Racimo Melanie Narciso and Another v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2047/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 November 2025.
1. The applicants are mother (“the mother”), and son, aged 19 (“the son”), who is now of age. By leave of the court on 3 November 2025, the son was joined as the 2 nd applicant in this action.
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HCAL 2047/2025 [2025] HKCFI 5499 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2047 OF 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicants: THE APPLICATION 1.The applicants are mother (“the mother”), and son, aged 19 (“the son”), who is now of age. By leave of the court on 3 November 2025, the son was joined as the 2nd applicant in this action. 2.The mother’s facts form the basis of their joint application. 3.This is the applicants’ joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 24 December 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing their subsequent claim of HCAL 2427 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 4.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against them since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicants may take out further proceedings to assert their non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 5.The applicants appeared before the Court on 3 November 2025 and the mother admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. The son was not before the court. The procedural history 6.The applicants are nationals of the Philippines. The mother was a domestic helper, who had overstayed after termination of her contract. The son was born in Hong Kong. They had applied to the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) for non-refoulement protection in the previous claim. 7.The Director rejected their claim for the reason that their claim was not substantiated. 8.They jointly appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board rejected the mother evidence that she will be harmed or killed by her partner’s wife. The Board also rejected the son’s reasons in support of his application. It dismissed their appeal. 9.The applicants then jointly applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed their application on 28 July 2020. They jointly applied for extension to appeal, which the Court of First Instance refused. 10.They jointly appealed to the Court of Appeal against the Court of First Instance’s decision refusing extension of time for their appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal. 11.They jointly issued a Notice of Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Their application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 30 December 2022. 12.They jointly applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal and their application was dismissed on 23 March 2024. 13.By letter dated 4 June 2024, the applicants jointly applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance. 14.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused their application. The subsequent claim application 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, they have to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.The mother and the son have submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support their application. Having considered the additional materials and the relevant country of origin information relevant to the application, the immigration officer came to the conclusion that they relied upon the same reasons of their previous claim. The Board had considered their previous claim and rejected them. 17.The immigration officer therefore found that the applicants failed to satisfy those conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed their application for subsequent claim. The application for leave to apply for judicial review application 18.The applicants filed Form 86 on 10 September 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 19.In her affidavit in support of her application, the mother did not raise any specific ground to challenge the Director’s Decision. The son had submitted the reasons that he had obtained an offer from the University of Wollongong College Hong Kong for his tertiary study. He has been raised in Hong Kong and has no connection in the Philippines. It will be difficult for him to live in the Philippines. He preferred to stay in Hong Kong and continued with his study so that he may make contributions to Hong Kong in future. He had submitted the “No objection” to the Director for approval. The Director had rejected his application. Discussion 20.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 21.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the mother admitted that she relied on the same reason 22.For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the immigration officer took the view that the applicants failed to satisfy the conditions in support of their application for subsequent claim. 23.The mother has raised no specific reasonable against the Director’s Decision. The son’s reasons under paragraph 18 are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision because those reasons are within the province of the Director. The Court will not consider those reasons to interfere with the Director’s Decision. 24.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in the applicants’ subsequent claim. I dismiss their joint application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 25.The Director’s findings show that the applicants are attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 26.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 27.In my view, the fact that the applicants are entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as their intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 28.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicants to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The mother admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application. 29.The mother has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the mother said she had nothing to say. 30.Having considered the mother’s explanation and that the son’s case relies on the mother’s case, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicants would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 31.The applicants’ application is dismissed. 32.RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicants. Dated the 19th day of November 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment