Lasmini and Another v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1018/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 September 2025.
1. The applicants are mother, aged 39 and son, aged 12. The mother’s facts form the basis of their joint application.
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 1018/2025 [2025] HKCFI 4358 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1018 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicants: THE APPLICATION 1.The applicants are mother, aged 39 and son, aged 12. The mother’s facts form the basis of their joint application. 2.This is the applicants’ joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 10 April 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their subsequent claim of HCAL 535 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 3.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against them since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicants may take out further proceedings to assert their non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 4.The 1st applicant appeared before the Court on 1 September 2025. She said that her son was at school and she represented him. The mother admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The procedural history 5.The applicant is a national of the Philippines. The applicants are illegal immigrants and they lodged a joint non-refoulement claim with the Director of Immigration (the “Director”). The Director, by his Decisions respectively dated 31 July 2015 on Torture risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk and 15 March 2017 on BOR 2 risk rejected their application. They appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board, by its Decisions respectively dated 20 February 2017 and 20 October 2017 (the “Board’s Decisions”), rejected their appeals and affirmed the Director’s Decisions. 6.The applicants then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decisions. The Court of the First Instance dismissed their application on 12 May 2020. They intended to appeal, but were out of time. Their application to the Court of First Instance for extension was refused. 7.They appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed their appeal. 8.They issued a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Notice of Motion. 9.They applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal and on 8 August 2024, the Court of Final Appeal dismissed their application. 10.By letter dated 19 August 2024, the applicants applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused their application. The subsequent claim application 12.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, they have to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 13.The mother has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials and the relevant country of origin information relevant to the application, the immigration officer considered that the new materials were in fact the reasons of their previous claim, which had been considered and rejected; state protection will be available. 14.The immigration officer further considered the 2nd applicant’s specific issues and found that even if he is discriminated if he returns to Indonesia, such discrimination will not amount to the level of persecution [19], and government or non-governmental organizations will render assistance to the 1st applicant and her son. The immigration officer also took into consideration the issue of nationality of the 2nd applicant, as raised by his mother. He referred to the law of Indonesia and took the view that the 2nd applicant has Indonesian citizenship by reason of his mother’s status as an Indonesian citizen. [21] 15.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicants failed to satisfy those condition under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed their application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 16.The applicants filed Form 86 on 29 April 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 17.In her affirmation in support of her application, the mother did not raise any specific ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the mother admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous action. Upon enquiry by the Court if there were any special issues that would adversely affect her son as a minor, she submitted that her son might either go to Indonesia with him or to his father’s country Pakistan. However, Pakistan is a dangerous country where most people are Muslims. Her husband is a Christian. 20.The issues above on her son do not constitute any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 21.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicants failed to satisfy the conditions in support of their application for subsequent claim. 22.The applicants have not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 23.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicants’ subsequent claim. I dismiss their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicants are attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicants are entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as their intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The mother admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 28.The mother has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the mother said she understood and she would accept it. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicants would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. 32.I shall treat non-compliance with Order 80, rule 2 of the RHC in these proceedings as a mere irregularity without rendering the 2nd applicant’s application a nullity. Dated the 30th day of September 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 1018/2025