Akram Asif v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 464/2021

[2026] HKCFI 109

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 464 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Val Chow:

1.  Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion as follows:-

a.  the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office be named as the Putative 1^st Respondent; and

b.  the Director of Immigration be named as the Putative 2^nd Respondent

2.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By Form 86 filed on 31 March 2021 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against (i) the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) dated 18 April 2019 (the “DOI Decision”); and (ii) the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 19 March 2021 (the “Board’s Decision”).

2.To ensure that the parties are properly named, I make an order to amend the Form 86 accordingly on the court’s own motion.

3.An oral hearing was requested by the Applicant. It took place before me on 22 December 2025 (the “Hearing”) and the Applicant attended in person.

Background

4.The Applicant’s background, the basis and history of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in details in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here.  The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. In gist, the Applicant claims that he would be subject to serious harm or death from his uncle and cousins if he were to return to Pakistan.

Discussion

5.This type of leave application is intended to be a filtering process and elaborate reasons are not necessary, see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.  Hence I shall set out the brief reasons for my decision below.

6.Before dealing with the substantive merits, I should emphasise that the challenge against the DOI Decision is misconceived. The appeal to the Board is conducted by way of rehearing and the Board’s Decision effectively supersedes the DOI Decision, see: Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549 at §45. Hence, the focus should be on the Board’s Decision.

7.The applicable legal principles relating to this type of applications are well established.  The judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal. Though in non-refoulement cases, the court adopts a high standard of fairness to review the decision of the Board with anxious scrutiny due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (“COI”) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board, see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14.

8.The Applicant’s grounds of review are set out in his affirmation in support of the Form 86. In gist, the complaints are as follows:-

(1)   The Board’s decision was unfair and Wednesbury unreasonable. 

(2)   The Board failed to give sufficient time and chance for the Applicant to arrange relevant evidence to his non-refoulement claim as well as his appeal to the Board.

(3)   The Board has failed to properly consider the following issues or matters:-

(a)   state acquiescence or state protection;

(b)   COI which suggests that police protection in Pakistan was insufficient and that police corruption was rampant in Pakistan.

9.As a general observation, the proposed grounds of review appear to be largely blanket claims without any proper particulars which would allow the court to properly understand how the Board’s Decision is said to be erroneous. In any event, I shall consider each ground individually below.

10.On ground (1), the Board’s Decision is comprehensive with adequate reasons provided for rejecting the Applicant’s claim.  In particular, the Board is entitled to find that there was a lack of evidence of any real risk of serious harm, in particular:-

(1)   The Board is plainly entitled to find the Applicant factual account of the conflict with his uncle/cousins to be incredible, given the numerous material inconsistencies in his evidence as identified at §§29-33, 37-43.

(2)   There was also no evidence that the Applicant’s uncle and cousins held any official (let alone high) political positions so as to command any significant political influence, see §§34-35.

11.The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test. 

12.On ground (2), the Applicant has completely failed to specify what documents he was unable to obtain which led to the alleged unfairness in the hearing before the Board, notwithstanding the lapse of over 4 years since the Board’s Decision.

13.On ground (3), contrary to the Applicant’s assertion, the Board in fact had expressly considered the issue of police inaction and corruption in Pakistan but ultimately found the Applicant’s allegation that the uncle’s family had exerted corrupt influence on the police to be unfounded (§§54-56). The Board in fact acknowledged that the Pakistani government and police was not without problems but it was entitled to find that the public authorities had implemented various means to improve the situation, especially with a new ruling party (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) coming into power. The Applicant has also not been able to specifically point to what COI evidence the Board is said to have failed to give proper consideration.

14.In any event, having conducted a detailed review of the Board’s Decision, I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (whether as alleged by the Applicant or otherwise). 

15.At the Hearing, the Applicant repeated his claim that his cousins were affiliated with the Pakistan Muslim League (Noon) (“PMLN”), a political party and that his cousins would kill him if he returns to Pakistan.  He also claimed that his cousins have threatened the Applicant’s mother as well. These matters have not been properly adduced into by way of affirmation and are at most only bare assertions.  I also do not see how this affects the Board’s determination as similar allegations were already made by the Applicant before the Board and were considered by the Board in its decision (see §15(a) concerning the alleged threat to the Applicant’s brother and §13(c) regarding the alleged affiliation of the Applicant’s cousins to the PMLN).

16.The Applicant also submitted documents showing that he was receiving medical treatment in Hong Kong. Having reviewed the same, the conditions suffered by the Applicnt do not appear to be life-threatening. In any event, there is no evidence to suggest that the Applicant would not receive adequate medical treatment if he returns to Pakistan.

17.In short, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success.  Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.

Conclusion

18.In the premises, I make an order that the Form 86 be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed.

Dated the 19^th day of January 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1