陳嘉琪 v. 律政司司長 and Another

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1529/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 August 2025.

1. By her Form 86 dated 3 July 2025 (original in Chinese), the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review in relation to (1) a decision on dismissal dated 5 July 2019, (2) appraisal decisions in performance appraisal reports of public offices and officers involved in the incident for the relevant year; and (3) decisions subsequent to those appraisal decisions. The putative respondents named are the Secretary for Justice and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. The putative interested part

Cites 2 cases

Case No.HCAL 1529/2025[2025] HKCFI 3103
Court
High Court CFI
Date07 Aug 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1529/2025

[2025] HKCFI 3103

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1529 OF 2025

________________________

BETWEEN

  陳嘉琪 Applicant    
  and  
  律政司司長 1st Putative Respondent    
  稅務局局長 2nd Putative Respondent    
  and     
  公眾人士 Putative    
    Interested Party    

________________

Before: Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Decision: 7 August 2025

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________

A.  Introduction

1.By her Form 86 dated 3 July 2025 (original in Chinese), the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review in relation to (1) a decision on dismissal dated 5 July 2019, (2) appraisal decisions in performance appraisal reports of public offices and officers involved in the incident for the relevant year; and (3) decisions subsequent to those appraisal decisions. The putative respondents named are the Secretary for Justice and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. The putative interested parties are named as “members of the public”.

2.The relief sought by the Applicant as stated in the Form 86 is:

(1) Reversal of decision on dismissal on the 5th day of July 2019;

(2) Reversals of appraisal decisions in performance appraisal reports of public offices and officers involved in the incident for the relevant year;

(3) Reversals of decisions subsequent to appraisal decisions in performance appraisal reports of public offices and officers involved in the incident for the relevant year;

(4) Pursuit of legal liabilities;

(5) Pursuit of relevant regulatory guidelines and regulatory responsibilities;

(6) Recovery of warranted proceeds;

(7) Recovery of unwarranted proceeds; and

(8) Claim for compensation.

3.However – though she has not herself pointed this out – the Applicant is the same applicant as in HCAL 313/2022, when she also sought relief in respect of her dismissal from employment by the decision dated 5 July 2019, also named the Secretary for Justice and the Commission of Inland Revenue as the putative respondents, and also named the general public as amongst the putative interested parties.

4.By my Decision dated 16 May 2022, [2022] HKCFI 1396, I dismissed that application. I did so on the various bases that (1) it failed to identify any proper intended grounds of review, (2) the delay was fatal to the application, and (3) the proceedings were an abuse of process, being a collateral attack on the previous decisions of the Labour Tribunal and the Court of First Instance relating to the Applicant’s challenge to her dismissal from employment from a post previously held in the Inland Revenue Department.

5.I have also found that the Applicant appealed from my Decision, but the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 4 November 2022, [2022] HKCA 1564. Her application to take the case to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 17 January 2023, [2023] HKCA 21.

6.From those facts, it is plain that the application in these proceedings constitutes a further abuse of process, and the application is liable to be dismissed. The central intended challenge relates to the decision dated 5 July 2019, when the Applicant was dismissed from her employment. The new Form 86 again does not itself identify any public law grounds of review, and I do not accept that the matters set out by the Applicant in her supporting affirmations either (1) show any matters which do not render this application an abuse of process, or (2) identify any reasons why any extension of time for bringing the application is justified.

7.I also point out that, where the application has been made (as is usual) on an ex parte basis, there was an improper failure to have made full and frank disclosure of (1) the previous application made by her, (2) that that application was dismissed, and (3) that her attempts to appeal were also dismissed.

8.I might also point out that both the previous and present intended challenges relate to a decision unlikely amenable to judicial review, because they have arisen out of matters of private employment law (appraisal reports and dismissal), even if the employer was a government department.

9.In the circumstances, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

10.As I have dealt with the ex parte application on paper, I make no order as to costs.

  (Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The applicant, acting in person