Thing Sunil v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office and Another

HCAL 865/2020

[2025] HKCFI 4366

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 865 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oralsubmissionsfrom the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew:

Leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed;

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By a Form 86 dated and filed on 11 May 2020 (“Form 86”), and an affirmation also dated and filed on 11 May 2020 (“Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to commence a judicial review regarding:

a.  A decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 12 March 2015 (“Director’s 1^st Decision”); and

b.  A decision of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 10 January 2020 (“the NRCPO Decision”) [1];

both of which were included within the exhibits to the Affirmation.

2.I did not understand the Applicant to seek leave in relation to the following decisions, not least because they are neither identified in the Form 86 as subjects of the leave application, nor exhibited to the Affirmation. However, given the context of the application I mention them here, and had regard to them below where they may be relevant:

a.  A decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/NRCPO dated 28 April 2017 (“TCAB Decision”)[2] which was the result of an appeal/petition from the Director’s 1^st Decision; and

b.  A decision of the Director dated 19 June 2017 (“Director’s Further Decision”), that the Applicant had failed to establish BOR 2 Risk in relation to his non-refoulement claim (from which the Applicant petitioned to the NRCPO resulting in the NRCPO Decision).

3.I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the TCAB Decision, and from the NRCPO Decision, unless otherwise specified herein.

4.The Applicant appeared at the oral hearing of his application. I adjourned the hearing to 20 June 2025 as the Applicant asked to be given an opportunity to locate and file supporting documents in relation to the question of delay. As set out below, no such documents were filed or submitted, and the hearing resumed and concluded on that day.

Background

5.This is primarily set out in both decisions of the Director, the TCAB Decision, and the NRCPO Decision. In summary:

a.  The Applicant claims non-refoulement relief on the basis that if he were sent back to Nepal, he would be harmed or killed by members of the Madhesi Morcha Forum (“Forum”) because he had caused their leader’s brother to be arrested by the police;

b.  The Applicant had the assistance of the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) in advancing such claims to the Director via his non-refoulement claim form (“NCF”) and at an interview (“Interview”). The Director assessed such on the grounds of Torture Risk[3], BOR 3 Risk[4], and Persecution Risk[5] and rejected them in the Director’s 1^st Decision dated 12 March 2015;

c.  The Applicant then petitioned/appealed to the TCAB/NRCPO, which held a hearing on 17 August 2016 and handed down the TCAB Decision on 28 April 2017 which dismissed the Applicant’s appeal/petition and confirmed the Director’s 1^st Decision;

d.  The Director by a letter dated 10 May 2017 invited the Applicant to submit, by 24 May 2017, additional facts regarding his non-refoulement claims in relation to BOR 2 Risk[6]. The Applicant failed to do so. The Director then found, by the Director’s Further Decision dated 19 June 2017, that the Applicant had failed to establish BOR 2 Risk in relation to his non-refoulement claim;

e.  On 6 September 2017 the Applicant filed a notice of appeal/petition against the Director’s Further Decision, which included an application for late filing (“2^nd Petition”); and

f.  The NRCPO (which was constituted by the same adjudicator who had decided the TCAB Decision) handed down the NRCPO Decision on 10 January 2020 which dismissed the Applicant’s application for late filing of his petition against the Director’s Further Decision.

Legal Principles

6.An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380).

7.It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO. (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886).

8.In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

9.Given RHC O. 53 r. 4(1) and s. 21K(6) High Court Ordinance (CAP. 4A),where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review more than 3 months after the decision:

a.  The failure to apply within 3 months constitutes “undue delay”. To justify an extension of time in which to apply for leave, the Applicant must show “good reason” to extend time. In deciding this, certain factors that are likely to be significant are (i) the length of the delay (ii) the explanation for the delay[7] (iii) the merits of the substantive application[8] (iv) prejudice, and (v) whether the application raises questions of general public importance;

b.  Where the court considers that there is no good reason for extending the period, it will refuse leave to apply for judicial review. The refusal of an extension of time is part and parcel of a refusal to grant leave to apply. It is not the case that the court refuses the extension of time as a discrete decision and then makes no decision on the question of leave to apply for judicial review, treating this as a separate matter entirely;

c.  If the court is satisfied that there is good reason for extending the period, it does not follow that leave to apply for judicial review will automatically be given. While the court might grant leave, it retains a discretion to refuse to do so and the existence of a good reason for undue delay is only one facet of the question, others including sufficiency of interest and the need to satisfy the arguability test. Leave may also be refused on the basis that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration; and

d.  Even if leave to apply is granted, the issue of undue delay on the part of the applicant may be raised again at the substantive hearing of the judicial review application. That is a separate consideration of whether relief should be refused on the basis that the court thinks that relief would be likely to cause substantial hardship or prejudice to the rights of another or be detrimental to good administration.

See AW v Director of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) (at §§23 to 36), Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1 (at §§43 to 45 as also cited in AW, supra), and H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44 citing inter alia both AW and Thomas Lai. See also Re Hariatiningsih [2021] HKCFI 1194 at §§12-13, 16-19 citing the aforesaid, upheld in [2022] HKCA 1321.

Discussion

10.The application was filed on 11 May 2020, just over 4 months after the TCAB Decision. I do not see any good reason on the papers, and in the circumstances, to extend time for the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. I therefore refuse to grant such an extension of time, and dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review. This is for the following reasons.

11.Dealing, firstly, with the merits of the substantive application, the Form 86 has obviously had the input of someone with legal training but does not set out any grounds of judicial review. Rather, in the Affirmation (which is entirely in English with no interpretation clause, and which contents have also had the input of someone with legal training) the Applicant has at Paragraphs 4 to 39 set out various complaints on which he relies, at least some of which have been copied more or less word for word from other cases. They can be summarised and organised as follows:

a.  The Applicant does not agree with decisions made by the Director, as well as by the NRCPO, as he “believes that his case has been determined unfairly” and the decisions “should be deemed invalid due to procedural impropriety” (Paragraphs 4, and 20 to 22 of the Affirmation) (Complaint 1);

b.  While the Director’s Decision was translated to him by an interpreter, he had no further language assistance, and no legal assistance in relation to the Notice of Appeal/Petition against the Director’s Decision, and merely relied on the help of his friends, such that with “very little legal guidance it was not possible for me to satisfy any authorities, ground by ground, in accordance with USM grounds” (see Paragraphs 11 to 13 of the Affirmation); (Complaint 2)

c.  In relation to the Director’s Further Decision, he had no language assistance in relation to the TCAB Decision, and did not get the Director’s letter dated 10 May 2017 by which the Director had invited him to submit additional facts and grounds relating to BOR 2 Risk, the Director rejected his claims without a screening interview or “follow up”, and he was never given an opportunity to respond “and be cross-checked by the [Director] either by way of [the Director’s Further Decision]” hence he was not “advised of my rights of BOR 2 properly” (see Paragraphs 14 to 15, and 29 to 30 of the Affirmation); (Complaint 3)

d.  He had no language assistance when he received the TCAB Decision, and did not receive the Director’s Further Decision but was only told upon reporting to the Department of Immigration that his claim had been rejected. He also had no language assistance when he received the Director’s Further Decisionwhichhe “could not get any help in translating”, and hence could not understand its contents or what he had been asked to do, nor what BOR 2 meant. He only filed the 2^nd Petition against the Director’s Further Decision with the help of a friend, such that the “lack of language assistance has been detrimental to my case” (see Paragraphs 16 to 19, 23 to 24, 27 to 28, 30 of the Affirmation); (Complaint 4)

e.  That his case was “never referred to the [DLS]” and that to his knowledge DLS “stopped representing [him] earlier before issue of the [Director’s 1^st Decision] because the [DLS] believed there are no merits for appeal at the [TCAB]”, and as BOR 2 was not a ground at the time the DLS “could not have assessed my case based on merits. The [DLS] should continue to represent me under such circumstances” (Paragraph 26 of the Affirmation); (Complaint 5)

f.  That the BOR 2 Risk claim was refused without him being given “a chance to explain or elaborate my appeal and give [the NRCPO] the evidences regarding to BOR 2 claim”, as he should have been given an opportunity before the NRCPO so that someone could explain to him “face-to-face what BOR 2 means and enable me give evidence in person” (Paragraphs 33 to 34 of the Affirmation); (Complaint 6)

g.  That, with apparent reference to a passage from the “AM” case, adequate reasons must be given by the TCAB/NRCPO (Paragraph 38 of the Affirmation); (Complaint 7) and

h.  He had no legal or language assistance in relation to the contents of the NRCPO Decision, such that (Paragraphs 20, 25, 30 to 32, 35 to 37, and 39 of the Affirmation):

i.  the adjudicator had “exercised his case management power wrongfully”, and leave should be granted on that ground alone; and (Complaint 8A)

ii.  the Applicant was hence “deprived of the opportunity to make a full application for leave to apply for judicial review” and reserves “the right to submit further evidence either in oral or in writing upon the Determination of petition issued… being read back to me in my first language via a qualified interpreter” andit is otherwise “procedurally unfair as every litigant should have the right to better understand their case better and my personal experience has proved that relying on another person’s help did not achieve a desirable outcome” and as “full participation in my appeal extends understanding such determination”. He was also “currently seeking legal presentation and reserve the right to submit additional and/or amended grounds and documents in support of any application”. Given all of the reasons above,he wishes the court to “hear my case once again with the assistance of an Interpreter”. (Complaint 8B)

12.Firstly, once the Applicant had pursued his appeal to the TCAB/NRCPO the Director’s Decision (and also hence the Director’s Further Decision) were (absent exceptional circumstances, of which none have been suggested to me) no longer susceptible to judicial review (Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549; Yeni Setyawati v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2019] HKCA 1310; Sherpunja Thapa Kul Prasad [2022] HKCFI 2434 §18). Accordingly:

a.  Complaint 3 is therefore irrelevant and cannot found any basis for leave to apply for judicial review;

b.  When considering the other Complaints (e.g. Complaint 1) I shall ignore any portions that apparently relate to the Director and/or decisions made by him as they are not reasonably arguable and must be dismissed.

13.Secondly, and as to Complaint 6, the Applicant’s late filing application in the 2^nd Petition was to be dealt with “as a preliminary decision without a hearing” (s. 37ZT Immigration Ordinance (CAP. 115) (“the Ordinance”), Sudimah [HKCA] 1030 at §14; Chaudhary Mohammad Mobeen @ Chaudhry Muhammad Mobeen [2018] HKCFI 995 (CFI) at §§27-28, 33 and [2018] HKCA 663 at §§12, 19; and Ram Chander v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 585). That was what the NRCPO did in the NRCPO Decision. Complaint 6 is hence totally misconceived and does not found or relate to any reasonably arguable basis any ground of judicial review.

14.Thirdly, and as to Complaint 7, AM v Director of Immigration & anor. [2014] 1 HKC 416 does not actually contain the quoted portion. Nevertheless, I have considered the contents of the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision and I do not consider that there is any reasonably arguable case that the decision-maker breached his duty to give adequate reasons in either of those decisions, having regard to the relevant principles that have been set out by the appellate courts in Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 at §51 and Melemoko Ndiala Saint Juste Seguy Lionel [2021] HKCA 609 at §5.

15.Fourthly, Complaints 2, 4, and 5[9] apparently assert that there was procedural unfairness as he did not receive the Director’s Further Decision, and he was not provided with legal and language assistance in relation to both the appeal/petition to the TCAB/NRCPO, and the 2^nd Petition to the NRCPO. However, I do not consider that they set out or give rise to any reasonably arguable ground of judicial review, whether in the nature of procedural unfairness, error of law, and/or irrationality:

a.  It was the Applicant’s duty to provide an address to which correspondence or notice could come to his attention in a timely manner. As he did not, he had to shoulder the consequences of his failure to provide an effective updated address. I hence do not see any reasonably arguable ground of judicial review sufficient to vitiate the NRCPO’s approach, and conclusions in relation, to his late filing application, including in particular the conclusion that the reasons given by the Applicant were not acceptable (see s. 37ZA of the Ordinance, Hasmi Rizwan Imran [2018] HKCA 439 at §§14 and 15, Paragraphs 1 to 6 of the NRCPO Decision);

b.  The high standard of fairness does not grant the Applicant an absolute right to free legal representation or interpretation services at all stages of the proceedings. (Re Zafar Muazam (unrep., CACV 2/2018, 23 March 2018); Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17; Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37; Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178 at §22; Akhondo Shakil [2021] HKCA 1616 at §20[10]; Vu Hong Diep v Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office [2023] HKCA 1378; Kamran Khan [2022] HKCFI 1924 at §§21-25 and [2022] HKCA 230 at §§16-17);

