Komala Dewi Bt Tarnipan Samiri v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 943/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 September 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 April 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 743 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 11 cases
|
HCAL 943/2025 [2025] HKCFI 3721 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 943 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 April 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 743 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 16 July 2025 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The procedural history 4.The applicant, aged 38, is a national of Indonesia. She is an illegal immigrant. She worked as a domestic helper. She did not depart after her employment contract had terminated. She surrendered to the Immigration Department and lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that, if refouled, she would be killed by her husband because she did not remit him money. 5.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board did not accept her evidence and found that she was not subjected to any of the applicable risks[1]. The Board therefore dismissed her appeal. 7.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 14 March 2023. 8.She appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her appeal. She issued a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Her application was refused by the Court of Appeal. 9.She applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal, which dismissed her application on 11 November 2024. 10.By letter received by the Director on 22 November 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 12.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 13.The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials and the relevant country of origin information relevant to the application, the immigration officer came to the factual conclusion that her fear of her husband remained the same source of fear, which had been considered and rejected by the Board in her previous claim. The immigration officer did not believe she will be killed by her husband if she returns to Indonesia. 14.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 15.The applicant filed Form 86 on 22 April 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 16.In her affidavit in support of her application, the applicant raised general grounds of procedural impropriety, error/misdirection in law without evidence in support except that she had complained that there was no hearing for her subsequent claim application. Discussion 17.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 18.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim. 19.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicant failed to satisfy the conditions in support of her application for subsequent claim. 20.Those reasons under paragraph 16 are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision. The law does not require the immigration officer to have an interview for her subsequent claim. General assertions of propositions of law will not assist the applicant.[2] The applicant had also said that she had married a Hong Kong resident and they had a daughter, who has the right of abode. But humanitarian or compassionate ground does not assist her application.[3] 21.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 22.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 23.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 24.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 25.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 26.The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say. 27.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 28.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 29.RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the applicant. Dated the 16th day of September 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable risks are:
[2] The Court of Appeal in Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244 held:
[3] On the question whether the applicant is entitled to rely upon humanitarian or compassionate grounds on the fact that the applicant is the mother of her child, who was born in Hong Kong and is a Hong Kong permanent resident, the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang, Milagros Tecson & others v Director of Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10, Chief Justice Ma, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Fok PJ, Mr Justice Stock NPJ and Mr Justice French NPJ, 4 April 2019 held:
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment