Ale Bishnu Kumari v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 754/2025

[2025] HKCFI 2793

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 754 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 18 February 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1283 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 2 May 2025 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application.

The procedural history

4.The applicant, aged 49, is a national of Nepal. She was arrested by police on 16 November 2009 and upon investigation, she admitted to have illegally entered Hong Kong via Mainland China in August 2009. She lodged a torture claim on 16 January 2010, which was rejected by the Director on 19 April 2013. Upon implementation of the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”), she lodged a non-refoulement claim on 18 February 2013 on the basis that she would be harmed or killed by her friend, Pradeep Thapa, due to an outstanding loan.

5.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated.

6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). The Board dismissed her appeal because her evidence was not reliable.

7.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 29 April 2024.

8.She intended to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but she was out of time. She applied to the Court of the First Instance for extension of time to appeal. The Court of the First Instance refused her application on 24 October 2024.

9.By letter dated 25 November 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance.

10.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

11.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

12.The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer found that she was still in fear of the same enemies because of the same reasons. [13] The applicant further raised religious problem in that she said that she had converted from Hinduism to Christianity, which she did not raise in her previous claim. The immigration officer, however, found:

“14. … …it is considered that you had ample opportunity to at least write to us regarding your claim ‘new fear’, and that your sudden assertion on non-refoulement due to your religious conversion is not convincing.”

13.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

14.The applicant filed Form 86 on 25 March 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

15.In her affidavit in support of her application, the applicant said that her loan is still outstanding, and that her husband and family are angry with her for her religious conversion and they will kill her if she returns to Nepal. She had also sent a letter to the Court repeating the same submissions to the Court.

Discussion

16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reason in her previous for this application. She further said that she had added the religious ground, but the Board did not believe her evidence. She submitted that she was not saying that the Board was wrong, however, she wanted this Court to review the Board’s Decision.

18.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicant failed to satisfy the conditions in support of her application for subsequent claim.

19.Those reasons in her affidavit and her letter are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision because the immigration officer had refused to accept her conversion as the fact of her case. It is within the Board’s province to assess her evidence. The applicant has not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision.

20.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application.

25.The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she wanted to thank the government to allow her to stay here. She asked for more time to stay in Hong Kong.

26.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

27.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant.

The applicant appeared in person.