c.  I see here nothing amiss in relation to the issue of legal representation after the Director’s Decision. The Applicant had been legally represented and assisted up to the making of the Director’s Decision, not only in relation to completion of the NCF[11] but also at the Interview. While the DLS can appear in appeal proceedings, this is subject to a merits test, and absent any assertion that the merits test had not been properly applied, the Applicant cannot complain about the lack of legal representation in proceedings before the TCAB/NRCPO (Zunariyah, supra, at §19). No such allegation is advanced, nor is there is any sufficient basis to support such in relation to either the appeal/petition from the Director’s Decision, or the 2^nd Petition from the Director’s Further Decision[12];

d.  Similarly, the high standard of fairness does not require or include provision of interpretation at any time the Applicant claimed or desired, particularly when it was his choice to overstay in Hong Kong, where the official languages are Chinese and English. In any event, the Applicant’s 2^nd Petition, Form 86, and Affirmation were all in English, with no interpretation clause. He hence either understood English or (if one accepts his claim in the Affirmation that “As a matter of fact, I do not know English”) has access to, and would have been able to seek, interpretation services and language assistance if necessary (Gurnishan Singh, supra; Gurung Sagar, supra; Kamran Khan, supra; Zafar Muazam, supra).

e.  Insofar as the Applicant alleges that the lack of legal and language assistance has led to procedural unfairness, he has not provided any details of how the lack of such assistance led to any error, or unreasonable/unfair procedure, at the board level. Without such details, the argument is untenable (see Akhondo Shakil [2021] HKCA 1616 at §§18-19), and in any event I also do not see how the lack of such assistance resulted in any relevant error by, or unreasonable/unfair procedure before the NRCPO (or for that matter the TCAB/NRCPO). Indeed, given the Applicant’s Grounds of Appeal/Petition in the 2^nd Petition, I also do not accept that the Applicant has established (as claimed) that he was “uncertain” and/or “not aware” of the meaning of BOR 2, or that there was hence some relevant error and/or unreasonable/unfair procedure.

16.I also consider that Complaints 8A and 8B[13] do not raise any reasonably arguable ground of judicial review, and are neither relevant to nor do they assist the leave application. In addition to the above analysis regarding legal and language assistance:

a.  I see no basis for the Applicant’s claim that the alleged lack of such assistance has inhibited his ability to proceed with the present leave application, particularly when he either sufficiently understood English or had been able to seek and had in fact obtained in these proceedings language assistance, as well as assistance from someone who has been legally trained, and when at the oral hearing before me he said (with the assistance of an interpreter) that there was nothing he wished to say (apart from on matters of delay which I address below); and

b.  Insofar as such or indeed any of the Complaints apparently suggest that the present proceedings are an “appeal”, this notion is misconceived and does not found or relate to an arguable ground of judicial review. After all, the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh even in the absence of any legal error (Lakhwinder Singh, supra).

17.Finally, if and insofar as Complaint 1 is said to advance free-standing ground(s) of judicial review on their own different from those considered above, it does not refer to any underlying facts or matters and hence does not amount to proper, or properly particularised grounds of judicial review, since general assertions or propositions of law without particulars are not effective grounds to support a judicial review and cannot assist an applicant (Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20 at §17; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578 at §17; Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626 at §24; Re Salim Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244 at §20; Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16; Akhondo Shakhil, supra, at §15).

18.However, and notwithstanding such, given the seriousness of the issues at hand I have further considered the NRCPO Decision (and also the TCAB Decision) with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness.

19.Having done so, I do not see that the Applicant has any reasonably arguable case that there was any other procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test that is sufficient to vitiate the conclusions in and justifies the grant of leave in relation to the NRCPO Decision or the TCAB Decision. In particular, and as regards the NRCPO Decision, while the NRCPO did not consider the merits of the Applicant’s case (cf. Qasim Ali [2019] HKCA 430):

