Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed v. Director of Immigration

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 16/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 March 2025.

1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 3 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1007 of 2018 (“the previous application”).

Cites 10 cases

Case No.HCAL 16/2025[2025] HKCFI 801
Court
High Court CFI
Date18 Mar 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 16/2025

[2025] HKCFI 801

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 16 OF 2025

_____________

BETWEEN

Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed Applicant
and
Director of Immigration Putative Respondent

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung in Court
Date of Hearing: 10 February 2025
Date of Judgment: 18 March 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 3 October 2024 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 1007 of 2018 (“the previous application”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 10 February 2025 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds.

The procedural history

4.The applicant, aged 35, is a national of Somali. He came to Hong Kong on 20 January 2014 and was refused entry, whereupon he raised torture claim. Later, he applied to withdraw his torture claim, to be replaced by non-refoulement claim on refouled, he would be harmed by (i) a family of Hawiye tribe (“Hawlye Family”) in Somalia because one of their family members died after taking the medicine given by his father; (ii) being a person of minority tribe in Somalia and he would face discriminatory treatments from the majority tribes if he returns to Somalia.

5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board did not believe his evidence that he had received death threats via the deceased’s elder brother and the 15-year old boy, as alleged by him. It also found that there would be no risk to him of being harmed or killed by the deceased parent’s family in Somalia. It therefore found that his claim was unfounded and dismissed his appeal.

6.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 26 November 2019. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed on 29 May 2023.

7.By letter dated 11 January 2024, the applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

8.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

9.Upon the immigration officer’s advice, he had submitted 2 letters, enclosed with 37 documents in support of this application. In the first letter, the applicant mentioned the psychological report. Having considered the evidence, the immigration officer found:

“18. All the available information and supporting documents furnished have been carefully considered. … As such, you are relying principally on the same basis to intensify your previous claim and the new information you provided for the Request is merely a continuation of your previous claim. The claimed risk of arm from the Hawiye Family, the majority tribes and AS has already been carefully considered by the Case Office and the Board in the previous claim… .

23. There is no indication that you would now be deprived of reasonable state protection and internal relocation due to the clan militias. Even if the risk of harm from the Hawiye Family or the clan militias exits, you may seek assistance or protection from the Somali authorities, if needed…. In gist, it is considered that you may resort to protection from the Somali authorities if you really face risk of harm from the Hawiye Family or the clan militias after your return to the country.

32. … it is still not considered unduly harsh for you to return to and live in your home country.”

10.The immigration officer considered his evidence and found that the applicant relied on the similar reasons in his previous claim. Although the immigration officer accepted that Counsel’s Report on his psychological health may be regarded as new evidence that shows change of circumstances, the immigration officer did not accept this issue as the applicant did not mention it in his previous claim. His claim was therefore treated as a continuation of his previous claim.

11.For those reasons, the immigration officer was not satisfied with the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and he refused his application for subsequent claim.

Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision

12.The applicant filed Form 86 on 2 January 2025 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

13.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has not raised any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.

Discussion

14.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

15.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim. However, he submitted a written submissions in which he has raised 2 grounds, viz. (1) Ignoring and/or cherry-picking country of origin information (“COI”) and other evidence; and (2) failure to appropriately consider the risk of harm based on changing conditions of armed conflict and violence and the applicant’s identity profile. The applicant complained that he had submitted 30 COI to the Director, who did not mention them in the Director’s Decision.

16.Those 2 grounds are the applicant’s bare assertions or his personal opinions without any evidence in support. They are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision[2]. Therefore, these 2 grounds are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision. In fact, the Board in his previous claim rejected his evidence that he had received threats via the deceased’s elder brother and the 15-year old boy, as alleged by him. See paragraph 5. This is the finding of the facts by the Board, which the applicant has raised no good reason for this Court to interfere with. The CIO are only information for the Director’s reference. He does not have to mention them in his decisions.

17.There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.

18.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

19.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

20.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

21.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

22.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say.

23.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

24.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

25.RPO in terms of paragraph 23 be made against the applicant.

  (K.W. Lung)
  Deputy High Court Judge

The applicant appeared in person.



[1]   The applicable risks are:

a. risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);

b. Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (Risk of violation of the right to life) (“BOR 2 risk”);

c. risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and

d. risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).

[2]   The Court of Appeal in Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244 held:

“20. … … general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case: Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20 and Ibrahim v Simon Russell [2019] HKCA 1327.” See also Re Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 [16].”