. He therefore reasons that the Current Arbitration satisfies the second limb of Article 76(2) of the CIETAC Rules[2]. Article 76 of the CIETAC Rules provides:
6.8On reflection, I can see the force of Mr Lin’s following counter-arguments. He points out that CIETAC Hong Kong had not been established at the time of the execution of the SPA. Therefore, even were the Further Condition satisfied, the parties must have intended that the arbitral proceedings would be one “seated” in the Mainland. Mr Lin therefore reasons that the Article 76(2) of the CIETAC Rules does not assist D. 6.9The difference between an arbitration administered by CIETAC and one administered by CIETAC Hong Kong may be significant. Were the arbitral proceedings administered by CIETAC Hong Kong, under Article 77 of the CIETAC Rules, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the place of arbitration shall be Hong Kong and the law applicable to the arbitral proceedings shall be the arbitration law of Hong Kong and the arbitral award shall be a Hong Kong award. 6.10I agree with Mr Wang that Mr Lin’s second argument is one concerning the interpretation of CIETAC Rules. In arguing that Article 76 of the CIETAC Rules has not been satisfied, Ps are not disputing the intention to arbitrate but whether the arbitration should be administered by CIETAC or CIETAC Hong Kong. 6.11I further agree with Mr Wang that the propriety of commencement of the Current Arbitration at CIETAC Hong Kong should properly be characterized as a procedural dispute. The combined effect of Articles 2(2)[3], 2(3)[4] and 2(6)[5] of the CIETAC Rules, is (1) CIETAC Hong Kong is a branch of CIETAC, (2) the CIETAC Arbitration Court may authorize and designate a sub-commission/arbitration centre (including CIETAC Hong Kong) to administer relevant cases having regard to the circumstances of such cases and (3) importantly, in the event of any dispute on the precise sub-commission/arbitration centre, a decision shall be made by CIETAC. 6.12Further, according to Article 87(2), the CIETAC Rules shall be interpreted by CIETAC. 6.13I therefore accept Mr Wang’s submission that the foregoing factors are such that Ground (2) should at first instance be decided in the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges. 6.14For the above reasons, I am of the view that Ground 2 does not justify the grant of an anti-arbitration injunction. 7.Ground (3): Whether current arbitration vexatious, oppressive and/or abusive 7.1The parties have at my request prepared a Scott Schedule which is annexed hereto as Annexure 1. The Scott Schedule has helpfully set out (1) the claims pursued in the Original Claims, (2) the claims pursued in the Amended Claims, (3) the parties’ respective positions on what was decided in the Beijing Arbitration, (4) the parties’ respective positions on the claims pursued in the Current Arbitration and (5) the parties’ respective positions on whether the identified claims should be injuncted. As may be seen from the Scott Schedule, the relevant issues for present purposes are Issues (2), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9). 7.2According to the Request for Arbitration for the Current Arbitration, Issue (5), namely whether Ps are liable to pay liquidated damages in the sum of RMB 100,000,000 is an alternative claim (Request for Arbitration §75(1)(d)). 7.3Similar to the observations made at Eton Properties §50, a particular feature in the present case is that the SPA has not been terminated and is continuing. At Eton Properties §50, Mimmie Chan J observed as follows:
7.4It is part of D’s case (disputed by Ps) that the claims made in the Current Arbitration are based on events which occurred between 2019 and 2023 and causes of action that only arose after the Beijing Arbitration was already in progress or after it was completed. As is plain from the Scott Schedule, res judicata in the narrow sense is only made in respect of Issues (5) and (8). For the other issues, Ps’ argument is that they should or could have been raised in the Beijing Arbitration. 7.5No authority has been cited by Ps to show that an anti-arbitration injunction has been granted on the basis that the rule in Henderson v Henderson has been offended. As Ps accept, by reference to Ngai Few Fung v Cheung Kwai Heung [2008] 2 HKC 111, it is one thing to refuse to allow a party to relitigate a question which has already been decided, it is quite another to deny him the opportunity of litigating for the first time a question which has not been previously adjudicated on. In so far as the rule in Henderson v Henderson suggests that there is a presumption against the brining of successive actions, the Court of Appeal considered that that is a distortion of the true position. 7.6In my view, unless a point is clear cut on the present material, the less I say about the dispute the better. As has been pleaded in the Defence and Counterclaim filed by Truetech and Mr He in the Current Arbitration, Ground 3 is specifically raised as a defence. Having considered the Scott Schedule and the submissions, I am not satisfied that there is a clear-cut answer on Issues (2), (6), (7), (8) and (9) and they should be left for adjudication in arbitration, in accordance with the general approach set out at §4.6 above. 7.7I am however satisfied that Ps have clearly shown that Issue (5), namely that relating to the issue of liquidated damages was decided against D in the Beijing Arbitration. I do not agree with Mr Wang’s submission that the Award never decided on the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause itself. 7.8The following is stated at pages 107-108 and 117 of the Award:
