Nguyen Thi Nam v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1683/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 September 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 July 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2807 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
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HCAL 1683/2025 [2025] HKCFI 4259 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1683 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 16 July 2025 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 2807 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 3 September 2025. She is deemed to abandon her right to be heard on why the court should not impose the RPO on her. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Vietnam. She is an illegal immigrant, having sneaked into Hong Kong from China. She lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that, if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her creditor because she was unable to repay the loan. 5.The Director rejected her claim for the reason that her claim was not substantiated. 6.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board found that her evidence was not accepted. State protection would be available and internal relocation would be viable. The Board therefore dismissed her appeal. 7.The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s decisions. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 22 March 2022. 8.She intended to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but she was out of time. She applied to the Court of the First Instance for extension of time to appeal. The Court of the First Instance refused her application. 9.She appealed to the Court of Appeal against the Court of First Instance’s decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. 10.She took out a Notice of Motion for appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed her Notice of Motion. 11.She applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal. The Court of Final Appeal dismissed her application on 17 April 2024. 12.By letter dated 17 April 2025, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 13.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application. The subsequent claim application 14.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 15.The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer found that she relied on the same facts in her previous claim. 16.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 17.The applicant filed Form 86 on 25 July 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 18.In support of her application, the applicant has submitted a statement, in which she said that the Director’s Decision is wrong and unreasonable because he did not consider state acquiescence, paying attention to the country of origin information without taking her personal background, without accepting her explanation or considering the issues of corruption and incompetent administration of Vietnam government. Discussion 19.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 20.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 21.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicant failed to satisfy the conditions in support of her application for subsequent claim. 22.The reasons under paragraph 18 are her bare allegations without any evidence in support. They are not valid to challenge the Board’s decisions. 23.The applicant has not raised any valid ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. 24.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant was absent at the hearing. 29.The applicant has abandoned her right to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her. 30.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant. Dated the 30th day of September 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment