Faruk Md v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 915/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 July 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 24 June 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1110 of 2017(“the previous application”).
Cites 6 cases
|
HCAL 915/2025 [2025] HKCFI 2911 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 915 OF 2025 ________________________
_____________
_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 24 June 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1110 of 2017(“the previous application”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 28 May 2025 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. The procedural history 4.The applicant, aged 55, is a national of Bangladesh. He has raised a non-refoulement claim with the Director on the basis that, if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the members of the Awami League (“AL”) because he had assisted its rival party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. 5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board rejected his evidence in support of his claim and dismissed his appeal. 6.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 12 June 2018. He appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. 7.He filed a notice of motion seeking leave to the Court of Final Appeal and the Court of Appeal dismissed his notice of motion. 8.His application to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal was dismissed on 20 April 2020. 9.By letter dated 9 June 2020 the applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 10.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 11.Upon the immigration officer’s advice, he had submitted additional materials in support of his application that his wife was harassed by a man, whom he believed to be a member of the AL and that his cousin had disappeared. He also believed that this was the result of the acts of the members of the AL. 12.The immigration officer considered his evidence and found that his belief was only his speculation as there was no evidence to show that the man, who harassed his wife was a member of the AL and his cousin’s disappearance had any connection with the AL. The immigration officer therefore took the view that the applicant relied on the similar reasons in his previous claim. His claim was therefore treated as a continuation of his previous claim. Besides, the immigration officer also found that state protection will be available to him and internal relocation is viable if he returns to his country. 13.For those reasons, the immigration officer was not satisfied with the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and he refused his application for subsequent claim. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 14.The applicant filed Form 86 on 16 April 2025 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 15.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has not raised any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied on the same reasons in his previous claim in support of this application. 18.There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 19.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 20.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 24.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 25.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 26.RPO in terms of paragraph 24 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1] The applicable risks are:
| |||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment