Chu Kwok Yiu, Wilson v. The Preliminary Investigation Committee of the Medical Council of Hong Kong
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 714/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 August 2025.
1. This judicial review may have been powered by understandable grief. But perhaps the unfortunate result is that a doctor who was a friend of the family of the patient, and who provided long-term care to the patient in circumstances where she outlived the typical prognosis on an incurable disease by many years, has been the subject of multiple attacks on his professional conduct.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 5 cases
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HCAL 714/2022 [2025] HKCFI 3535 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 714 OF 2022 ________________________
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_________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.This judicial review may have been powered by understandable grief. But perhaps the unfortunate result is that a doctor who was a friend of the family of the patient, and who provided long-term care to the patient in circumstances where she outlived the typical prognosis on an incurable disease by many years, has been the subject of multiple attacks on his professional conduct. 2.The Applicant’s grandmother (“Madam Tung”) died in 2013 after suffering over many years from lung and liver cancer. Since her death, Madam Tung’s family has taken severe issue with the doctor who treated her before she died – the Interested Party (“Dr Teo”). In particular, the Applicant takes issue with Dr Teo’s prescription of a chemotherapy drug called Sunitinib, which was administered on 10 occasions from May 2009 to May 2013. 3.So the Applicant made a complaint against Dr Teo to the Medical Council of Hong Kong (“Council”). The Council’s Preliminary Investigation Committee (“PIC”) – tasked under statute with screening out complaints that do not demonstrate a prima facie case of professional misconduct – held, after consulting an independent expert, that the Applicant’s complaint did not demonstrate a case for referral to the Council. The Applicant sought a review of the PIC’s decision. But the PIC maintained its view on 17 May 2022, albeit for slightly different reasons (“Decision”). 4.In these proceedings, the Applicant seeks to challenge the Decision. 5.At its heart, the Applicant’s complaint is that the prescription of Sunitinib was not necessary or appropriate to treat Madam Tung’s lung or liver cancer. Further, it is said that Dr Teo did not obtain the requisite consent for the use of Sunitinib to “salvage” Madam Tung’s condition. 6.I granted leave to apply for judicial review. At the substantive judicial review hearing, the Applicant was represented by Mr Wong Chi-kwong and Mr Dexter Leung of Counsel; the PIC was represented by Mr Anthony Chan of Counsel (now Mr Anthony Chan SC); and Dr Teo was represented by Mr Anthony Ismail of Counsel. 7.At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision. This is my Judgment. B. Factual Narrative B.1 The parties 8.As canvassed above, the Applicant is the grandson of Madam Tung, who passed away on 2 October 2013. 9.The PIC is established by the Council pursuant to section 20BA(2)(d) of the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap. 161) (“MRO”). Pursuant to section 20S of the MRO, the PIC comprises of 4 registered medical practitioners appointed by the Council, and 3 lay persons appointed by the Council. 10.It is convenient to outline the PIC’s function at this juncture, as provided for under the MRO and the Medical Practitioners (Registration and Disciplinary Procedure) Regulation Cap 161E (“Regulation”). If the Council receives a complaint that a doctor had committed professional misconduct – and assuming that complaint is neither groundless nor frivolous, when it would be screened out by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the PIC under section 6(3) of the Regulation – the complaint is referred to the PIC for its consideration. The PIC will then have to decide whether there is a prima facie case of professional misconduct. If so, it may then refer the complaint to the Council for consideration on the merits, and an inquiry may be held. After the inquiry, and if the doctor is found to be guilty of professional misconduct, the doctor may be sanctioned. 11.So, in short, the PIC serves as a second-layer filter as to whether an inquiry should be held. 12.Dr Teo was and is a clinical oncologist, a fellow of the Hong Kong Academy of Medicine and the Hong Kong College of Radiologists and provides specialist and clinical services in clinical oncology at the Central Comprehensive Cancer Centre (“Centre”) at Room 522, Central Building, 1 Redder Street, Central. At the relevant time, the care of Madam Tung was entrusted to him. B.2 Madam Tung (between 2009 and 2013) 13.Madam Tung was diagnosed with primary hepatocellular carcinoma (“HCC”) i.e. liver cancer in 2007. She underwent surgery on 17 December 2007 and 17 January 2009. Unfortunately, her HCC relapsed in 2009, and she could no longer undergo any further surgery. This is known as “unresectable” cancer (i.e. a cancer that cannot be surgically removed). 14.According to Dr William Foo (“Dr Foo”), the expected median overall survival was about 10 months and the median time to radiological progression was about 5 months. This is not disputed by the Applicant. So in other words, it would be expected that the HCC would progress, and that the patient would not live long. 15.In such circumstances, on 8 May 2009, Dr Teo first prescribed a drug called Sorafenib. In medical terms, it is an inhibitor of several serine / threonine and receptor tyrosine kinases. Dr Teo further prescribed 200mg per day of Sorafenib on 29 May 2009, 26 June 2009, 7 August 2009, 7 September 2009, and 14 September 2009. 16.In turn, Madam Tung’s alphafetoprotein (“AFP”) levels – which indicate how rapidly a cancer might be progressing, where higher AFP levels indicate a more rapid progression – decreased from 15 May 2009 (124.2 ng/ml) to 12 June 2009 (64.7 ng/ml), and remained relatively steady thereafter (83.4 ng/ml and 74.3 ng/ml respectively on 26 June 2009 and 7 August 2009 respectively) until 7 September 2009, when it rose to 141.6 ng/ml. Madam Tung’s AFP levels also rose to 152.1 ng/ml and 242.3 ng/ml on 5 October 2009 and 2 November 2009 respectively. 17.Given the signs of cancer progression, Dr Teo prescribed another drug Sunitinib – together with Sorafenib – on three occasions: 14 September 2009, 29 September 2009, and 5 October 2009. On each occasion, 12.5 mg of Sunitinib per day was prescribed to her. 18.Sunitinib, like Sorafenib, is an inhibitor of multiple receptor tyrosine kinases. But, usually, it is used to treat gastrointestinal stromal tumours, advanced renal cell carcinomas, and neuroendocrine tumours of pancreatic origin. The suitability of Sunitinib as treatment for Madam Tung’s condition is precisely the gist of the present judicial review. 19.According to Dr Teo, before prescribing Sunitinib on 14 September 2009, he had explained its use to both Madam Tung and Mr Simon Chu (“Simon”), who was Dr Teo’s friend, Madam Tung’s eldest son, and the person who had always accompanied Madam Tung to Dr Teo’s medical appointments. Dr Teo believed he had obtained both Madam Tung’s and her family’s consent. However, there was no written documentation of any consent. 20.After 5 October 2009, however, this “combination use” of Sorafenib and Sunitinib (as termed by the Applicant) was dropped thereafter as the HCC continued to progress. 21.In lieu, from November 2009 to January 2010, Sorafenib was combined with a different set of (cytotoxic) drugs, capecitabine and oxaliplatin. This combination was known as “SECOX”. According to Dr Foo – which is not disputed by the Applicant – it was not a “recognised, standard treatment” for HCC. Rather, such treatment was still subject to a multi-centre phase II trial in Hong Kong and Singapore. Again, according to Dr Foo, this unconventional approach seemed to work to an extent. While Madam Tung’s AFP levels decreased, they were still significant. 22.After January 2010, the cytotoxic drugs were dropped. Dr Teo continued to administer Sorafenib until 16 May 2012 (i.e. for almost 2.5 years), but at half dosage. From January 2010 to October 2010, Madam Tung also underwent radiotherapy to treat various metastatic sites. 23.In around March 2010, things grew even more complicated. A new lesion (an area of abnormal tissue or damage) appeared in the apical right lower lobe (“RLL”) of the lung, alongside multiple lesions in Madam Tung’s liver, sternum, C7/T1 vertebra, and neck nodes. At the time, Madam Tung was not fit for a biopsy, so the lesion was monitored by several interval scans. 24.On around 19 July 2012, a biopsy of the lesion in the RLL was conducted. It was confirmed that the lesion was a second cancer: namely, non-small cell lung carcinoma (“NSCLC”) – i.e. lung cancer. It was further confirmed that the lesion was not due to HCC. The relevant portions of Dr Teo’s medical records dated 1 August 2012 indicate:
25.So Dr Teo arranged treatment (including curative and palliative radiotherapy) for NSCLC. He also prescribed Sunitinib to “replace” Sorafenib. In his Representations to the PIC, Dr Teo also said that Sunitinib was to “palliate the advanced HCC”. 26.A consent form was signed by Madam Tung dated 1 August 2012 (“Consent Form”). The Consent Form provides as follows, that:
27.Simon confirms that (1) he had trusted Dr Teo for “his expertise in cancer treatment”, and more importantly, (2) the Patient signed the Consent Form, and “let the medical staff tick the boxes” in the Consent Form for her. But Simon says Madam Tung was not told of how Sunitinib was to be used as a “second line” / off-label treatment. 28.Sunitinib was prescribed on 7 occasions thereafter: on 1 August 2012, 12 October 2012, 9 November 2012, 7 December 2012, 4 January 2013, 1 March 2013, and 2 May 2013. On each occasion, 25mg of Sunitinib per day was prescribed to her. And after every two weeks of Sunitinib treatment, there would be a 1-week break. 29.From 1 August 2012 to 27 May 2013, Madam Tung’s AFP levels ranged from 10.8 ng/ml to 20.94 ng/ml. 30.According to Dr Teo’s medical records, on around 6 to 7 June 2013, a combination of other chemotherapy drugs – Avastin, Alimta, Carboplatin and Afinitor – was prescribed for the first time. This combination was further prescribed on 14 June 2013, and 17 June 2013. Other drugs were prescribed in combination with Alimta in August 2013. 31.According to Madam Tung’s last AFP test conducted by Chan & Hou Medical Laboratories Ltd, Madam Tung’s AFP levels as at 22 July 2013 stood at 6.16 ng/ml. 32.But ultimately – and sadly – Madam Tung succumbed to her illness and passed away on 2 October 2013. B.3 The reaction of Madam Tung’s family members 33.Madam Tung’s family members were understandably distraught at her passing. As the Applicant’s father and Madam Tung’s son Mr Augustine Chan (“Augustine”) put it, he had held a “high hope” that Dr Teo could keep Madam Tung’s HCC and NSCLC in check. 34.But given what happened after Madam Tung’s death, “distraught” might be putting it too mildly. In the evidence, there is a barrage of complaints from the Applicant and his family members which, to me, were either (a) not relevant to the grounds of review as contained in the Form 86, (b) were not even pursued with any gusto by the Applicant’s counsel, Mr Wong and Mr Leung, or (c) not borne out by the evidence. 35.First, there was a complaint that Dr Teo should have taken better care of Madam Tung by conducting a biopsy before 20 July 2012 (and indeed, on 8 March 2010) as to the lesion in the RLL of Madam Tung’s lung – even though the Applicant’s Counsel agrees this was a non-starter, given that “Madam Tung was not fit for a biopsy at the time”. 36.Second, there was a complaint that Madam Tung’s “condition” – which may refer to either (1) the NSCLC itself, or (2) Madam Tung’s bleeding in her lung that she experienced from 17 June 2013 to 15 July 2013 – may be caused by the “aggressive combination of chemotherapy drugs for treatment of NSCLC and HCC”. As will be seen below, not even Professor Lee – the Applicant’s expert – says this. 37.Third, there was a complaint that Dr Teo had misdiagnosed the lesion in the RLL of Madam Tung’s lung. The complaint arose in the following manner.
38.Dr Teo also took the chance to clarify the Error in a without prejudice meeting requested and attended by the Applicant’s solicitors on 3 October 2015 (“WP Meeting”). Dr Teo’s solicitors, “Mr Kan” of Howse Williams, and Augustine’s solicitors also attended. According to Mr Kan’s contemporaneous records, he made the following two notes: “We knew lung CA I wrote report Simon w/o looking at records” and “report wrong…Simon asked for simple…but did dx lung CA Bx did”. “Dx” refers to diagnose, and “Bx” refers to biopsy. 39.Augustine maintains in his affirmation that the Error was never admitted to Madam Tung’s family members. In support, he also draws upon various letters sent by Howse Williams – Dr Teo’s solicitors – dated 18 April 2017, 12 May 2017, and 23 June 2017 which do not mention the Error. On a related but separate note, he also alleges that it is “totally inconceivable” how the Error could have arisen, as Dr Teo had supposedly prepared the Medical Report for 2 months and is a reputable specialist in clinical oncology. 40.I share – to a degree – Augustine’s bewilderment that the Medical Report was not prepared according to the contemporaneous documents. I think this was avoidable. But the fact is that the contemporaneous records suggest Dr Teo correctly diagnosed the RLL of Madam Tung’s lung as NSCLC. So I would think that any suggestion that Dr Teo seemed to have “misdiagnosed” Madam Tung’s condition is incorrect. 41.Indeed, on 7 September 2016, Augustine commenced a claim in his capacity as a co-executor of Madam Tung’s estate against Dr Teo in HCPI 996/2016. This was settled by a Tomlin order made on 26 September 2017. B.4 The Complaint to the PIC 42.Thereafter, the Applicant became “curious about the treatment received” by Madam Tung because “she had a lot of pain and suffering during the treatment process”. 43.After reviewing the list of prescriptions of Sorafenib and Sunitinib from May 2009 to 2 May 2013, Augustine also grew curious as to whether Sunitinib had a “higher efficacy or a lower toxicity” than Sorafenib, or why there had been a change from Sorafenib to Sunitinib. 44.In these circumstances, the Applicant instructed his solicitors – Paul CK Tang & Chiu – to seek an Expert Opinion from Professor Vivian WY Lee (“Professor Lee”), an Associate Professor in the School of Pharmacy at CUHK, and a specialist in cardiology pharmacotherapy, on a host of issues. The Applicant’s solicitors did so on 7 September 2018 and 10 September 2018. 45.Professor Lee was asked to deal with the following issues: (1) whether Sorafenib and Sunitinib drugs were approved by the Food and Drug Administration of the USA (“FDA”) during 8 May 2009 to 2 May 2013, and whether they were approved in Hong Kong, (2) whether the dosage of the two drugs prescribed to Madam Tung was effective at the time, (3) whether Madam Tung suffered from toxicity of the 2 drugs, and (4) whether there was “reasonable therapeutic management” on Dr Teo’s part for prescribing Sorafenib and Sunitinib to Madam Tung. 46.This Expert Opinion was provided on 10 April 2019 (“Lee Expert Opinion”). Professor Lee relevantly concluded as follows:
47.On the other hand, she also fairly concluded that:
48.On the strength of the Lee Expert Opinion, the Applicant made the following complaints to the Council on 6 August 2019 (“Complaint”). Per his Statutory Declaration, he inter alia complained that:
49.Enclosed with the Complaint was inter alia the Death Certificate of Madam Tung, the Medical Report, the medical records relating to Madam Tung’s treatment by Dr Teo, a table which lists when Sorafenib and Sunitinib was prescribed by Dr Teo from May 2009 to May 2013, and the Lee Expert Opinion (and the materials it was based on). 50.On 12 August 2019, the Council indicated that the Complaint would be attended to, and that a copy of the Complaint would be sent to Dr Teo. 51.On 3 January 2020 and 4 March 2020, the Council requested the Applicant to collect Madam Tung’s medical records from HKSH and St Paul’s for its perusal. 52.On 20 April 2020, the Council wrote a letter to Dr Teo, indicating that a complaint had been made against him. Dr Teo was invited to submit a written explanation if he wished to before 20 May 2020. Dr Teo says that he did not receive this letter, but nothing turns on this. 53.On 17 August 2020, the Council wrote to Dr Foo, a specialist in Clinical Oncology, a Consultant in Clinical Oncology at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, and Director of Radiotherapy & Oncology of the Hong Kong Baptist Hospital, for his expert advice.
54.On 17 August 2020, Dr Foo agreed to give his expert opinion. On 23 October 2020, Dr Foo rendered his Expert Opinion (“Foo 1st Expert Opinion”). Dr Foo found that as part of his factual summary:
55.On this basis, Dr Foo then went on to give the following comments:
56.In his conclusion, Dr Foo also said this, which is worth quoting in full:
57.The PIC met on 8 January 2021 to deliberate on the Complaint. It decided that there was insufficient evidence to show a reasonable prospect of Dr Teo being found guilty of misconduct in a professional respect, and the Complaint was dismissed. No inquiry was to be held. This was because:
58.On 10 February 2021, Dr Teo was told by the Council that in light of all the information provided, the PIC had concluded the case should not proceed any further and that no inquiry would be held. 59.On the same day, the Applicant’s solicitors were informed by the Council that no inquiry would be held. In that letter, the PIC was said to have “considered” large portions of Foo 1st Expert Opinion in reaching its conclusion. It was also said that the PIC thought that:
B.5 The Review 60.In a letter dated 14 April 2020, the Applicant took issue with the PIC’s decision. Amongst other things, the Applicant took issue with:
61.To further support the Review, the Applicant furnished a second Expert Opinion from Professor Lee (“Lee 2nd Expert Opinion”) to the PIC. Professor Lee opined as follows:
62.At this juncture, it is helpful to look at the Wörns Study. I would note that the authors also made the following observations that are pertinent to the present case:
63.In these circumstances, on 9 August 2021, the PIC informed Dr Teo that it had received “new information” for the Complaint. Again, the PIC invited Dr Teo to submit written explanation if necessary. 64.On 4 October 2021, Howse Williams – Dr Teo’s solicitors – submitted his written representations (“Dr Teo’s Representations”). They contained (1) a chronology of the material events, including a clarification that the Sunitinib prescribed from 1 August 2012 was to “palliate the advanced HCC” instead of NSCLC, and (2) the following pertinent observations:
65.In these circumstances, on 12 November 2021, the PIC invited Dr Foo to produce a supplemental expert report based on inter alia the Applicant’s letter dated 10 February 2021 and the letter from Dr Teo dated 4 October 2021. 66.Dr Foo rendered his supplemental Expert Opinion on 7 February 2022, which amended his 1st Expert Opinion (“Foo 2nd Expert Opinion”) in the following material ways:
67.The PIC met on 23 April 2022. In the Minutes of the meeting, the PIC referred to the above additions / amendments in the Foo 2nd Expert Opinion and maintained its view that no inquiry should be held as there was insufficient evidence to show a reasonable prospect of Dr Teo being found guilty of misconduct in a professional respect.
68.The PIC’s decision was relayed to the Applicant’s solicitors on 17 May 2022. After reciting the pertinent parts of Foo 2nd Expert Opinion, the PIC stated that it “concurred with the opinion of the independent expert”, and that the PIC noted Madam Tung had been treated by Dr Teo for “almost four years and was satisfied that implied consent had been given”. This is the “Decision”. 69.In these circumstances, the Applicant launched his application for judicial review against the Decision. C. Grounds of Review 70.By the Form 86, the Applicant advances 3 grounds of review against the Decision. In gist, he contends that the Decision was Wednesbury unreasonable in 3 main respects.
71.The PIC and Dr Teo, of course, contend that the Decision was not unreasonable. They characterise the challenge as, in effect, seeking a review on the merits, where the PIC made a professional and independent assessment based on the available evidence that there was no real prospect of a finding of misconduct against Dr Teo. They further contend that the Applicant failed to exhaust available remedies, though I do not need to deal with the latter point given my conclusion on the merits. D. Law 72.As alluded to above, there is a three-stage process for handling complaints against registered medical practitioners: see Chairman, Preliminary Investigation Committee, Medical Council of Hong Kong v Hospital Authority [2022] 1 HKLRD 330 at §5. The present case concerns the second stage. 73.At the second stage:
74.The test for whether the defendant has been guilty of misconduct in a professional respect is not in dispute. The question is whether the “doctor’s conduct has fallen short of the standard expected among doctors”: see Dr Chan Po Sum v Medical Council of Hong Kong [2015] 1 HKLRD 330 at §50. 75.The role of the PIC is to screen out some complaints, where disturbance to medical practitioners is not justified. Again as alluded to above, the PIC must find that there is a prima facie case of professional misconduct by a doctor before it refers the complaint for an inquiry. There is some dispute as to what this precisely means. 76.It is not disputed that the PIC should examine whether the complaint has any “real prospect of being established”, and may conduct preliminary investigation into its prospects, and may refuse to refer the complaint to the Council if that real prospect is not present: see Law Yiu Wai Ray v the Medical Council of Hong Kong [2016] 4 HKC 1 at §135(4). 77.But Mr Wong, for the Applicant, stresses that in deciding whether a complaint has a “real prospect of being established”, the PIC should not “resolve any conflicts of evidence”. This is particularly when the nature of the procedure itself means the complainant does not have the right of access to the doctor’s response, and the full state of materials at the second stage: see Law Yiu Wai Ray at §135(5). In this regard, the PIC must approach its task with the “utmost caution”. Mr Wong also refers to Mr K v Preliminary Investigation Committee of the Medical Council of Hong Kong [2020] HKCFI 321 at §35, which repeated the principles. But it is also important to note that the context of that case was where the PIC had considered that there was “no evidence” to substantiate the complaint of professional misconduct (which is not what the PIC did or said in the present case). 78.On the other hand, both Mr Chan and Mr Ismail submit – to the extent that Law Yiu Wai Ray might seem to lay down a rule whereby the PIC is not to resolve any conflict of evidence whatsoever – that should not be followed. This is because of various reasons:
79.The result of this judicial review does not turn on this fine point of law, as I will explain below. But in any event, I accept Mr Chan’s and Mr Ismail’s submissions that the PIC is not automatically required to send a complaint for an inquiry once there is a “conflict” of evidence. I think this is supported by a fuller reading of Law Yiu Wai Ray, and as a matter of principle:
80.It is not easy to conclude that the PIC had acted contrary to public law principles. Indeed, it is only in a highly exceptional case that the Court would interfere with the PIC’s decision whether to hold an inquiry, particularly if that decision turns on the assessment of the evidence concerning the medical profession. The Court respects the role of the PIC and that the PIC may use its professional knowledge to assess the evidence. The Court should not and would not likely lightly impose its views on the appropriate weight to be attributed to the evidence on the views of the PIC. The function of the Court does not involve re-examining whether the decision of the PIC was correct or not. The Court can only consider whether the decision of the PIC was without legal basis, Wednesbury unreasonable, or procedurally unfair: see Lau Wah at §12(2) and (3). 81.That is consistent with the high threshold generally for finding irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness in a public law challenge, but is especially so where the decision concerns an assessment of the professional conduct of a professional by the professional body. Hence, where the PIC concludes, on the basis of the materials and information before it, that there is insufficient evidence to show a reasonable prospect of the doctor being found guilty of misconduct in a professional respect, that is a valid and sufficient reason for the PIC’s decision: see Leung Wai Kuen v Preliminary Investigation Committee of the Medical Council of Hong Kong [2021] HKCFI 132 at §§20 and 22. 82.It is also trite that the reasonableness of the decision falls to be determined at the date and evidence known to the decision-maker at the time: see, for example, Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, 1052C-E; R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, 554C-D. 83.Bearing these principles in mind, I now turn to the respective grounds of review. E. Ground 1 84.For Ground 1, the Applicant complains that the Decision was unreasonable because it did not refer the issue of whether the prescription of Sunitinib in view of the NSCLC was necessary and appropriate to the Council. I do not think this Ground has any merit.
85.In these circumstances, I do not need to deal with whether Sunitinib was contraindicated for the treatment of NSCLC or not. 86.Nor do I have to consider in any depth whether Dr Teo misdiagnosed the lesion in the RLL of Madam Tung’s lung as metastatic HCC, in light of (1) how it is clear that Dr Teo did not, from the contemporaneous records, (2) Sunitinib was used to treat the diagnosis of HCC, and (3) Dr Foo’s comments that the diagnosis of NSCLC would not have made a difference as to whether the prescription of Sunitinib was appropriate or necessary. 87.In gist, the issue of whether the prescription of Sunitinib was inappropriate or unnecessary in light of Madam Tung’s NSCLC was not actually or properly put before the PIC. The PIC certainly cannot be blamed for not “dealing” with it. 88.Ground 1 thus fails as being not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. F. Ground 2 89.Under Ground 2, the Applicant contends that the Decision was unreasonable as the PIC failed to refer the issue of whether the ‘off-label’ use of Sunitinib was necessary and appropriate to the Council in light of Madam Tung’s HCC. In gist, Mr Wong’s argument is that Sunitinib is of “low efficacy” and “severe toxicity”. 90.Again, I fail to see how Ground 2 could arguably be made out. 91.First, even in Lee 2nd Expert Opinion, Professor Lee admitted that the Wörns Study – which is the only study cited in the context of Sunitinib being prescribed as a “second line”, instead of a “first-line treatment”, for HCC – showed that Sunitinib had a “modest” clinical efficacy. This was also noted in Dr Teo’s Representations and Foo’s 2nd Expert Opinion. The Wörns Study, Dr Teo’s Representations, and Foo’s 2nd Expert Opinion were all before the PIC. 92.In such circumstances, Mr Wong is wrong to say that there were “conflicting expert opinions” between Professor Lee and Dr Foo as to the efficacy of Sunitinib in a second line treatment – which, of course, is the relevant context. Thus, I do not think Mr Wong is right that given this “conflict”, the PIC acted unreasonably in not referring this issue to the Council for an inquiry. 93.Further, I would think that for this reason alone the PIC had ample basis to conclude that Dr Teo’s “second line treatment” involving – and thus ‘off-label’ use of – Sunitinib was not inappropriate or unnecessary, particularly when it is indisputable that Madam Tung’s HCC was progressing as the expected life span of someone with relapsed liver cancer was about 10 months. 94.In contrast, I do not think that the Lee 2nd Expert Opinion really gave much reason as to why the use of Sunitinib in the ‘off-label’ or “second line” context was inappropriate or unnecessary. The high point of Lee 2nd Expert Opinion was that given that Sorafenib and Sunitinib had similar pharmacological actions, their adverse effects would be similar – so that, if used together, “additional side effects” would be “expected”. But there does not seem to be evidence to support this “expectation”. 95.Indeed, while Madam Tung did suffer from toxicity-related adverse effects, it is difficult actually to pinpoint whether Madam Tung’s ailments were caused by Sunitinib or Sorafenib, or whether she would have suffered these ailments irrespective of whether Sunitinib was prescribed – such that the PIC could conclude there was a “real prospect” that Sunitinib was not necessary or appropriate, and Dr Teo had committed professional misconduct.
96.The above further suggests that the PIC had ample reason to “concur” with Dr Foo, instead of Professor Lee. This is particularly when Dr Foo is a clinical oncologist with over 35 years of experience, and that Professor Lee is a clinical pharmacist specialising in cardiovascular medicine and not oncology. This Court – unless there are highly exceptional reasons – should not interfere with the PIC’s conclusion, and its choice to prefer one expert over another in matters of professional and medical judgment. 97.I do not think there is any merit in Mr Wong’s contention that the PIC had “fettered the exercise of its investigatory power and duty by effectively disregarding Professor Lee’s expert opinion and deferring to and endorsing Dr Foo’s expert opinion merely because Dr Foo is a specialist in clinical oncology”. Rather, in both the Minutes and the Decision, the PIC specifically “noted / considered” the Wörns Study as one of the bases for accepting Dr Foo’s expert opinion. That paper concluded Sunitinib provided modest anti-tumour activity in patients with advanced HCC after progression under Sorafenib. As I expressed above, this was a cogent and rational reason for accepting that the second line and ‘off-label’ use of Sunitinib was appropriate, and that there was no real prospect of establishing professional misconduct by Dr Teo. 98.Ground 2 thus fails as being not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. G. Ground 3 99.Under Ground 3, the Applicant contends that the Decision was unreasonable because the PIC failed to refer the issue as to whether Dr Teo had obtained proper consent from Madam Tung as to the ‘off-label’ use of Sunitinib. 100.I will address this issue in two stages. First, whether there was consent as when Sunitinib was prescribed: (a) the 3 occasions from September 2009 to October 2009, and (b) the 7 occasions from August 2012 to May 2013. Second, whether there was consent specifically to the ‘off-label’ use of Sunitinib – and indeed, whether this was a requirement. 101.It is incontrovertible that August 2012 consent was given by virtue of the Consent Form, which was shown to the PIC. There is no suggestion that Madam Tung was incapacitated. Furthermore, the Consent Form demonstrated that the consent so obtained was fairly comprehensive. According to the Consent Form, not only did Dr Teo explain the purpose, possible benefits and potential risks of treatment and other treatment alternatives, but he had also told Madam Tung that she could stop receiving Sunitinib “at any time”. 102.I also think it was reasonable for the PIC to have concluded that there had been “implied consent” to the administration of Sunitinib in September 2009 to October 2009 on the evidence that was before it:
103.As to the second stage, the question arises as to whether there was a requirement at all – under the Codes prevailing in September 2009 or August 2012 – that Madam Tung’s consent as to the ‘off-label’ use of Sunitinib must be obtained. I do not think so. I accept Mr Chan’s straightforward submission that there was no requirement at the time that a doctor must expressly explain to a patient that a particular medication was being used in an ‘off-label’ manner, or as a “second line” treatment. If no particular requirement can be identified – and certainly none has been identified by Mr Wong – it is difficult to see how there is a real prospect that Dr Teo could be said to have committed professional misconduct in this respect. 104.In any event, I would have thought that the “second line” or ‘off-label’ nature of the prescription of Sunitinib would have been quite clear. Sunitinib was not the “first choice” drug. Madam Tung must have known that she was in a precarious position after 2009 when her liver cancer relapsed. But she signed a Consent Form in 2012 and was administered Sunitinib thrice in 2009. Indeed, it seems to be quite clear that there was implied consent even as to the ‘off-label’ use of Sunitinib. At least, the PIC plainly took that into account in its Decision by saying that Madam Tung had returned to Dr Teo for treatment for 4 years. 105.Mr Wong contended in his submissions that the PIC failed to exercise its powers under sections 11(2) and (7) of the Regulation to request a complete set of Madam Tung’s medical records – and thus consent forms – from the Centre. However, this was not part of the argument in the Form 86. For this reason, I will not entertain this. Indeed, it is one thing to allege that the PIC reached a Wednesbury unreasonable decision on the materials that it had before it. It is another to allege that the PIC did not carry out its statutory functions properly. 106.In his 2nd affirmation, the Applicant also adduced various consent forms to cast doubt as to whether Dr Teo had actually obtained consent from Madam Tung in respect of the prescription of other drugs, such as Sorafenib; and whether Dr Teo had meticulously – or substantively – advised Madam Tung as to all aspects of the prescription of other drugs, such as Alimta and Avastin. In gist, the Applicant tries to portray Dr Teo as taking a cavalier approach towards consent in general, and that he would never “fully” advise Madam Tung or her family members on the prescription of various drugs. 107.I do not need to concern myself with that, as (1) the present judicial review is strictly related to the prescription of Sunitinib, and (2) the consent forms exhibited in the Applicant’s 2nd affirmation (as alluded to above) were not even brought to the PIC’s attention when it made its Decision. Whether the Decision was Wednesbury unreasonable must be assessed according to the evidence known to the PIC at the time it made its Decision. 108.Further, if the Applicant wished to make a complaint against Dr Teo based on these newly produced consent forms and the prescription of other drugs, then he ought to have first exhausted the alternative remedy of the complaint mechanism to the Council and PIC under the MRO and Regulation. 109.Ground 3 thus fails as being not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. H. Result 110.I dismiss the Applicant’s application for judicial review. 111.I do not see why costs should not follow the event, so that the Applicant pays the PIC’s and Dr Teo’s costs. However, I will make this order first on a nisi basis, which will become absolute after 14 days unless before that a variation application is made. Any variation application will be made on paper.
Mr Wong Chi-kwong and Mr Dexter Leung, instructed by Paul C.K. Tang & Chiu, for the Applicant Mr Anthony Chan SC, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the Respondent. Mr Anthony Ismail, instructed by Howse Williams, for the Interested Party | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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