Abbas Khawar v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 3506/2019

[2025] HKCFI 3422

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 3506 OF 2019

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.The Applicant is a 46-year-old national of Pakistan who entered Hong Kong illegally on 26 June 2019 and was arrested by police on the same day. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Pakistan he would be harmed or killed by certain local Sunni Muslims in his home village as he was a Shia Muslim and/or by some local supporters of the political party Pakistan Muslim League (N) (“PML(N)”) as he supported their rival Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (“PTI”).

2.The Applicant was born and raised as a Shia Muslim in Mionwal Kalan, District Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan. After leaving school he worked as a farmer and later as a grocery store owner in his home village where the majority of the villagers were Sunni Muslims who often showed hostilities towards the Applicant and his fellow Shia Muslims due to their religious differences which had led to violent fights between them in the village.

3.On one occasion in early 2014 while the Applicant together with his fellow Shia Muslims were celebrating a Shia religious ceremony when they were attacked by a group of Sunni villagers with wooden sticks and other weapons that the Applicant suffered injuries to his left shoulder and left eyebrow and other bruises that he together with other injured Shia villagers were subsequently taken to the local hospital for medical treatments.

4.After the attack the Applicant together with other Shia villagers made a complaint to the police but were told to go away, and hence the Applicant continued to live in fear of the Sunni Muslims in his home village.

5.In addition the Applicant also faced constant threats and harassments from some of the local PML(N) supporters who were suspected to have even burgled his grocery shop twice so as to harass him, and on one occasion in July 2018 when the Applicant and his brother were on their way home after attending a PTI meeting, they were confronted by 3 local PML(N) supporters who fired shots at them with their pistols that hit and killed his brother, and although the assailants were subsequently arrested by the police and were charged with murder, they were eventually acquitted by the court due to insufficient evidence.

6.After their acquittal the 3 PML(N) supporters continued to make threats against him, and so the Applicant fled from his home village to Lahore to take shelter in a cousin’s place before moving on to Rawalpindi to stay with a friend, and on 24 June 2019 he departed Pakistan for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong, and upon his arrest by the police he then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 6 August 2019 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

7.By a Notice of Decision dated 26 August 2019 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

8.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from the Sunni Muslims villagers or those local PML(N) supporters upon his return to Pakistan as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of any of them to seriously harm or kill him, that in any event these were private religious or political disputes without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Pakistan with a large population of 204 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 796,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Karachi where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.

9.On 2 September 2019 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 7 November 2019 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 20 November 2019 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

10.In its decision[1] the Board found material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Applicant’s evidence that it doubted the credibility of his claim of fear of harm from any Sunni Muslim in his home village or local PML(N) supporters that caused him to leave his country to come to Hong Kong to seek protection, that even if his account of events prior to his departure of Pakistan were true that there was no reliable evidence of any real intention of any of them to seriously harm or kill him, and that in any event these were private disputes between them within his home village without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Pakistan as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

11.On 26 November 2019 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward various grounds for his intended challenge, of which he confirmed at the hearing as follows:

(1)  That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;

(2)  That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim without realizing that he was tortured at the behest of the state law enforcement agencies and politicians that the state would be rendered liable to the Applicant by cause of the state and its public officials failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence;

(3)  That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;

(4)  That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in her country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5)  That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;

(6)  That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;

(7)  That the Adjudicator failed to take into account the nexus of political parties and official corruption which exist in the Applicant’s country making the persecution of the Applicant effectively persecution by the State;

(8)  That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.

12.These are however all just bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case or what evidence is there to suggest that the Applicant has ever been tortured by law enforcement agencies or politicians when on the factual basis of even his own case that these were private disputes between them only without any official involvement at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant in his affirmation or at the hearing of his claim in which he just repeated his claim as before, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

13.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

14.In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risks of harm in his claim if real are localized ones and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Pakistan, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

15.In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

16.For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Dated the 14^th day of August 2025

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1