Sandhu Rajinder Singh v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2188/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 December 2025.
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 September 2025 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all the applicable grounds.
Cites 3 cases
|
HCAL 2188/2025 [2025] HKCFI 6227 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2188 OF 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 September 2025 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all the applicable grounds. 2.The Applicant is a 33-year-old national of India who previously arrived in Hong Kong on 6 September 2013 but when he was refused entry by the Immigration Department, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by members of the political party Shiromani Akali Dal (“SAD”) in Punjab as he supported their rival and splinter group Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) (“SAD (A)”). Previous Non-Refoulement Claim 3.The Applicant was born and raised as a Sikh in Tarn Taran, Punjab, India where he supported SAD(A), the more radical splinter group of SAD, and that on one afternoon in mid‑2013 he and his fellow supporters were attacked by a group of SAD supporters that he suffered lacerations all over his body and with a fractured wrist that he subsequently required medical treatments in a local hospital. 4.After the assault he fled to Tehsil Patti to take shelter in a cousin’s place, and after receiving further threats from the SAD people, he then fled to Fairdkot City where one day his motorbike was struck by a jeep driven by some SAD supporters that he fell but managed to make his escape home without serious injuries, and on 5 September 2013 he departed India for Hong Kong and raised his non-refoulement claim for protection. 5.By a Notice of Decision dated 27 September 2018 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”). 6.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and found no substantial grounds for believing that there will be any real risk of him being ill-treated by those SAD people (named SADB in the decision) upon his return to India due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no reliable evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India with a large population of 1.2 billion people spread across a vast territory of more than 3.2 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able‑bodied young adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Mumbai where it would be difficult if not impossible for those SAD people to locate him. 7.On 10 October 2018 the Applicant lodged an appeal to Board against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 6 April 2020 before the Board during which he gave oral evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 22 September 2020 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision. 8.In its decision the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of being a Punjabi Sikh who had actively supported SAD(A) that caused him to come to the attention of the local members of rival SAD that he was attacked by them on several occasions that he fled from his home village and eventually departed India for Hong Kong, and that at the time of his departure that he was a person of adverse interest to the local SAD supporters in the Amritsar area that he left the country in fear of being subjected to serious harm by those people, but found no evidence of any official involvement in those attacks that state protection would be available to him upon his return to India as well as internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other areas away from his home village to large cities without any risk of being located that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds. 9.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was subsequently withdrawn at his own request by DHCJ P. Li on 19 February 2021 (HCAL 1989/2020), whereupon on 20 February 2021 he was repatriated to India. Request To Make Subsequent Claim 10.Almost 4 years later on 1 January 2025 the Applicant sneaked back into Hong Kong and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 2 January 2025 when he requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that he fears of being harmed or ill-treated or killed by the India government and authorities if refouled to India for having participated in the 2021 Indian farmers’ protests against certain legislations enacted by the government in 2020 but which were opposed by many farmers in the country. 11.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non‑refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:
12.Accordingly, the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did via his lawyer from Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) with the following information (see [10] of the Director’s decision):
13.By a Notice of Decision dated 9 September 2025 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, that those changes as alleged by the Applicant were not accepted as true or credible and therefore do not constitute as significant change of circumstances which would give his intended subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success, and as found in his previous claim that state protection and internal relocation alternatives would similarly be available to him upon his return to India to lower or negate his perceived fears from his intended subsequent claim. 14.On 29 September 2025 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:
15.These are however bare and vague assertions of the Applicant without the necessary details or particulars or elaboration as to how they actually apply to his case, or in what way did the Director or the immigration officer exactly err in the decision or that it was unfair or unreasonable, nor was the Applicant able to do so at the hearing of his application. 16.Nevertheless, and while accepting that the Director and his immigration officers are as of necessity entitled to strictly apply Section 37ZO of the Ordinance as a stringent filtering process in dealing with requests to make a subsequent claim so as to eliminate unmeritorious claims by claimants after their previous claims have already been properly and finally determined and disposed of to prevent abuses by them to seeking to avoid or delay their removal by the Immigration Department, but in the present case and on the basis of the detailed information submitted by the Applicant as noted above, it is quite clear that the factual basis of his intended subsequent claim is different from his previous claim, and that the asserted risk to him is now said to be from the Indian government and authorities which has hitherto never been screened as to its merit or substance under the USM, henceforth high standards of fairness would require the Court to scrutinize the Director’s reasons for any error of law or procedural unfairness in refusing the Applicant’s request to make his such subsequent claim. 17.The Director’s reasons for the refusal can be found in the following paragraphs of his decision:
18.It appears from the above that the Director refused the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim essentially for the following reasons:
19.I shall deal with the last point first, given the Applicant’s asserted risk of persecution is from the Indian state and/or state-agents from ruling political parties who are presumed to act throughout the country, if indeed they are the feared persecutors, it is clear that state protection would not be applicable, and that there is also a presumption in principle that an internal flight or relocation alternative is not available either: See Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426 at para 21; TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526 at 539 – 540. 20.It then follows that whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the Applicant would be at risk of being subjected to ill-treatment or persecution by the Indian state and/or state agents from the ruling or leading political parties is a question of primary facts to be made by the Director, with the burden of course laid with the Applicant to convince the Director and the immigration officer of what he said were true, of which the standard of proof is of civil standard on the balance of probabilities: Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 FC 706; Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1994] 1 FC 589. 21.The Applicant was as noted above found by the Board in his previous claim to be a credible witness with active involvement in the politics of SAD(A), and that in his request to make a subsequent claim he had also provided details of information as to how he upon returning to India again became politically active and participated in the demonstration for farmers rights in 2022 as well as his subsequent arrest by the police and authorities, and while it was necessary for the Director and his immigration officer to subject such request to stringent compliances of the requisitions stipulated under Section 37ZO of the Ordinance, high standards of fairness would still require the Director to make clear findings of the primary facts, and that if it was not possible to do so just based on the materials submitted by the Applicant, in my view the immigration officer should consider whether it would be necessary to conduct an interview of the Applicant or in the presence of his lawyer from DLS for further enquiries and to give him the opportunity to clarify any inconsistencies that the immigration officer might wish to raise, and to point out to him of any intention to impeach the credibility of his evidence or at least to draw his attention to any such problems with his claim so that he may respond or explain or otherwise deal with such aspect of his evidence, rather than just appearing to simply brush aside his claimed threats from Laljit as mere hearsays, or to find his assertion that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him as not credible simply because he was able to move around and subsequently left the country without any difficulty: See Re Masud MD [2021] HKCA 1449 at paras 32 - 36. 22.Furthermore, in assessing the credibility of the Applicant’s intended subsequent claim, it did not appear that the Director or the immigration officer had referred to any relevant COI at all as regard the conditions then in India in particularly as to the alleged demonstrations in support of farmers rights in 2021 - 2022 and the subsequent actions, if any, by the police and/or the Indian government against those who had participated in such demonstrations or activities before rejecting the Applicant’s claim as not credible: See Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar (2007) 7 HKCFAR 187 at paras 52 - 55. 23.In the premises, and for these reasons I am of the view that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Director’s decision in refusing his request to make a subsequent claim is reasonably arguable on the grounds that the Director (1) failed to properly or adequately consider the Applicant’s request and/or (2) failed to refer to any or relevant COI in assessing the credibility of the Applicant’s intended subsequent claim and/or (3) erred in law in the assessment of the availability of state protection and internal relocation to the Applicant upon his return to India, thus meeting the threshold for leave to be granted as laid down in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. 24.Accordingly I grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review on the grounds stated above, and direct that he shall file and issue the originating summons within 14 days of this decision, and to serve a copy thereof together with all the relevant documents on the Director as respondent. Dated the 16th day of December 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence Form CALL-1
|
Cases cited in this judgment