a.  The decision-maker would apply the amended version of s. 37ZT(2) and (3) of the Ordinancesuch that the issue of the Applicant’s merits would be academic as there would be no need to have regard to the substantive merits of the Applicant’s appeal (Cadnan Foose Maxamad [2022] HKCFI 429 at §§20-21; Ripon Mohammed [2022] HKCFI 592 at §34.a. to b.). Moreover, it would be futile to remit the matter, and hence leave should be refused as there is no realistic prospect of relief being granted[14]. This is because the NRCPO would refuse to allow late filing given s. 37ZA of the Ordinance, the principles in Hasmi Rizwan, supra, and the evidence available (including the reasons given by the Applicant to support his late filing application, alongside the matters of fact as to address and service recorded at NRCPO Decision Paragraph 6); and

b.  Even if the decision-maker were to apply the pre-amendment version of s. 37ZT(2) and (3), consideration of the merits of the substantive application would be futile and not change the ultimate result, hence leave should still be refused as there is no realistic prospect of relief being granted[15]. I so conclude given firstly the correctness of the analysis at NRCPO Decision Paragraphs 1 to 6, but also as given the following, the merits of the Applicant’s case were extremely weak:

i.  When assessing BOR 2 Risk, the findings and determinations from the TCAB Decision (in particular those relating to risk of harm and BOR 3 Risk at Paragraphs 28 to 40 thereof), were and would have been the starting point in considering BOR 2 Risk, such that the Applicant’s claim based on BOR 2 Risk was bound to fail absent additional information affecting those earlier conclusions (See Kulwinder Kaur [2022] HKCA 49 at §59, Sandhu Vinny [2022] HKCFI 2327 at §§24-26; Sandhu Vinny [2023] HKCA 1261 at §§30, 32-33); and

ii.  While the Applicant had in the 2^nd Petition advanced various allegations of serious and extreme developments since the TCAB Decision, they were and are mere and bare allegations which (despite their seriousness and the time that has since elapsed) (i) Are not supported by any, let alone any sufficiently cogent or credible, evidence, information (including COI), and/or documentation; and (ii) There is no explanation, let alone a sufficiently cogent one given the seriousness of the allegations, as to why such sources, information, and documents have not been named or made available. A fortiori when the Applicant has been assisted in these proceedings by someone with legal training.

20.In the circumstances, there is hence no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success.

21.Moving on from the question of merits, there is undue delay in this case as the leave application was filed just over a month of time. Despite this, and the Applicant having had the assistance of someone with legal training, there is no request for an extension of time to make the application in the Form 86. I also do not consider that I have been given an acceptable explanation for the undue delay as:

a.  Paragraph 21 of the Affirmation obliquely says that due to COVID-19 the Applicant was unable to file the leave application “as the Court was not opening on regular bases”. However, this is not an acceptable explanation given that from 9 March 2020 onward there were generally[16] special arrangements put in place to enable parties to file applications for leave to apply for judicial review (including non-refoulement claims) in the High Court Registry where the time limit for making the application provided by RHC O. 53 r. 4(1) would expire during GAP, which have not been referred to or explained in the Affirmation (let alone with reference to the specific facts of the Applicant’s case), even though the Affirmation had the input of someone with legal training and who must be taken to have known of the duty of full and frank disclosure; and

b.  At the oral hearing before me the Applicant sought to blame COVID-19 for the delay. After I highlighted that the original date typed on the Form 86 was 17 April 2020[17], he claimed that he had intended to file it that day (which would still reflect an undue delay of 7 days), and had been unable to do so due to health problems[18]. As he said that he believed he might have some supporting documentation in the nature of “receipts”, I gave him an opportunity to file an affirmation exhibiting such before, and for him to be further heard on such at, the resumed hearing. However, eventually no such documents were submitted or filed and instead the Applicant explained by way of submission that he could not find any. I hence do not accept, and I have not had regard to, the bare and unsubstantiated allegation that he suffered any health problems that caused any delay from 17 April 2020 onward.

22.With that said, given the other factors mentioned herein I would still reach the conclusion in Paragraph 10 above, even if I have somehow erred as to the exact length of, and/or the lack of an acceptable explanation for, the undue delay.

23.Finally, I do not see any question of general public importance raised by the application which is likely to be resolved by the courts in any event. Given the lack of any reasonably arguable grounds, I also see no prejudice to the Applicant if the application were not allowed to proceed, whereas allowing it to proceed would clearly be to the detriment of public administration and would needlessly prejudice the putative Respondent.

Conclusion

24.In the circumstances, I have ordered that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 19^th day of September 2025

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1