HKSAR v. Hussain, Adnan
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 502/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 3 December 2025.
1. The Appellant (D1) and another person (D2) were jointly charged with one count of “trafficking in a dangerous drug” contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap. 134 (Charge 1). The Appellant was additionally charged with one count of “careless driving” contrary to section 38(1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374 (Charge 2). The Prosecution eventually decided to withdraw Charge 1 before plea. The Appellant pleaded guilty to Charge 2 and was convicted accordin
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HCMA 502/2024 [2025] HKCFI 5935 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 502 OF 2024 (On appeal from TMCC 544/2023) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ 1.The Appellant (D1) and another person (D2) were jointly charged with one count of “trafficking in a dangerous drug” contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap. 134 (Charge 1). The Appellant was additionally charged with one count of “careless driving” contrary to section 38(1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374 (Charge 2). The Prosecution eventually decided to withdraw Charge 1 before plea. The Appellant pleaded guilty to Charge 2 and was convicted accordingly, for which he was fined. The Appellant through his then legal representative (not counsel for this appeal) applied for costs in respect of Charge 1 which was refused by the Magistrate on 19 November 2024. The Appellant now appeals against this refusal of cost order. The Facts 2.The Magistrate set out the relevant prosecution case at paragraph 3 in his “Statement of an Order” based on the brief facts:-
3.To resist the costs application, the Prosecution provided to the Magistrate a CCTV footage which captured the Vehicle proceeding along Castle Peak Road-Yuen Long and stopping at the roadside (“CCTV Footage”) and also the transcripts of the Appellant’s video recorded interview (“Appellant’s VRI”). 4.The Magistrate set out the relevant contents of the Appellant’s VRI at paragraph 11 in his “Statement of an Order”:-
5.The parties agreed that the Appellant accepted HK$200 as the fee for the trip. The Parties’ respective stances and the Magistrate’s decision on costs 6.The Prosecution took the stance that the Appellant’s driving manner, as captured by the CCTV Footage, had brought suspicion upon himself in respect of Charge 1 the trafficking charge as he drove slowly past a rubbish bin before stopping the Vehicle for police investigation, thus allowing an opportunity for another to dispose of the drugs to avoid police detection (“Point A”). Also, the Prosecution submitted that the Appellant’s acceptance of the ride order as he described in his VRI had brought suspicion upon himself as well. It was because, for just HK$200, the Appellant had agreed to take D2 and WP, whom he barely knew, in his Vehicle for a journey without a clear destination and had to rely on their direction during the trip (“Point B”). 7.The Defence stance, in relation to Point A, was that the Appellant only followed the police’s instructions on where to stop the Vehicle, as he explained in his VRI. It was not his decision to slow down at the relevant location to provide an opportunity for another to throw the drugs away from the Vehicle. In relation to Point B, the Defence, while agreeing that the manner in which the ride order was accepted might be different from the usual practice, it did not give rise to any suspicion of drug trafficking. There could be different business practices, some were app-based with proper records and there were also sub-leasing of licences and vehicles leading to less detailed recorded activities. 8.The Magistrate had considered the respective arguments of the parties. For Point A, the Magistrate, after having considered the CCTV Footage and the Appellant’s explanation about his driving manner in his VRI, expressed that he was unable to draw the conclusion that the Appellant’s driving manner had brought suspicion upon himself. However, for Point B, the Magistrate agreed with the Prosecution that the Appellant had brought suspicion upon himself for the following reasons[2]:-
9.The Magistrate said that he approached the Appellant’s case with common sense and eventually decided to refuse the costs application for Charge 1 on the basis that the Appellant had brought suspicion upon himself[3]. Grounds of appeal 10.The Appellant’s solicitors in the notice of appeal raises two grounds: the Magistrate failed to properly assess that the Appellant was merely following the police instructions when he slowed down the Vehicle (Ground 1); and that the Appellant’s actions might raise some suspicion but not in relation to Charge 1 the drug trafficking charge (Ground 2). Mr Allan for the Appellant in the two perfected grounds and written submissions basically argued that the Magistrate erred in law and in his analysis of the facts in refusing the Appellant’s costs as there was nothing to suggest that the Appellant brought suspicion on himself in respect of the ride order, and that Charge 1 was dismissed on the Prosecution’s withdrawal with no evidence presented in a trial against the Appellant. My Decision 11.I have already considered all the written submissions by the parties and shall dispose of this appeal by way of “rehearing” as required by the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in HKSAR v Hui Lai Ki[4]. 12.The Magistrate in his reasons had correctly identified the relevant legal principles on the questions of costs in cases where the prosecution withdrew the charge, by referring to Secretary for Justice v. Lam Chiu Fong [5] and HKSAR v. Chen Fen [6]. 13.In cases where charges are withdrawn, the starting consideration is the same as where there has been an acquittal, namely, that there should be an award of costs in favour of the person charged unless there is positive reason for making a different order. Where the essential facts are realistically in dispute, and the person charged has not by his conduct brought suspicion on himself or led the investigating authorities to believe that the case against him was stronger than in fact it was, then when a charge is withdrawn the costs discretion ought to be exercised in favour of that person[7]. 