乐推(上海)文化传播有限公司 v. 深圳市麦凯莱科技有限公司 and Another

HCRE 54/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3204

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS NO 54 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.Upon the Plaintiff’s ex parte application, on 30 July 2025, Master Hui ordered that the judgment of Shanghai Second Intermediate People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China (上海市第二中级人民法院) (the “Intermediate Court”) under (2024) 沪 02 民终 6131号 dated 9 July 2024 (the “Intermediate Judgment”) be registered pursuant to the provisions under the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Cap 597 (the “MJREO”).

2.This is the 2^nd Defendant’s application by summons dated 1 December 2025 seeking to set aside the registration of the said Intermediate Judgment.

B.  Material Background

3.The Plaintiff is a Mainland company that carries on a business of providing marketing and advertising services.

4.The 1^st Defendant is a Mainland Company that carries on a business of manufacturing and selling electronic gadgets, cosmetic products, and household goods.

5.The 2^nd Defendant is a director and shareholder of the 1^st Defendant. She is also a Hong Kong citizen.

6.On 1 August 2021, the Plaintiff and the 1^st Defendant entered into an agreement, whereby the 1^st Defendant engaged the Plaintiff to provide marketing services (the “Promotion Agreement”).

7.By a subsequent agreement dated 31 December 2021 (the “Extension Agreement”), the Promotion Agreement was extended for 1 year until 31 December 2022.

8.It is not in dispute that the 1^st Defendant was unable to pay service fees to the Plaintiff pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Promotion Agreement and the Extension Agreement.

9.In the circumstances, on 24 October 2022, the Plaintiff and the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants entered into a repayment agreement 《还款计划协议》(the “Repayment Agreement”), which contains the following material terms:

(1)  The parties acknowledged that as of 23 October 2022, the 1^st Defendant owed the Plaintiff outstanding service fees in the amount of RMB24,415,400.71 (clause 2).

(2)  The 2^nd Defendant agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the outstanding service fees due to the Plaintiff and the accruing default interest (clause 5).

10.On 5 December 2022, the Plaintiff and the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants entered into a supplemental repayment agreement《还款计划协议之补充协议》(the “Supplemental Repayment Agreement”), which contains the following material terms:-

(1)  The parties acknowledged that the outstanding indebtedness owed by the 1^st Defendant to the Plaintiff was in the amount of RMB13,195,793.06, and the said indebtedness should be repaid by instalments (clause 2).

(2)  The 2^nd Defendant agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the outstanding service fees due to the Plaintiff and the accruing default interest (clause 5).

11.It transpired that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants did not pay the outstanding indebtedness in accordance with the timetable under the Supplemental Repayment Agreement.

12.In the circumstances, on 19 January 2023, the Plaintiff commenced legal proceedings against, inter alia, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants in the Shanghai Jiading District People’s Court (上海市嘉定区人民法院) (the “First Instance Court”)

13.On 23 November 2023, the First Instance Court handed down the judgment under (2023) 沪 0114 民初 3299 号 (the “First Instance Judgment”). Insofar as the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are concerned[1], it was adjudged and ordered that: -

(1)  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants shall, within 10 days from the effective date of the First Instance Judgment, pay the Plaintiff a sum of RMB12,688,822.63.

(2)  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants shall, within 10 days from the effective date of the First Instance Judgment, pay the Plaintiff default interest at a daily rate of 0.02% on the following sums:

(a)  RMB359,619.70 from 25 August 2022 until the date of full payment;

(b)  RMB12,281,353.86 from 25 September 2022 until the date of full payment;

(c)  RMB28,346.87 from 25 October 2022 until the date of full payment; and

(d)  RMB19,502.20 from 25 November 2022 until the date of full payment.

(3)  The 1^st Defendant shall, within 10 days from the effective date of the First Instance Judgment, pay the Plaintiff a sum of RMB1,447,330.83;

(4)  The 1^st Defendant shall, within 10 days from the effective date of the First Instance Judgment, pay the Plaintiff default interest on the aforesaid sum of RMB1,447,330.83 at a daily rate of 0.02%.

(5)  In the event that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants fail to perform the payment obligations under the First Instance Judgment, additional interest at double the rate on the judgment debts shall apply under Article 260 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law (the “Enhanced Interest Order”).

(6)  The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants shall, within 7 days from the date of the First Instance Judgment, jointly pay the Plaintiff’s costs in the proceedings, and the amount is RMB112,176.00.

14.On 28 December 2023, the 1^st Defendant lodged an appeal to the Intermediate Court.

15.However, the 1^st Defendant, in breach of the directions given by the Intermediate Court, failed to pay the case acceptance fee.

16.Thus, on 9 July 2024, the Intermediate Court handed down the Intermediate Judgment. It was adjudicated and ordered that: -

(1)  The appeal be treated as automatically withdrawn.

(2)  The First Instance Judgment shall stand and take effect on the date when the Intermediate Judgment was served.

(3)  The Intermediate Judgment is final and conclusive (本裁定为终审裁定).

17.On 10 July 2024, both the First Instance Court and the Intermediate Court issued a notice (ie the 裁判生效通知) confirming that the First Instance Judgment and the Intermediate Judgment took effect on 10 July 2024.

C.  The 2^nd Defendant’s Grounds for Setting Aside the Registration of the Intermediate Judgment.

18.The 2^nd Defendant[2] relied on the following grounds to set aside the registration of the Intermediate Judgment: -

(1)  First, it was contended that the Intermediate Judgment is not final and conclusive by reason of the fact that the 2^nd Defendant had lodged a retrial application to the Intermediate Court (“Ground 1”).

(2)  Second, it was alleged that the 2^nd Defendant was not served with any documents in relation to the legal proceedings in the Mainland, such that she was not in a position to defend herself (“Ground 2”).

(3)  Third, it was contended that the Intermediate Judgment does not constitute an order for payment of a sum of money (“Ground 3”).

D.  Deliberation

19.For the following reasons, none of the grounds relied on by the 2^nd Defendant has merit.

D1  Ground 1

20.Section 5(2)(c) of the MJREO provides that in order for a Mainland judgment to be registrable, the same must be “final and conclusive as between the parties to the judgment”.

21.Section 6(1) further provides that for the purpose of section 5(2)(c), a Mainland judgment is “final and conclusive between the parties” if: -

(1)   it is a judgment given by an “Intermediate People’s Court (中级人民法院)”, and the time limit for appeal in respect of the judgment has expired according to the law of the Mainland but no appeal has been filed: see section 6(1)(b); or

(2)  it is a judgment of the second instance by a “designated court” other than a “recognized Primary People’s Court (認 可基層人民法院)”: see section 6(1)(c).

22.In my view, the present scenario falls squarely within the ambit of section 6(1)(b) and section 6(1)(c) of the MJREO.

23.Insofar as section 6(1)(b) of the MJREO is concerned: -

(1)  There is no question that the Intermediate Court (ie Shanghai Second Intermediate People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China (上海市第二中级人民法院)), which gave the Intermediate Judgment, is an “Intermediate People’s Court (中级人民法院)”.

(2)  There is no evidence showing that the 2^nd Defendant had filed an appeal against the Intermediate Judgment at all.

(3)  Thus, section 6(1)(b) is engaged.

24.As regards section 6(1)(c) of the MJREO: -

(1)  The Intermediate Judgment arose from the 1^st Defendant’s appeal against the First Instance Judgment. As such, the Intermediate Judgment must be a judgment of the second instance.

(2)  The Intermediate Court, which gave the Intermediate Judgment, is a “designated court” within the meaning of MJREO. Under Schedule 1 of the MJREO, the meaning of “designated court” includes “Intermediate People’s Courts (中级人民法院)”. As mentioned, there is no question that the Intermediate Court (ie Shanghai Second Intermediate People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China (上海市第二中级人民法院)) is an “Intermediate People’s Court (中级人民法院)”. Meanwhile, it is not a “recognized Primary People’s Court (認可基層人民法院)”.

(3)  Thus, section 6(1)(c) is engaged.

25.In the premises, I conclude that by reason of sections 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(c), the Intermediate Judgment is “final and conclusive as between the parties” within the meaning of section 5(2)(c) of the MJREO.

26.However, the 2^nd Defendant emphasized that she had lodged an application for retrial. I cannot see how this allegation may disengage sections 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(c) of the MJREO. None of the provisions under sections 5 and 6 of the MJREO provides that a judgment given by the Intermediate People’s Court or a judgment of second instance given by a designated court[3] shall not be treated as “final and conclusive as between the parties” so long as the judgment debtor has made an application for retrial.

27.In any event, I do not accept the 2^nd Defendant’s allegation that she had lodged an application to the Intermediate Court for retrial: -

(1)  As pointed out by the Mainland lawyer engaged by the Plaintiff, under Article 214 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law, after the second instance court received documents in relation to an application for retrial, it would send copies of the same to the successful party within 5 days, and the successful party would have to make submissions in response within 15 days.

(2)  The Plaintiff’s representative confirmed on oath that it had not received any notification from any court in the Mainland in regard to the alleged retrial application lodged by the 2^nd Defendant.

(3)   Meanwhile, the 2^nd Defendant has not adduced a shred of documentary evidence to show that her application document (ie a “再審申請書” dated 15 October 2025) was actually lodged with the Intermediate People’s Court. The 2^nd Defendant has also failed to provide any information in relation to the progress of her alleged retrial application. There is not a shred of evidence in respect thereof.

28.On the available evidence, it is more likely than not that the 2^nd Defendant did not lodge the alleged retrial application to the Intermediate Court at all.

29.For all the above reasons, I reject Ground 1.

D2  Ground 2

30.Section 18(1)(f) of the MJREO provides that: -

“On an application in that behalf made by any party against whom a registered judgment shall be set aside if the Court of First Instance is satisfied that:- …(f) the judgment debtor who did not appear in the original court to defend the proceedings-

(i) was not summoned to appear according to the law of the Mainland; or

(ii) was so summoned but was not given sufficient time to defend the proceedings according to the law of the Mainland;”

31.Section 18(2) provides that: -

“Subsection (1)(f) does not apply where the judgment debtor was summoned to the original court by service by public announcement according to the law of the Mainland.”

32.As pointed out by the Mainland lawyer engaged by the Plaintiff, under Article 95 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law, where a litigant cannot be located, it is permissible to effect service on him/her by public announcement. The evidence of the Plaintiff’s Mainland lawyer has not been contradicted.

33.On 9 July 2023, the First Instance Court issued a public announcement. There, it was stated, inter alios, that: -

(1)  The whereabouts of the 2^nd Defendant are unknown.

(2)  Thus, in accordance with Articles 95 and 274 of the PRC Civil Procedure law, a copy of the complaint, notice to appear, notice to produce evidence and summons to appear in court are served on the 2^nd Defendant by public announcement.

(3)  Service shall be deemed to have been effected on the 2^nd Defendant 3 months after the date of the announcement.

34.As stated in the First Instance Judgment, the First Instance Court charged the Plaintiff a public announcement fee of RMB560.

35.More importantly, in the First Instance Judgment, it was expressly stated that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, inter alia, were “lawfully summoned” to appear before the First Instance Court, but they did not appear. As such, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants were deemed to have abandoned their rights to contest the proceedings. The relevant parts of the First Instance Judgment read as follows:

“被告麦凯莱公司…戴丽香经本院合法传唤未到庭参加诉讼，本院依法缺席审理。本案现已审理终结。”

“被告麦凯莱公司…戴丽香经本院合法召唤未到庭参加诉讼，系其自愿放弃答辩、质证等诉讼权利，相关法律后果由其自负。”

36.The contents of the First Instance Judgment are not only reliable evidence of the law in the Mainland, but also reliable evidence showing the relevant events that took place in the legal proceedings before the Mainland court: see 苏州高新文旅集团有限公司 v 電競國際集團有限公司 [2025] HKCFI 1015 at para 47.

