Re Emelita Arista
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 241/2023 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 16 June 2025.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) dated 23 June 2023 refusing to extend time for the applicant to appeal against his decision dated 19 January 2023 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 31 July 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”
Cites 6 cases
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CAMP 241/2023, [2025] HKCA 552 On an intended appeal from [2023] HKCFI 201 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 241 OF 2023 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 879/2019) ____________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) dated 23 June 2023 refusing to extend time for the applicant to appeal against his decision dated 19 January 2023 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 31 July 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 August 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim (“the Director’s Decision”). Background 2.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. She entered Hong Kong as a visitor in 2006, but she overstayed and was arrested by the police on 19 February 2017. Thereafter, she lodged a non‑refoulement claim by way of a written signification dated 28 February 2017. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by her nephew due to a land dispute. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [1] to [4] of his decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[1]. 4.By the Director’s Decision, the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the torture risk[2], persecution risk[3], the BOR 2 risk[4] and the BOR 3 risk[5]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Board against the Director’s Decision. After a hearing on 28 May 2018, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal by its Decision. In dismissing the appeal, the Board found material inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence, on which her claim of risk of harm was based, and did not accept such claim. The Judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed a Form 86 out of time on 1 April 2019, seeking to judicially review the Board’s Decision, without setting out any grounds for review. In her supporting affirmation, the applicant merely exhibited a copy of the Board’s Decision. 7.After summarising the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s and the Director’s Decisions, the Judge refused to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave at [9] to [17] of the CALL‑1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 8.The applicant’s last known address at the time of the Judge’s decision was at 382-384 King’s Road, North Point (“the Address”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the Address on 19 January 2023, and were not returned undelivered. 9.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 19 January 2023. 10.The applicant thereafter took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 6 April 2023 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which her address was also stated to be the Address. In her Summons and supporting affidavit filed on the same date, she claimed that she did not receive the Judge’s decision in the post. 11.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by the Judge on 23 June 2023[6]. 12.By a summons filed on 27 June 2023, the applicant renewed her application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons, the applicant stated that she wished to appeal against the decision given by the Judge on 23 June 2023, being the Judge’s refusal to grant an extension of time for her to appeal against his decision dated 19 January 2023. Although in the summons the applicant purported to seek leave to appeal against the decision of the Judge dated 23 June 2023, we shall treat it as a renewed application for an extension of time to appeal against the substantive decision of the Judge dated 19 January 2023, by which leave for judicial review was refused. 13.In the summons and her supporting affidavit, the applicant merely contended that the court had disregarded her “dangerous situation”. 14.In breach of the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant failed to lodge written submissions with the court. She is therefore deemed to have abandoned her right to rely on the same. 15.For completeness, we should mention that by a letter received by this court on 28 August 2023, the applicant informed the court that she would “like to request to close [her] case HCAL 879-19” because it is now safe for her to return to the Philippines. Discussion 16.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. 17.As noted above, the Judge’s decision was sent to the last known address of the applicant, i.e. at the Address, but was not returned undelivered. The inference to be drawn is that she has had notice of the Judge’s decision within the period which she was permitted to lodge an appeal. We are therefore of the view that the applicant has proffered no reasonable reason or explanation for the delay in bringing the intended appeal, nor has she explained when she had come to learn of the Judge’s decision. 18.Given the applicant’s latest request for dismissal of the present application, an order for dismissal should be granted. We have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the intended appeal. 19.The applicant has not condescended to any particulars, in the Form 86 or otherwise, as to on what basis the Board is said to have acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 20.The applicant has failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 21.It is well-established that an appeal against a refusal to grant leave for judicial review is not a fresh application for leave, and that an applicant must point to errors on the part of the Judge. This has clearly not been done here. 22.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. This court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 27 June 2023 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person [2] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [3] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. |
Cases cited in this judgment