14.A positive reason for not awarding costs to the defendant upon an acquittal exists where the defendant has brought suspicion upon himself. A court, exercising the discretion with regards to costs, must look at the relevant conduct of a defendant so long as that conduct is relevant to the charge. The conduct most relevant was the defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial, as well as the conduct which formed part of the setting for the charge laid against the defendant prior to the investigation and trial stages[8], which referred to the well-settled principles in authorities on costs in criminal cases such as Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR[9], Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2)[10] and HKSAR v Chan Kam Ching (No 2)[11]. 15.It is important to note that the test is not whether the evidence would have been sufficient or probably sufficient to secure a conviction, but whether the circumstances raising the suspicion were enough to justify the court in exercising its discretion against granting the defendant costs[12]. 16.Ground 1 is in essence related to Point A which had already been decided by the Magistrate in the Appellant’s favour. In other words, the Magistrate did not consider the Appellant’s driving manner at the scene had brought suspicion upon himself. The matters raised by the Appellant or his complaints against the Magistrate under Ground 1 were not reasons for which the Magistrate refused him costs. Ground 1 is of no merits for this appeal. 17.For Ground 2, Mr Allan for the Appellant submitted that the Magistrate erroneously found that the manner in which the Appellant accepted the ride order was suspicious, and wrongly placed great weight and emphasis on this matter in his assessment of the costs application. It is submitted that the Magistrate reached his finding that the Appellant had brought suspicion upon himself by relying on his own opinion on how the ride order was processed or should be processed. The Magistrate erroneously speculated on issues concerning the ride order and how it happened, which in any event was too remote to bring suspicion on the Appellant in relation to Charge 1. It is also submitted that there was no clear indication that the Appellant knew or was given a clear final address, which would be consistent with his innocence. 18.In the present case, no evidence was presented at the proceedings for Charge 1 the drug trafficking charge because this charge was withdrawn. Nevertheless, the Magistrate was entitled to, and in fact should, consider the materials put forward by the Prosecution during the costs application, including the brief facts (the “Amended Allegation” dated 29 August 2023) as well as the Appellant’s VRI, both of which were not disputed by the defence[13]. 19.Apart from and in addition to those circumstances considered by the Magistrate, I agree with the Respondent that the Appellant’s act of driving in the wrong direction added to the suspicion brought upon himself. It was generally an unusual driving behavior which could raise suspicion in the circumstances of this case that the Appellant being the driver was attempting to avoid the police, in particular when there were in fact drugs in the Vehicle which were subsequently thrown out and recovered by the police. 20.As disclosed by the Appellant in his VRI, the drugs were thrown out by a passenger whom the Appellant permitted to be on board the Vehicle, and that the Appellant got involved in this case as a result of a ride order which was accepted by the Appellant under suspicious circumstances. Those suspicious circumstances had already been correctly identified by the Magistrate as I had summarized above, in particular the Appellant did not know the Passengers well but privately accepted their ride order for HK$200 without even knowing the destination. 21.As rightly observed by the Magistrate, it is a matter of common sense that a driver being hired must consider the cost and profit of a trip when accepting a ride order. The passenger’s destination is a crucial factor that would impact the fuel cost and the driver’s working time. Without knowing the destination, the distance and the route, the Appellant would not have been able to assess (let alone agree on) if a HK$200 fare was reasonable and acceptable. Also, without knowing the destination, the Appellant being the driver might be directed to go to an unfamiliar or even unsafe area. It is therefore wholly unreasonable for anyone in the position of the Appellant to have accepted that HK$200 fare in private for the ride order without knowing the destination in advance. As such, the Appellant’s version of accepting the ride order in question is apparently doubtful and suspicious. 22.There is clear and sufficient basis for the Magistrate to come to conclude that the Appellant had brought suspicion upon himself in respect of Charge 1. I am not convinced at all by the Appellant’s arguments that the Magistrate had speculated on any issues concerning the ride order. Ground 2 fails as well. 23.I have considered all the circumstances and agreed with the Magistrate’s reasoning and conclusion on this costs matter. This appeal against the order refusing costs is without merit and is hereby dismissed. The Magistrate’s order for refusing the Appellant’s costs for Charge 1 should stand.
Ms Lilly Wong, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Allan William G., instructed by Mohnani & Associates, for the Appellant [1] The WP escaped from the scene and could not be located. [2] Appeal Bundle at 111E-U, paragraph 15 of “Statement of an Order” [3] Appeal Bundle at 112C-D, paragraph 16 of “Statement of an Order” [4] (2024) 27 HKCFAR 265 [5] [2009] 2 HKLRD 484, see paragraphs 42-44 of the judgment [6] FAMC 4/2023, [2024] HKCFA 19, see paragraphs 5-6 of the judgment [7] As per paragraph 42 of the judgment of Lam Chiu Fong [8] See paragraphs 23 and 32 of the judgment of Lam Chiu Fong, paragraph 5 of the judgment of Chan Fen [9] (1999) 2 HKCFAR 531 [10] (2007) 10 HKCFAR 730 [11] (2022) 25 HKCFAR 181 [12] As per paragraph 6 of the judgment of Chen Fen [13] See also paragraphs 25-29 of the judgment of Lam Chiu Fong, which suggest that the court does not have to hear oral evidence on an application for a costs order and is entitled to consider materials such as a statement of facts provided by the prosecution | |||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment