Mohomed Rahoof Mohomed Sajahan v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2234/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 2 December 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 15 September 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 2216 of 2018 (“the previous claim”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 2234/2025 [2025] HKCFI 5860 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2234 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 15 September 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 2216 of 2018 (“the previous claim”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 17 November 2025 and admitted that he had made judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. He added that now he had a warrant of arrest against him, which he had told the immigration officer. The procedural history 4.The applicant is a national of Sri Lanka. He is an illegal immigrant, having entered Hong Kong illegally on 27 July 2006. He was arrested. He lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on the basis that, if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by his enemies for political reasons. 5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that his claim was unfounded and dismissed his appeal. 6.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 4 May 2022. He applied to the Court of First Instance for extension of time to appeal. His application was refused. 7.He appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. 8.He issued a notice of motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the notice of motion. 9.He applied to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court of Final Appeal dismissed his application on 14 October 2024. 10.By letter dated 23 December 2024, the applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 11.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 12.Upon the immigration officer’s advice, he had submitted additional materials of a medical report, a copy of a warrant of arrest and a statement in support of his application. 13.The immigration officer considered his evidence and found that the medical was to show his injuries 20 years ago, the warrant of arrest could not verified and it was never produced to the Board in his previous claim. His enemies remained the same in the previous claim. The immigration officer found that internal relocation was viable. 14.For those reasons, the immigration officer did not accept that the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and he refused his application. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 15.The applicant filed Form 86 on 6 October 2025 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 16.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has not raised any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 17.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 18.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied on the same reasons in his previous claim. He said he had also produced the warrant of arrest to the immigration officer. 19.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 20.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 21.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 24.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 25.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 26.RPO in terms of paragraph 24 be made against the applicant. Dated the 2nd day of December 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1]. The applicable risks are:
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Cases cited in this judgment