Akter Mst Rina v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 139/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 March 2026.
1. By a Form 86 filed on 15 February 2022 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 10 January 2022 (the “ Board’s Decision ”).
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HCAL 139/2022 [2026] HKCFI 1228 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 139 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Sabrina Ho:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a Form 86 filed on 15 February 2022 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 10 January 2022 (the “Board’s Decision”). 2.In the Affirmation in support of the Leave Application (the “Affirmation”), the Applicant exhibited a copy of Decision by the Director of Immigration and the Board’s Decision. 3.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the Leave Application, which took place on 26 January 2026 (the “Hearing”). At the Hearing, the Applicant said that she would respect and obey the Court’s decision. Background 4.The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. Discussion 5.The Applicant has not identified any ground in support of the Leave Application, whether in the Form or the Affirmation. 6.The relevant legal principles are well established. The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at para 14. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. 7.Having considered all the relevant materials before me, I do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. 8.I have reviewed the Board’s Decision in detail. The Board had fully considered the Applicant’s evidence and her grounds for challenging the Director’s decision in refusing her claim for non-refoulment protection. On the facts, the Board found that the Applicant’s fear of her husband arose from a pure case of domestic violence and there is no basis for her fear at all: see the Board’s Decision paras 42-60. While there is COI of Bangladesh showing that the Bangladesh police does have corruption and abuse of power problems, the COI also shows that the Bangladesh government has taken steps to improve the performance of the police. In the present case, as the Applicant had not reported to the police, it remains a pure speculation for the Applicant to say that the police would not render the assistance she requires. In addition, the Board considered that there were internal relocation options available to the Applicant: see the Board’s Decision paras 59, 67-70. On the above bases, the Board found that the Applicant would not face any Persecution Risk, BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk or Torture Risk[2] if she returns to Bangladesh and rejected the Applicant’s appeal: see the Board’s Decision paras 42-71. I do not consider there to be any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 9.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and this Court is not expected to give elaborated reasons for its decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at para 23. I have considered all the relevant materials in reaching the present decision. Conclusion 10.For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Leave Application.
Dated the 23rd day of March 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000139_2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] As defined in paragraph 3 of the Board’s Decision
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