Rahman Mohammad Mejanur v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 145/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 March 2026.

1. By a Form 86 filed on 17 February 2022 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 10 November 2021 (the “ Board’s Decision ”) [1] .

Cites 4 cases

Case No.HCAL 145/2022[2026] HKCFI 1230
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Mar 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 145/2022

[2026] HKCFI 1230

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 145 of 2022

BETWEEN

  Rahman Mohammad Mejanur Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Putative
  Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

    consideration of documents only;      or
   consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Sabrina Ho:

1.   The Form 86 be amended by naming the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non refoulement Claims Petition Office as the only putative respondent and the Director of Immigration as the only putative interested party.

2.   The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By a Form 86 filed on 17 February 2022 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 10 November 2021 (the “Board’s Decision”)[1].

2.The Applicant named both the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) and the Board as the respondents and the interested party in the Form.  I will amend the Form on my own motion to name the Board as the only putative respondent and the Director as the only putative interested party.

3.In the Affirmation in support of the Leave Application (the “Affirmation”), the Applicant exhibited a copy of the Board’s Decision.

4.In both the Form and the Affirmation, the Applicant complained that the Board was unreasonable as his claims were not carefully considered.

5.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the Leave Application, which took place on 26 January 2026 (the “Hearing”).  At the Hearing, the Applicant said that he has nothing to add.

Background

6.The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here.  The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[2] for reference.

Leave Application out of time

7.The Board’s Decision was issued on 10 November 2021.  However, the Form was only filed on 17 February 2022, 7 days beyond the time prescribed for filing an application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision, which is 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision: see Order 53 Rule 4 RHC (Cap 4A).

8.No application has been made by the Applicant for extension of time for him to bring the Leave Application.  No explanation has been provided by the Applicant for the delay, whether in the Form or the Affirmation.

9.In considering whether time should be extended for an application for leave for judicial review, the Court will consider, amongst other things, the following:

a.   The length of the delay;

b.   The explanation of the delay;

c.   The merits of the substantive application;

d.   The prejudice to the applicant if time is not extended, and the prejudice to the respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed out of time; and

e.   The question of general public importance.

See: AW Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63/2015, 3 November 2015 at para 27

10.As I have pointed out above, there was no application for extension of time and no explanation for the delay.  Further, the Leave Application has no merits, for reasons which I will explain below.  Hence, even if there had been any application by the Applicant for extension of time to apply for leave for the judicial review, I would have rejected it.

Leave Application unmeritorious

11.The relevant legal principles are well established.  The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board.  Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at para 14.  There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. 

12.Having considered all the relevant materials before me, I do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

13.I have reviewed the Board’s Decision in detail.  The Board had carefully considered the Applicant’s evidence and his grounds for challenging the Director’s decision in refusing his claim for non-refoulment protection.  On the facts, the Board found that the Applicant’s case is unreliable as there are various inconsistencies and exaggerations in his assertions: see the Board’s Decision paras 63-83.  The Board also found that the weight of the COI shows that over all, the Bangladesh police have the will and capacity to investigate and prosecute and uphold the law.  The Applicant was also aware of the mechanism to seek redress of faults with the standard of policing.  The fact that the Applicant failed to seek the police’s assistance shows that he did not hold a genuine fear of imminent, serious or fatal harm as he claims: see the Board’s Decision paras 72-73, 84-87.  In addition, the Board considered that there were internal relocation options available to the Applicant: see the Board’s Decision paras 88-89.  On the above bases, the Board found that the Applicant would not face any Persecution Risk, BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk or Torture Risk[3] if he returns to Bangladesh and rejected the Applicant’s appeal: see the Board’s Decision paras 90-96.  I do not consider there to be any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.

14.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and this Court is not expected to give elaborated reasons for its decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at para 23.  I have considered all the relevant materials in reaching the present decision.

Conclusion

15.For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Leave Application.

 

 

Dated the 23rd day of March 2026

  (Annson Cheung)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 23/3/2026

Rahman Mohammad Mejanur

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 23/3/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 17581/21/1/77/B2204

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 667/20 (formerly RBCZ 10577/20)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]   While the Applicant referred to the decision, as the “Decision of The Director of Immigration/TCAB, Decision Date: 10 November, 2021…”, the decision dated 10 November 2021 is the Board’s Decision.

[2]   https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000145_2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

[3]   As defined in paragraph 1 of Appendix A of the Board’s Decision