Dilbag Singh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office and Another

HCAL 1391/2020

[2026] HKCFI 1618

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1391 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew:

1.   The Form 86 be amended of the Court’s own motion by substituting “24 February 2017” in place of the words “10 December 2014”; and

2.   The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.The Applicant is a national of India.  By a Form 86 filed on 6 July 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also filed on 6 July 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of:

(1)   Two decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 25 November 2014 (“Director’s Decision”) and 31 March 2017 (“Director’s Further Decision”);

(2)   A decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) / Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) (“the TCAB Decision”)[1] dated 24 February 2017[2], and a decision of the NRCPO made on 4 June 2020 (“the NRCPO Decision”)[3].

2.The Applicant sought an oral hearing of his application.  A further affirmation was filed on 1 September 2025 (“2^nd Affirmation”), in English without a translation clause, to which were exhibited some other written submissions and documents, again all in English without any translation clauses. While he failed to attend the hearing scheduled for the morning of 4 September 2025, he claimed to court staff over the telephone, and after the court had finished sitting for the day, that he had just arrived at court and asked to be given another hearing.  A hearing hence took place on 10 September 2025, at which he said he had nothing to say save that he asked to be given some time because he had married in Hong Kong and applied for a dependant visa[4], and could not go back to India.

3.I have amended the Form 86 on my own motion to reflect the correct date of the TCAB Decision.  I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision unless otherwise specified herein. 

Background

4.This is set out in the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision.  While I will not repeat the contents thereof, in summary and in relation to the assessment of his claim:

(1)   The Applicant claimed non-refoulement relief on the basis that if he were sent back to India he would be killed by Koko, Gurbir, and their group;

(2)   The claim was assessed on the grounds of Torture Risk[5], BOR 3 Risk[6], and Persecution Risk[7] and was rejected by the Director in the Director’s Decision dated 25 November 2014.  The Applicant hence appealed/petitioned to the TCAB/NRCPO, which held an oral hearing on 27 May 2016 (the Applicant having failed to attend a hearing scheduled for 29 February 2016) and ultimately dismissed the appeal/petition by way of the TCAB Decision dated 24 February 2017;

(3)   On 16 March 2017 the Director sought to canvass the issue of BOR 2 Risk[8] and invited the Applicant to submit further material, which he did by way of a letter dated 28 March 2017.  The Director then found, in the Director’s Further Decision dated 31 March 2017, that the Applicant had failed to establish BOR 2 Risk; and

(4)   The Applicant petitioned to the NRCPO, which sought to hold a hearing on 11 May 2020.  However such was not attended by the Applicant, who could not be contacted over the telephone either on the day before, or on the day of, the hearing; and

(5)   The NRCPO therefore applied the procedure in s. 15 of Schedule 1A, Immigration Ordinance (CAP. 115) and, as it had received no response in relation to such from the Applicant by 25 May 2020, proceeded to determine the petition/appeal in his absence and issued the NRCPO Decision dated 4 June 2020, in which it dismissed the petition and confirmed the Director’s Further Decision.

Legal Principles

5.An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep.  HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380).

6.It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers.  The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them.  While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO.  (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886).

7.In order for me to give leave to apply for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).  As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

8.Given RHC O. 53 r. 4(1) and s. 21K(6) High Court Ordinance (CAP. 4A), where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review more than 3 months after the decision:

(1)   The failure to apply within 3 months constitutes “undue delay”.  To justify an extension of time in which to apply for leave, the Applicant must show “good reason” to extend time.  In deciding this, certain factors that are likely to be significant are (i) the length of the delay (ii) the explanation for the delay[9] (iii) the merits of the substantive application[10] (iv) prejudice, and (v) whether the application raises questions of general public importance;

(2)   Where the court considers that there is no good reason for extending the period, it will refuse leave to apply for judicial review.  The refusal of an extension of time is part and parcel of a refusal to grant leave to apply.  It is not the case that the court refuses the extension of time as a discrete decision and then makes no decision on the question of leave to apply for judicial review, treating this as a separate matter entirely;

(3)   If the court is satisfied that there is good reason for extending the period, it does not follow that leave to apply for judicial review will automatically be given.  While the court might grant leave, it retains a discretion to refuse to do so and the existence of a good reason for undue delay is only one facet of the question, others including sufficiency of interest and the need to satisfy the arguability test.  Leave may also be refused on the basis that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration; and

(4)   Even if leave to apply is granted, the issue of undue delay on the part of the applicant may be raised again at the substantive hearing of the judicial review application.  That is a separate consideration of whether relief should be refused on the basis that the court thinks that relief would be likely to cause substantial hardship or prejudice to the rights of another or be detrimental to good administration.  

See AW v Director of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) (at §§23 to 36), Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1 (at §§43 to 45 as also cited in AW, supra), and H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44 citing inter alia both AW and Thomas Lai.  See also Re Hariatiningsih [2021] HKCFI 1194 at §§12‑13, 16-19 citing the aforesaid, upheld in [2022] HKCA 1321.

Discussion

9.As a starting point, once the Applicant had pursued his appeal to the TCAB/NRCPO, and alter to the NRCPO, the Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision were (absent exceptional circumstances, of which none have been suggested to me) no longer susceptible to judicial review (Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549; Yeni Setyawati v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2019] HKCA 1310; Sherpunja Thapa Kul Prasad [2022] HKCFI 2434 §18).  The application for leave for judicial review of those two decisions of the Director hence must fail.  Hence, insofar as the Affirmation and 2^nd Affirmation advance criticisms and/or seek leave in relation to either or both of those decisions, such are not reasonably arguable and must be dismissed.  The same goes for portions of the Complaints (defined below) that relate to the Director, the Director’s Decision, and the Director’s Further Decision.  Hence, where the Complaints below refer to matters that apparently relate to the Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision, I have included such only for the sake of context.

10.The Form 86 contains no grounds of judicial review.  However, the Affirmation and the 2^nd Affirmation set the following complaints:

(1)   General claims at Paragraph 8 of the Affirmation and Paragraph 2 of the 2^nd Affirmation that “Neither the authorities had have taken my unique situation into account fairly and sequentially” and that he did not think his case had “been determined fairly”; (Complaint 1)

(2)   The following complaints generally relating to the lack of legal and language assistance and procedural unfairness, at least some of which have been copied word for word from other cases (Paragraphs 9 to 22 of the Affirmation, Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the 2^nd Affirmation):

i.   After the issuance of the Director’s Decision he was told by the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) that there were no grounds for appeal, and “No second opinion was sought”, hence he was not represented by the DLS and he was deprived of his basic right as a litigant to be informed of his legal rights and to be duly informed of all information, as there was no legal or language assistance;

ii.   There was no legal or language assistance provided to him in relation to the determination of BOR 2 Risk by the Director, which is procedurally unfair as he “could only understand the bit about providing “additional information”, but not as to what BOR 2 Risk actually refers to and this is something that needs to be explained to [him] as a concerned applicant”;

iii.   As English is not his first language and he is in a foreign country where he does not understand the culture, process, or language, without language assistance it was hard for him to understand and fill in the Notice of Appeal, and to receive, understand and respond to correspondence;

iv.   In the Affirmation, that despite the Adjudicator being aware that the Applicant does not speak, read, or write English, “the Determination of Appeal/Petition” has never been read or translated to him in his first language.  Hence without being advised properly of the reasons for rejection he cannot provide full grounds for an appeal (which lack of such basic assistance is procedurally unfair).  The use of English in the “Determination” without provision of interpretation/translation to understand the reasons for rejection is “insensitive” and “possibly unlawful”;

v.   He was “not informed fully of the materials put before the Adjudicator, and certainly do not understand the Determination of Appeal/Petition to its fullest”;

vi.   While (with apparent reference to a passage which he says he has quoted from the “AM” case, at Paragraph 18 of the Affirmation) adequate reasons must be given by the TCAB/NRCPO, due to the lack of language assistance he could not have understood the reasoning despite it being written out;

vii.   That, apparently due to the general lack of legal and language assistance, the leave application should succeed as the “Adjudicator has exercised his case management power wrongfully”;

viii.   In an exhibit to the 2^nd Affirmation, that “Without knowing through how case was determined, it is not easy for me to appeal against the decision [apparently referring to those of the Director as well as the adjudicator of the TCAB].  I believe there should have been a proper and fair mechanism that allows unrepresented litigants to understand more about their claim…”, that he was “never provided with proper legal and language assistance”, with his limitations in terms of “resources, funding and language capabilities it has been burden some for a Non‑refoulement claimants like me to appeal against the decision”, and “The determination of Appeal/ petition has been never read to me on my own language, and I believe such failures in providing proper assistance to Non‑refoulement claimants is procedurally unfair” ; and

(collectively, “Complaints 2A”)

ix.   According to the Affirmation, he has hence been“deprived of the opportunity to make a full application for leave to apply for judicial review” and reserves “the right to submit further evidence and further grounds either orally or in writing upon the Determination of Petition issued by the [TCAB] being read back to me in my first language via a qualified interpreter”, that “full participation in my appeal extends to understanding such determination”, an oral hearing is requested “to hear my case once again with the assistance of an Interpreter”, and requests that the “Determination of the Appeal/Petition to be translated or interpreted to [the Applicant] for [the Applicant’s] better understanding, upon which [the Applicant requests] to have reasonable and sufficient time to provide further written grounds (if any)”; (Complaint 2B)

(3)   He was unaware of the scheduling of the oral hearing before the NRCPO in relation to BOR 2 Risk, and therefore did not attend. No enquiries were made into why he did not attend the oral hearing. He hence did not voluntarily give up the opportunity to explain himself with the assistance of an interpreter.  (Paragraphs 11 to 12, Affirmation); (Complaint 3)

(4)   Given his “limitations in language” and Complaint 3, the dismissal of his claim was unduly harsh as his credibility might be challenged and he would not be made aware of such (Paragraph 12, Affirmation); (Complaint 4)

(5)   The following Complaints in Paragraph 5 of the 2^nd Affirmation, which have been copied word for word from other cases, that “The Respondent’s is in breach of procedural fairness in the following parts”:

i.   “The Respondent’s had unlawfully fettered his discretion by refused my appeal on the grounds that they did not satisfy the requirements”;

ii.   “The Adjudicator acted in a procedural unfairness in dealing with my appeal”;

iii.   “The Respondent’s decisions to refuse my appeal were unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense or are a result of procedural errors or unfairness.”

iv.   “The Respondent’s failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-Represented claimants.”

(Complaints 5)

(6)   The following Complaint in Paragraph 6 of the 2^nd Affirmation, which has also been copied word for word from other cases, that “The discriminatory act of authorities towards Non-refoulement claimants merely on the basis of quick disposed of Non-refoulement cases is unacceptable and is determinate to the spirit of Judicial system.”  (Complaint 6)

(collectively, “the Complaints”)

11.As for the TCAB Decision, the application for leave was filed more than 3 months after the TCAB Decision was issued, and more than 3 years out of time.  I do not see any good reason to extend time for the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the TCAB Decision.  I therefore refuse to grant such an extension of time and dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review of the TCAB Decision.  I also dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review of the NRCPO Decision.  This is for the reasons below.

12.Firstly, I do not see any factual basis for Complaint 3, or that such gives rise to any reasonably arguable public law complaint.  In the usual course of events, a notice of hearing would have been issued to the Applicant at the last-known address provided by him to the TCAB/NRCPO, and in this case there is no evidence that such was not issued, or that it was returned undelivered.  I therefore reject the bare and unparticularised allegation that the Applicant says he was “unaware” of the scheduled oral hearing on 11 May 2020.  In any event, it is clear both that the Applicant could not be contacted by the NRCPO over the telephone to remind him of the hearing, and that inquiries were made as to why he did not attend such including by the NRCPO applying the procedure in s. 15 of Schedule 1A, Immigration Ordinance (CAP. 115), before the NRCPO proceeded to determine the petition/appeal in his absence (Paragraph 6.3, NRCPO Decision).  Again, there is no evidence that such letter was returned undelivered.  I therefore also reject the Applicant’s bare allegation that no enquiries were made with him.  The Applicant therefore only has himself to blame for his failure to attend the hearing and explain himself with the benefit of an interpreter, and in any event for his failure to explain/comment on his non-attendance, and on any related matters and considerations considered by the NRCPO.

13.Thirdly, as regards Complaints 2A and 2B, and any relevant attempt to rely on such in relation to the other Complaints, I do not see that the alleged lack of legal or language assistance after the Director’s Decision gives rise to any reasonable argument that the high standard of fairness was breached or that they give rise to any reasonably arguable public law basis for vitiating the TCAB Decision, or the NRCPO Decision:

(1)   The high standard of fairness does not grant the Applicant an absolute right to free legal representation or interpretation services at all stages of the proceedings.  (Re Zafar Muazam (unrep., CACV 2/2018, 23 March 2018); Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17; Re Lopchan Subash[2018] HKCA 37; Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178 at §22; Akhondo Shakil [2021] HKCA 1616 at §20[11]; Vu Hong Diep v Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office [2023] HKCA 1378; Kamran Khan [2022] HKCFI 1924 at §§21‑25 and [2022] HKCA 230 at §§16-17).

