Jondhi Pranoto v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 905/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 1 August 2025.

1. By Form 86 filed on 14 May 2020 (the “ Form 86 ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 8 May 2020 (the “ Board’s Decision ”) and the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 September 2019 (the “ DOI Decision ”).

Cites 5 cases

Case No.HCAL 905/2020[2025] HKCFI 3076
Court
High Court CFI
Date01 Aug 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 905/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3076

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 905 of 2020

BETWEEN

  Jondhi Pranoto Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
1st Putative
Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration 2nd Putative
    Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;          or
   consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Val Chow:

1.  The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion that:

a.  The Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office be made the 1st Putative Respondent

b.  The Director of Immigration be made the 2nd Putative Respondent

2.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By Form 86 filed on 14 May 2020 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 8 May 2020 (the “Board’s Decision”) and the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 30 September 2019 (the “DOI Decision”).

2.In the Form 86, the Applicant has named both the Board and the Immigration Department as the proposed respondents and proposed interested parties. As confirmed at the oral hearing, the Applicant wishes to challenge both the DOI Decision and the Board’s Decision. Hence, I make an order on my own motion to name both the Board and the Director as proposed respondents.

3.The oral hearing of the Leave Application (“Hearing”) took place before me on 14 July 2025 and the Applicant attended in person.

Background

4.The Applicant’s background, the basis and history of his non-refoulement claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision. For brevity, I shall not repeat the same herein. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. In short, the Applicant claims that he was engaged in an inheritance dispute with his elder brother (the “Brother”) and the Brother had threatened to kill him. If the Applicant returns to Indonesia, he fears that the Brother will seriously harm or kill him.

Discussion

5.At the outset, I should point out that the DOI Decision is not susceptible to judicial review. As appeals to the Board are by way of rehearing, the Board’s Decision effectively supersedes the DOI Decision, see: Re Moshin Ali [2018] HKCA 549 at §45.

6.It remains for me to consider the merits of the proposed challenge against the Board’s Decision.

7.The applicable legal principles relating to this type of applications are well established. The judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal. Though in non‑refoulement cases, the Court will adopt a high standard of fairness to review the decision of the Board with anxious scrutiny due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (“COI”), risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board, see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14).

8.Leave application of this sort is intended to be a filtering process and elaborate reasons are not necessary (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Hence, the brief reasons for my decision are set out below.

9.In the Form 86, the Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the Leave Application.

10.In the supporting affirmation, the Applicant said that:-

(1)  He came to Hong Kong to save his life from the Brother.

(2)  The Brother wanted to kill the Applicant because of the inheritance dispute with the Applicant.

(3)  The Brother has placed a bounty on him and many people were seeking to harm the Applicant.

11.I have considered the Board’s Decision in detail. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters or that it had taken into account irrelevant matters.

12.The Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons provided. Amongst others, the Board was plainly correct in finding the risk of serious harm was low, given that:-

(1)  The level of injury sustained by the Applicant as a result of the Brother’s attack was only minor and there was no evidence that the Brother had any intention to actually kill the Applicant (§27).

(2)  There was no suggestion that the Brother had any real influence over government officials in Indonesia (§28). He was never detained or charged with any crime in Indonesia (§29).

13.The Applicant’s contention that he cannot relocate to other parts of the country is a bare assertion not supported by credible evidence.

14.In the present cases, the Board was entitled to find that the Applicant can be relocated to other parts of the country (§§45-51 of the Board’s Decision), given that Indonesia is a sizable country and that the Applicant is an able-bodied adult with reasonable working experience. There should be no genuine difficulty for him to relocate to large cities such as Jakarta or Surabaya.

15.In my judgment, the Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

16.At the Hearing, the Applicant also expressed his wish to continue to reside in Hong Kong so that he can stay with his family. I note that this ground has not been properly raised in the Form 86 or the Applicant’s supporting affirmation with propoer evidence. In any event, as held by the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang Milagros Tecson v Director of Immigration (2019) 22 HKCFAR 59 at §§38-50, the Applicant, who has no right of abode in Hong Kong, is not entitled to rely on family unity in this type of application by virtue of the reservation for immigration legislation under s.11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

17.In short, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.

Conclusion

18.In the premises, I make an order that the Form 86 be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed.

Dated the 1st day of August 2025

  ( Edison Ho )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 01/08/2025

Jondhi Pranoto

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 01/08/2025

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
1st Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 16399/19/10/48/I1767

Director of Immigration
2nd Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 676/19 (formerly RBCZ 10408/19)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



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Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 905/2020