Ahmad Ashfaq v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1740/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 October 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 25 July 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 3355 of 2019 (“the previous claim”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1740/2025 [2025] HKCFI 4772 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1740 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 25 July 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 3355 of 2019 (“the previous claim”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 22 September 2025. I shall deal with his application on the papers and he is deemed to abandon his right to be heard on why this Court should not impose a RPO on him. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by the father of a friend who held him responsible for his friend’s death in a motorcycle accident. He also claimed that he will be arrested on a false charge relating to that accident. 5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that his claim was unfounded and dismissed his appeal. 6.His application for extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 7 November 2022. He appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. 7.He made a second attempt to the Court of Appeal for the extension of time to appeal, which the Court of Appeal dismissed. 8.He issued a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Notice of Motion. 9.He applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal. The Court of Final Appeal dismissed his application on 20 September 2024. 10.By an undated letter, which the Director received on 8 January 2025, the applicant applied to the Director for re-opening his claim, which the Director took it as making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 12.Attached to the said undated letter, there are some documents, which the immigration officer considered not conducive to his subsequent claim application. The applicant therefore relied on the same reasons in his previous claim in support of this application. 13.The immigration officer did not accept that the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and refused his application. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 14.The applicant filed Form 86 on 6 August 2025 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 15.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has not raised any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 16.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 17.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 18.There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 19.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 20.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Since the applicant was absent, he is deemed to abandon his right to be heard. 24.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 25.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 26.RPO in terms of paragraph 24 be made against the applicant. Dated the 23rd day of October 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment