Shan Ahmed v. Mox Bank Ltd and Another

DCCJ 7268/2024

[2026] HKDC 713

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 7268 OF 2024

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DECISION

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A.  Introduction

1.This is P’s application by summons dated 26 January 2026 (the “Summons”) for:

(1)  leave to appeal out of time against the Court’s decision dated 14 October 2025 (the “Decision”); and

(2)  leave to appeal.

2.In these proceedings, P claims that in around March 2023, a fraudster used his personal data to open a bank account with D1 in P’s name. The fraudster obtained a credit card and bank loans with the said bank account.

3.In August 2023 and June 2024, P lodged complaints about the alleged fraud with the North Point Police Station and Tseung Kwan O Police Station respectively.

4.On 27 June 2024, P attended an identity parade conducted by the police and identified the alleged fraudster, who was subsequently arrested by the police.

5.P claimed against D2 for its alleged severe inaction, slow and inefficient investigation and unserious approach towards the alleged fraud and fraudster, causing trouble, loss, acute hardship, and physical, mental, financial and emotional loss and stress to P. P sought damages of $3 million from D2.

6.On 20 January 2025, D2 applied to strike out the parts of the Statement of Claim concerning it and for the dismissal of the action against it. On 25 July 2025, Master Bianca Yu made a decision (“Master Yu’s Decision”), striking out the parts of the Statement of Claim concerning D2 and dismissing P’s claim against D2 on the ground that the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and/or is frivolous or vexatious.

7.On 11 August 2025, P appealed against Master Yu’s Decision. The appeal was heard on 9 October 2025. On 14 October 2025, the Court handed down the Decision, dismissing the appeal on the ground that P’s claim has no foundation, cannot possibly succeed, and is frivolous.

B.  Purported grounds of appeal

8.In his affirmations filed on respectively 26 January 2026, 9 February 2026 and 11 February 2026 in support of his application (together, “P’s Affirmations”), P contended that there was a “significant error of law” and proposed a “re-look into the case which includes reassessing the presented evidence, re-evaluating critical testimonies and a thorough examination of the case legal backdrop”.

C.  Applicable legal principles

9.Pursuant to section 63A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336), leave to appeal may only be granted if the Court is satisfied that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there are some other reasons that the intended appeal should be heard. Reasonable prospect involves the notion that the prospect must be more than “fanciful” without having to be “probable”. See eg Hong Kong Balance International Trading & Logistics Co Ltd v Kwok Yiu Hung and Ng Kwok Wai [2025] HKCA 283, §13, per Kwan VP.

10.It is pointless for an appellant to merely restate arguments that were already presented in the lower court. This is not the intended purpose of the appellate mechanism. The grounds of appeal should be directed at the lower court’s judgment, identifying specific errors and succinctly stating the reasons why the judge has allegedly erred. Simply re-submitting arguments that were previously raised and rejected by the first instance judge, without providing grounds to explain how the judge has erred, is futile. See, e.g. 秦錦釗 及 香港特別行政區 [2018] HKCA 167, §8.

11.When determining an application for leave to appeal out of time, the Court will consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) whether the intended appeal has reasonable prospect of success; and (4) prejudice to other parties if leave to appeal out of time is granted. See Huang Lidong v Kwong Wing Chung [2024] HKCA 465, §13, per Anthony Chan J (as his Lordship then was).

12.Where the reasons given for the delay are not satisfactory, the applicant must show “real prospect of success” (a strongly arguable case) on the merits of his proposed appeal before the court will exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time. See Huang Lidong (supra), §16.

13.Although prejudice to the other party is a ground for refusing to extend time, the absence of prejudice is not a ground for extending time. See, e.g. Jotz, Klaus-Bernhard Markus v. Hamawy, Tarek Mahmoud & ors [2018] HKCA 144, §11.

D.  Analysis

D1.  Lateness and reasons for delay of the leave application

14.The Decision was handed down on 14 October 2025. Pursuant to Order 58 rule 2(4)(b) of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H) (“RDC”), an application for leave to appeal must be made within 28 days from the date of the Decision, ie by 12 November 2025. P’s delay of 75 days in taking out the leave application on 26 January 2026 was substantial.

15.As to his explanation for the delay, P is unable to provide any valid explanation for the substantial delay. P alleged that he was away from Hong Kong from 2 September 2025 to 23 November 2025. However, it is P’s duty as a litigant to prosecute the appeal with due dispatch. In any event, upon his return on 23 November 2025, P still failed to take out the Summons expeditiously. P only mentioned that he had written to the Commissioner of Police and the Chief Executive upon his return to Hong Kong, but there is no satisfactory explanation as to why he only took out the Summons on 26 January 2026.

16.In the premises, I find P’s explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and inexcusable. He must therefore show “real prospect of success” (a strongly arguable case) on the merits of his proposed appeal before the Court will exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time.

D2.  The purported grounds of appeal

17.First, in P’s Affirmations and submissions, he simply rehashed the arguments which he had deployed before. In paragraphs 12 to 15 of the Decision, the Court has already dealt with those arguments and rejected the same.

18.As explained above, it is pointless for an applicant to merely restate arguments that were already presented in the lower court without providing grounds to explain how the judge has allegedly erred.

19.Secondly, as to the complaint that the Court proceeded with hearing P’s appeal against Master Yu’s Decision in his absence on 9 October 2025, as explained in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the Decision, P wrote to the Court on 1 September 2025 and stated that he would not be able to attend the hearing but urged the Court to continue hearing the appeal in his absence.

20.Having considered the nature of the application, the Court found it appropriate and expedient to proceed with the hearing in P’s absence pursuant to Order 32 rule 5 of RDC. P has failed to explain how such decision was wrong.

21.Thirdly, as to the costs order in the Decision, it adheres to the principle of costs follows the event. P’s impecuniosity is not a reason for overturning the costs order.

22.In the premises, P has failed to show any real prospect of success on the merits of his proposed appeal that warrants the Court’s exercise of its discretion to grant an extension of time.

23.Finally, there is no other reason in the interests of justice that the intended appeal should be heard.

E.  Conclusion

24.For all the reasons above, P’s applications for leave to appeal out of time and leave to appeal are dismissed.

25.I make a costs order nisi that P do pay D2’s costs of the Summons, such costs to be summarily assessed on papers. Should any party seek to vary the costs order nisi, such party should take out an application within 14 days from the date of this decision.

26.D2 has submitted its Statement of Costs dated 10 April 2026. Should there be no application to vary the above costs order nisi, I order that P do file and serve his list of objections to D2’s Statement of Costs (if any) within 14 days from the date of this decision. The Court will then summarily assess D2’s costs on paper.

The Plaintiff acting in person

Mr Mike Yau of Department of Justice, for the 2^nd Defendant