37.Based on the contents of the First Instance Judgment as well as the court documents issued by the First Instance Court, I find that the 2^nd Defendant was indeed summoned to the First Instance Court by service by public announcement according to the law of the Mainland within the meaning of section 18(2) of the MJREO. Thus, there is no room to apply section 18(1)(f).

38.Accordingly, Ground 2 must fail.

D3  Ground 3

39.There is no room for the 2^nd Defendant to contend that the Intermediate Judgment is not a judgment for a sum of money.

40.In Huzhou Shenghua Financial Services Co Ltd v Hang Pin Living Technology Co Ltd [2025] 3 HKLRD 447, G Lam JA held that: -  

(1)  At common law, a foreign judgment is enforceable if it is “for a debt or definite sum of money”: see para 32 (citing rule 46(1)(a) of Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws (16^th Ed).

(2)  “[I]t is not necessary that the exact amount is directly specified in the foreign judgment; it is sufficient if the sum is ascertainable by a mere arithmetical calculation”: see para 37 (citing Beatty v Beatty [1924] 1 KB 807).

41.In the present case: -

(1)  The sums that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants were ordered to pay the Plaintiff under the First Instance Judgment are readily ascertainable by arithmetical calculation.

(2)  The First Instance Judgment was affirmed by the Intermediate Court under the Intermediate Judgment.

42.In the premises, it cannot be said that the Intermediate Judgment is not concerned with an order in respect of “payment of a sum of money” with meaning of section 5(2)(e) of the MJREO.

43.For completeness, it should also be mentioned that in Huzhou Shenghua Financial Services Co Ltd (supra) at para 77, G Lam JA also held that:-

“Where [the second instance judgment] simply dismisses the appeal and affirms the first instance judgment containing an order for the payment of a sum of money, it may be treated for the purposes of the MJREO as a judgment re-making that order, so that the second instance judgment also satisfies the sum of money requirement.”

44.Accordingly, it is not open to the 2^nd Defendant to contend that the Intermediate Judgment does not satisfy the “sum of money requirement’ under section 5(2)(e) of the MJREO or that the Plaintiff should have registered the First Instance Judgment instead of the Intermediate Judgment.

45.For all the above reasons, Ground 3 has no substance and must fail.

E.  Disposition

46.None of the Grounds relied on by the 2^nd Defendant is made out.

47.However, Ms Kelly Shum (for the Plaintiff) fairly informed the Court that in light of DHCJ Jonathan Wong’s decision in 兴业银行股份有限公司宁波分行 v 宁波百丰选矿有限公司 & Ors [2026] HKCFI 2455 at paras 42 to 46, the Enhanced Interest Order under the First Instance Judgment (which was affirmed by the Intermediate Judgment) cannot stand as it constitutes a penalty.

48.This is a very fair concession.

49.In the premises, I will only set aside paragraph (c) of Master Hui’s order dated 30 July 2025, which reflects the Enhanced Interest Order. Save as aforesaid, Master Hui’s order dated 30 July 2025 shall stand and remain valid and enforceable.

50.The Plaintiff is obviously the successful party, and there is no reason why costs should not follow the event.

51.I order the 2^nd defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s costs in respect of her summons dated 1 December 2025, summarily assessed at HK$270,000.

52.I express my gratitude to Ms Kelly Shum for her helpful assistance.

Ms Kelly Shum, instructed by M/s King & Wood, for the Plaintiff

The 1^st and 2^nd Defendants were not represented and did not appear