Okezie Munachiso Alias Okujeto Philip v. Director of Immigration
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HCAL 218/2026 [2026] HKCFI 1518 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 218 OF 2026
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 15 October 2025 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all the applicable grounds. 2.The Applicant is a 56-year-old national of Nigeria who arrived in Hong Kong on 25 March 2006 as a visitor under a Ghanaian passport with a false identity, and subsequently overstayed and was arrested by police almost 9 years later on 13 January 2015. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Nigeria he would be harmed or killed by the Nigerian authorities due to his past association with the illegal secessionist organization Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (“MASSOB”) and/or by various Islamic extremist or terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram, the Fulani herdsmen, and the Arewa Youths Forum due to his Christian religion. Previous Non-Refoulement Claim 3.By a Notice of Decision dated 12 September 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”). 4.In his decision, the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and doubted and rejected the credibility of his claims due to various serious and material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the information and evidence given by him in his information and during his screening interview before an immigration officer, that his credibility was further undermined by his use of false travel documents to enter Hong Kong and failed to raise his claim upon first arrival until almost 9 years later and only after his arrest by the police that it was not accepted that the Nigerian authorities would have any adverse interest in him or that he will face any risk of harm from the Nigerian authorities or for that matter from any of the Islamic extremist or terrorist groups upon his return to Nigeria in the absence of any credible evidence of any past threats or ill-treatments from any of them, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Nigeria with a large population of 186 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 910,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district or areas where such extremist or terrorist groups operated and in large cities such as Lagos State where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him. 5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was dismissed by the Board on 1 August 2018 after hearing him in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in his claim or appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decision. 6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 24 August 2021 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 2005/2018 [2021] HKCFI 2467). 7.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 October 2022 (CAMP 327/2022 [2022] HKCA 1472). 8.The Applicant’s Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decisions was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 24 February 2023 ([2023] HKCA 178), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 26 August 2024 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A. Request To Make Subsequent Claim 9.Some 10 months later on 26 June 2025 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim so that he could have another opportunity and time to provide further evidence to support his claim as he still fears of being harmed or killed by the Nigerian authorities and the Islamic terrorist groups as before if refouled to Nigeria. 10.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:
11.Accordingly, the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, but which he never did and without any further explanation or response despite repeated requests and reminders from the Immigration Department for him to do so. 12.By a Notice of Decision dated 15 October 2025 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that his claimed bases thereof were essentially the same as those of his previous claim, and that he failed to provide any evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been any significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success. 13.On 20 January 2026, the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or in his supporting affirmation of the same date in which he just asserted that the decision was wrong and that his life is still in danger in his home country but without putting forth any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor was he able to do so at the hearing of his application. 14.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application. Restricted Proceedings Order 15.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 26 August 2024, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before or invalid basis, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him. 16.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:
17.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:
18.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section. 19.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] - [10]). 20.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] - [40]). 21.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claims without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, to which he was unable to answer or raise any valid objection at the hearing, I am convinced that the Applicant will likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary. 22.Accordingly, I make the following order:
Disposition 23.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. 24.A RPO in terms of paragraph 22 be made against the Applicant. Dated the 13th day of March 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
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