(2)   There is nothing amiss in relation to the issue of legal representation after the Director’s Decision.  The Applicant had the benefit of legal representation by and assistance from the DLS up to the making of such, including apparently not only in relation to completion of the TCF and SCF but also at 2 Interviews, and would in the ordinary course of events have also been provided with interpretation services if requested.  While the DLS can appear in appeal proceedings, this is subject to a merits test, and absent any assertion that the merits test had not been properly applied, the Applicant cannot complain about the lack of legal representation in proceedings before the TCAB/NRCPO (Zunariyah, supra, at §19).  No such assertion is advanced.  Moreover, even if (as claimed by the Applicant) a second opinion was not sought, this is neither here nor there, particularly when he has not (despite the Affirmation and the exhibits to the 2^nd Affirmation clearly having had the input of someone with some legal training) alleged or provided supporting evidence that his case falls under the specific circumstances in which one would be sought[12].

(3)   Similarly, the high standard of fairness does not require or include provision of interpretation at any time the Applicant claimed or desired, particularly in Hong Kong where the official languages are Chinese and English, and when (as can be seen from the Director’s Decision) it was his choice to travel to Hong Kong[13], and then overstay and seek non-refoulement relief here, where the official languages are Chinese and English.  He has to find assistance from among his friends and ethnic community.  I hence do not see how any public law complaint, let alone unlawfulness, could possibly arise from the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision having been written in English, or from the fact that neither decision was arranged to be interpreted to him.  This is especially so given that the Form 86, the Affirmation, the 2^nd Affirmation, and the exhibits thereto are all written in English, and only the Affirmation contains an interpretation clause, hence the Applicant hence either understood English or (even if one accepts his claim in the Affirmation that he does not “speak, read or write English”) has access to, and would have been able to seek, interpretation services and language assistance if necessary (Gurnishan Singh, supra; Gurung Sagar, supra; Kamran Khan, supra; Zafar Muazam, supra).

(4)   The Applicant should have been familiar with the information that had been provided before the hearing by the TCAB/NRCPO, and in particular with the TCF, the SCF, and the records of the 2 Interviews, all of which were of core importance and which would have been prepared with the benefit of translation and legal assistance leading up to the Director’s Decision.  Similarly he should have been familiar with the information provided by him in the Notice of Appeal/Petition to the TCAB/NRCPO, and then later to the Director and then the NRCPO regarding BOR 2 Risk.

(5)   Importantly, while the Applicant alleges that the lack of legal and language assistance has led to procedural unfairness and/or prejudice, he has not provided any details of how the lack of such assistance led to any error by, or unreasonable/unfair procedure before, the TCAB/NRPCO, and then later the NRCPO.  Without such details, the argument is untenable (see Akhondo Shakil,supra, at §§18-19).

(6)   Indeed, and in any event, during the appeal from the Director’s Decision to the TCAB/NRCPO, the Applicant did not apparently complain about or seek redress in relation to (i) the lack of legal representation (ii) any issues of interpretation and/or language; or (iii) his lack of comprehension/understanding of information, materials and his rights.  Rather, on the contrary, at the oral hearing before the TCAB/NRCPO he had repeated that he had already said everything before and had nothing to add, even though the TCAB/NRCPO stressed the purpose and nature of the hearing, that it was conducting a rehearing, and that the Applicant would be handicapped in seeking to prove his claim without giving evidence by missing the opportunity to clarify or elaborate any relevant points of issues (Paragraph 26, TCAB decision).  Nor were any such complaints were made to the Director in relation to BOR 2 Risk, or to the NRCPO in his petition against the Director’s Further Decision.

(7)   AM v Director of Immigration & anor.  [2014] 1 HKC 416 does not actually contain the quoted portion at Paragraph 18 of the Affirmation, and I also do not see that that the Affirmation alleges that inadequate reasons were given by the TCAB/NRCPO or the NRCPO, let alone with reference to the requisite particulars in relation to the facts of the case. Nevertheless, I have considered the contents of the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision and I do not consider that there is any reasonably arguable case that the decision-maker breached its duty to give adequate reasons, having regard to the relevant principles that have been set out by the appellate courts in Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 at §51 and Melemoko Ndiala Saint Juste Seguy Lionel [2021] HKCA 609 at §5.  Indeed, the contents of the TCAB Decision, and of the NRCPO Decision, are patently sufficient to enable the Applicant to consider the possibilities of administrative and judicial review.

(8)   In relation to Complaint 2B, and (insofar as such may be relevant) the last portion of Complaint 2A, I see no basis for his claim that the alleged lack of such assistance has inhibited his ability to proceed with the present leave application, particularly when judicial review proceedings are not an appeal, when the Applicant has clearly been able to seek and had in fact obtained in these proceedings both language assistance (see Re Kartini [2025] HKCA 699 at §16(5)) and assistance from someone with some legal training, and when at the oral hearing before me he had the assistance of an interpreter but had nothing else to say other than those matters mentioned in Paragraph 2 above.

14.Given the above, I do not accept that Complaint 4 gives rise to any reasonably arguable public law basis to vitiate the NRCPO Decision (which seems to be its main, if not only, target of complaint), or for that matter the TCAB Decision.

15.I also therefore do not accept that any or all of Complaints 1, 5 and 6 (insofar as any of the latter three rely on any or all of Complaints 2A through to 4) give rise to any reasonably arguable public law basis to vitiate the TCAB Decision, or the NRCPO Decision.  If and insofar as Complaints 1, 5 and 6 are said to raise freestanding complaints unrelated to those in Complaints 2A through to 4, they are also entirely inadequate as they consist of generic, vague, and unparticularised assertions using selected keywords and phrases without reference to any underlying facts or matters establishing why, how, and where each of those complaints arise in relation to the TCAB Decision or the NRCPO Decision, and the process by which each of them was reached.  Such general assertions or propositions of law without particulars are not effective grounds to support a judicial review and cannot assist an applicant (Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20 at §17; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578 at §24; Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626 at §24; Re Salim Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244 at §20; Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16; Akhondo Shakil, supra,at §15).

16.With that said, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have conducted a rigorous examination and have anxiously scrutinised the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness.   Having done so, it is clear that the TCAB/NRCPO, and then later the NRCPO in relation to BOR 2 Risk, both applied a high standard of fairness, considered the relevant evidence and COI, and gave sufficient reasons for their conclusions on salient issues.  I see no reasonably arguable public law error sufficient to vitiate (let alone justify the grant of leave in relation to) the assessment, reasoning, and findings regarding credibility, state protection, internal relocation, and risk of harm in the TCAB Decision, and as to the risk of harm in the NRCPO Decision, which are all matters primarily within the province of the decision-making body. Nor is there any public law or error or basis to vitiate the TCAB/NRCPO’s consequent conclusions regarding Torture Risk, Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, and the NRCPO’s consequent conclusion regarding BOR 2 Risk.

17.As for the matters and documents that I have mentioned in Paragraph 2, I do not see how any of them or contents are relevant to the leave application or to his non‑refoulement claim (Adeel Muhammad [2023] HKCA 948), particularly given the findings in and my aforesaid analysis of the TCAB Decision and the NRCPO Decision, and the nature of judicial review proceedings which are not meant to provide a further avenue of appeal.

18.I am not therefore not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success in relation to the TCAB Decision or the NRCPO Decision.

19.Secondly, there is undue delay in relation to the application to seek leave in relation the TCAB Decision, as such application was filed over 3 years out of time.  Despite this, there was no request for an extension of time to make the application in the Form 86, and I do not see that any explanation (let alone a credibly valid or acceptable explanation) has been given in any of the documents, or at the hearing before me for the undue delay, notwithstanding the Applicant’s duty of full and frank disclosure as mentioned above.

20.Thirdly, and also in relation to the application to seek leave in relation to the TCAB Decision, I do not see any question of general public importance raised by the application which is likely to be resolved by the courts in any event.  Given the lack of any reasonably arguable grounds, I also see no prejudice to the Applicant if the application were not allowed to proceed, whereas allowing it to proceed would clearly be to the detriment of public administration and would needlessly prejudice the putative Respondent.  Indeed, even if there were an acceptable explanation for the delay, given the other matters herein I would still refuse to grant leave.

Conclusion

21.In the circumstances I have ordered that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed, and have also made the other orders above.

Dated the 8^th day of April 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1