7.9In my view, the above passages have dealt with the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause against D, on the basis that it was penal in nature. As such, I agree with Mr Lin that it matters not that the breaches relied on by D in the Current Arbitration are different from those in the Beijing Arbitration. 7.10I am therefore satisfied that D’s claim for liquidated damages in the Current Arbitration is vexatious, oppressive and an abuse of process in seeking to attack the Award. Insofar as necessary, I also take into account that D’s claim for liquidated damages is an alternative claim, and to that extent, any potential injustice caused is as a result mitigated. 8.Ground (4): Locus of P2 8.1Section 22(1) of the AO provides:
8.2In the present case, P1 is the administratrix of the estate of the late Mr Gong in Hong Kong. It is accepted by Mr Lin that D can legitimately commence the Current Arbitration against P1 in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate. 8.3P2, however, is only sued as a beneficiary of the estate of the late Mr Gong. D points out that the letter of administration in respect of the estate of the late Mr Gong only deals with the Hong Kong real properties. D relies on the fact that under PRC Succession Law: (1) P1 and P2 are the only members of the category of beneficiaries entitled to inherit at least Mr Gong’s sizeable pool of landed properties located in the Mainland, (2) there is no division of labour between a legal representative and a beneficiary, and (3) P1 and P2 are liable to repay the debt of Mr Gong to the extent not higher than the value of the estate that they are entitled to inherit. 8.4But for the existence of Ground (2), I would have granted an anti-injunction on the basis that P2 is not a proper party. In my view, D cannot derive assistance from PRC Succession Law. According to D’s PRC law expert:
8.5In my view, Article 33 of the PRC Succession Law only mandates that the entitled beneficiaries are liable to settle the tax liabilities and debts of the deceased. The Current Arbitration is only concerned with the adjudication stage, namely to ascertain whether Mr Gong is indebted to D as claimed. It seems to me that it is only when D prevails against P1 (in her capacity of the personal representative of the late Mr Gong) then P2 may become relevant in the process of execution. In my view, under section 22(1) of the AO, only P1 and not P2 is the proper party to the arbitration agreement set out in Clause 12.2 of the Agreement. 8.6However, there is an uncertainty on how CIETAC would decide on Ground 2 in the Pending Jurisdictional Challenges, for example whether CIETAC may decide that the Current Arbitration should be administered by one of its branches in the Mainland, and upon that eventuality, whether Article 77 of the CIETAC Rules continues to apply, namely the law applicable to the arbitral proceedings (as opposed to the proper law of the dispute) is the arbitration law of Hong Kong. 8.7I therefore am not minded to grant an anti-arbitration injunction on the basis of Ground (4). 9.The Summons 9.1Wong 2nd consists primarily of submissions. I do not find that it has any influence on the result of the case. 9.2I dismiss the Summons. 10.Conclusion 10.1For the above reasons, I grant an order in terms of OS §§(1) and (2) but only in respect of D’s claim against Ps for liquidated damages. In case of disagreement, parties are to submit a draft order for my approval within 7 days hereof. 10.2I also make an order that D is to pay to Ps the costs of the Summons to be taxed if not agreed. In respect of the OS, it seems to me that given only the limited success of Ps, a fair order is that D should pay to Ps 30% of the costs of the OS (including any costs reserved) to be taxed if not agreed. The above costs orders are on an nisi basis.
Mr Kenny Lin and Mr Victor Lau, instructed by Simon C.W. Yung & Co., for the 1st - 2nd Plaintiffs Mr Clark Wang, instructed by Kwok, Ng & Chan, for the Defendant Annexure 1
[1] 《最高人民法院关于内地与香港特别行政区法院就仲裁程序相互协助保全的安排》 [2] Both parties have referred to the version which came into effect on 1 January 2024. [3] CIETAC has an Arbitration Court (“Arbitration Court”), which performs its functions in accordance with these Rules under the direction of the authorized Vice Chairman and the President of the Arbitration Court. [4] CIETAC is based in Beijing. It has sub-commissions or arbitration centers (Appendix I) [including CIETAC Hong Kong]. The sub-commissions/arbitration centers are CIETAC’s branches, which accept arbitration applications and administer arbitration cases with CIETAC’s authorization. [5] The parties may agree to submit their disputes to CIETAC or a sub-commission/arbitration center of CIETAC for arbitration. Where the parties have agreed to arbitration by CIETAC, the Arbitration Court shall accept the arbitration application and administer the case. Where the parties have agreed to arbitration by a CIETAC sub-commission/arbitration center, or have agreed to arbitrate or conduct the oral hearing in the province, autonomous region, or centrally-administered municipality where a CIETAC sub-commission/arbitration center is located, the arbitration court of that sub-commission/arbitration center shall accept the arbitration application and administer the case unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The Arbitration Court may authorize and designate a sub-commission/arbitration center to administer relevant cases having regard to the circumstances of such cases. Where the sub-commission/arbitration center agreed upon by the parties does not exist or its authorization has been terminated, or where the agreement is ambiguous, the Arbitration Court shall accept the arbitration application and administer the case. In the event of any dispute, a decision shall be made by CIETAC. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment