Sulrini and Others v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 629/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 August 2025.
1. The applicants are the mother, aged 51, her daughter, aged 9, and her son aged 7. The 1 st applicant’s facts form the basis of their joint application.
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 629/2025 [2025] HKCFI 3184 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 629 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.The applicants are the mother, aged 51, her daughter, aged 9, and her son aged 7. The 1st applicant’s facts form the basis of their joint application. 2.This is the applicants’ joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 March 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their subsequent claim of HCAL 1605 of 2018 and HCAL 227 of 2020, ordered to be heard together by Order dated 20 August 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 3.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against them since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicants may take out further proceedings to assert their non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 4.The 1st applicant, on behalf of herself and her children appeared before the Court on 16 June 2025 admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The procedural history 5.The 1st applicant is an illegal immigrant. She was a domestic helper here and her contract was prematurely terminated, but she did not depart and overstayed since 26 October 2014. She gave birth to the 2nd applicant on 24 January 2016. She surrendered to the Immigration Department and lodged non-refoulement claim with the Director for herself and the 2nd applicant. 6.The Director reject the 1st and the 2nd applicants’ application on 14 October 2016. They appealed to the Board and the Board dismissed their appeal on 19 April 2018 (“the Board’s 1st Decision”). 7.The 1st applicant gave birth to the 3rd applicant on 16 September 2018. She lodged non-refoulement claim as the guardian ad litem for the 3rd applicant with the Director, who refused their application on 31 October 2019. The 3rd applicant appealed to the Board, which dismissed his appeal on 20 October 2020 (“the Board’s 2nd Decision”). 8.Acting for herself and the other applicants, the 1st applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decisions by way of 2 separate applications. The Court of the First Instance ordered the applications to be heard together, and it further dismissed their joint application on 11 March 2021. 9.They appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed their appeal. They filed a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed their Notice of Appeal. 10.They applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal and the Court of Final Appeal dismissed their application on 28 August 2024. 11.By letter dated 12 September 2024, the applicants applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 12.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused their application. The subsequent claim application 13.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, they have to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 14.Despite advice from the immigration officer, the 1st applicant did not submit any additional information to the immigration officer to support their application. 15.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicants failed to satisfy those conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed their application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicants filed Form 86 on 12 March for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.In her affirmation in support of her application, the 1st applicant did not raise any specific ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the 1st applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of this application. 20.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicants failed to satisfy the conditions in support of their application for subsequent claim. 21.Upon enquiry from me as to whether there are any child specific issues that should be considered by the Court for the children, the 1st applicant said that she had nothing to say. 22.The applicants have not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicants’ subsequent claim. I dismiss their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicants are attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicants are entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as their intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The 1st applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in their previous claim in support of their subsequent claim application. 28.The 1st applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against them, the 1st applicant said she had nothing to say. 29.I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicants would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicants’ application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicants. 32.I shall treat non-compliance with Order 80, rule 2 of the RHC in these proceedings as a mere irregularity without rendering the application of the 2nd applicant and the 3rd applicant a nullity. Dated the 19th day of August 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment