Re Anachebe Chibuzor Reuben

CAMP 75/2024, [2026] HKCA 902

On appeal from [2023] HKCFI 2472

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 75 OF 2024

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 878/2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 29 August 2025, this court (Barma JA and Au JA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung dated 14 December 2023 refusing to extend time for the applicant to appeal against his decision dated 5 October 2023 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim based on the BOR 2 risk.

2.The facts and issues in the applicant’s application, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.  

3.The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed on 5 September 2025, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant stated that this court was wrong “as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decision made by the Director of Immigration in refusing [his] application for Judicial Review”.  He also claimed that there was “some error in law” in his “decision”, and that “the Judge did not apply the law properly”.

4.In the applicant’s written submission dated 19 September 2025, he referred, inter alia, to the well-established principles in ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[2] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514.

5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised.

7.The Notice of Motion failed to provide any particulars in the supposed errors in our judgment and it raises no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

8.Further, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the trite principles referred to in his written submissions had not been applied by this court or by the Judge.

9.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 5 September 2025 is dismissed.

The applicant acting in person